The 9/11 Detainees Want Hartmann Disqualified, Too
In thoroughly unsurprising news, the defense attorneys for the five 9/11 High Value Detainees (including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh) have moved to either have the charges against their clients dismissed or, at least, have General Hartmann disqualified as Legal Advisor to the Show Trials. Here’s Carol Rosenberg on that story–as well as the news that Judge Allred will delay the start of Salim Hamdan’s trial until after SCOTUS rules in Boumedienne.
This motion obviously piggy-backs on Judge Allred’s decision from last week to have Hartmann disqualified in the Hamdan trial. The 9/11 defendants largely replicate the Hamdan complaint in their own motion–with one significant addition. They also argue that Hartmann illegally tried to coerce defense counsel, in addition to Colonel Morris Davis, the Chief Prosecutor. As they describe:
On January 25, 2008, a member of the Convening Authority’s staff, Colonel Wendy Kelly, inadvertently emailed a draft copy of the charges against Khaleed Sheikh Mohammed and five other detainees to Mr. Michael Berrigan, the Deputy Chief Defense Counsel. The draft charges were being circulated within the Office of the Convening Authority. Mr. Berrigan immediately notified Colonel Kelly of the disclosure and ascertained it was inadvertent, but after seeking counsel from his state bar, refused to return the draft charges.
On February 1, 2008, the Legal Advisor to the Convening Authority wrote a memorandum to the Chief Defense Counsel, Colonel Steven David. General Hartmann stated that he had contacted the professional responsibility offices for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and they had opined that Mr. Berrigan must return the draft charges in this case; charges which approximately two weeks later General Hartmann claimed to have just received.
[snip]
The fact that the Legal Advisor, rather than the Chief Prosecutor, sent the Memorandum to the Chief Defense Counsel illustrates the point that the Legal Advisor failed to retain the required independence from the prosecution function and maintain his ability to provide independent, neutral, and impartial advice to the Convening Authority.
The [Military Commissions Act] prohibits attempting to coerce or unlawfully influence the professional judgment of trial or defense counsel. While the Secretary of Defense has attempted to circumvent the statutory prohibition against unlawful influence of trial counsel by regulation, he has not done so for defense counsel. When unlawful influence is directed against a defense counsel, it "affects adversely on accused’s right to effective assistance of counsel." [citations removed]
Now, Hartmann would argue (as he did in his memo to Colonel David) that Berrigan,
…serves in a supervisory attorney capacity and does not represent clients. To my knowledge he does not have an attorney-client relationship with any of the individuals represented in the privileged materials. Therefore, returning the privileged materials presents no conflict with any duty to protect a client.
I’ll let the lawyers present assess that argument (I would note, though, that when Hartmann made that argument, none of the six detainees in question had attorneys). Obviously, though, since Berrigan did keep the email proving that Hartmann and the Convening Authority generally were included in drafts of the charges, it utterly undercuts Hartmann’s claim to independence when–in his press conference announcing the charges–he suggested he had yet to evaluate the charges.
I will evaluate the charges and all of the supporting evidence, along with the chief prosecutor’s recommendation, and I will forward them with my independent recommendation to Mrs. Susan Crawford, the convening authority for the Military Commissions.
Like I said, this was a thoroughly unsurprising move–when Allred disqualified Hartmann in Hamdan, whose charges Hartmann had little influence over, it particularly threatened those charges that Hartmann was closely involved in.
It makes you wonder how long Hartmann will still be involved in the Show Trials.
It also makes me wonder if Hartmann will be disbarred. But, I’m sure Boalt Hall will be happy to salvage his career.
Endless regression
I assume that Colonel Kelly
is already looking for another career.
Actually, it looks like she still has a job.
I wondered about that too. There have been a few other cases of inadvertent (but useful!) copying lately — I mean, what do I know, but it makes me wonder.
A year ago, eg, in response to an AI (access to information) request in the case of Abdullah Khadr, older brother of Omar Khadr (Guantanamo child soldier and test case), our intel people inadvertently passed on a CIA (we think) memo about their payment of a $500,000 bounty to agents in Pakistan (the ISI, I presume) for apprehending and interrogating A. Khadr there for a year. (He’s back in Canada now, detained and fighting extradition.) Just this week a judge ordered the memo released, whence that Globe and Mail article.
And there have been so many other inadvertents. I suppose that people do make mistakes, and there are always coincidences, but still.
OT- Col. Pat Lang has a post just up on Bush & the Saudis. An interesting take on GWB’s most recent foray into the ME:
http://turcopolier.typepad.com…..bus-1.html
Why would counsel for the Convening Authority be getting drafts in the first place?Based on the descriptions of the job I have seen, it looks like that the prosecutor would forward the indictment and the supporting evidence to the Convening Authority, whose job it would be to evaluate the complaint against the evidence and say yea or nay.
This wasn’t about drafts, it was about the finished product of the prosecution, subject to change if the Convening Authority said to change it. Maybe this “draft” contained the changes the CA wanted?
Hey, my first wild-arsed guess!
Yeah, I think that’s the implication. Though by his claimed role, Hartmann was supposed to review the charges (after they were drawn, not before) and advise Crawford whether to accept them or not.
The email is included at the link, but not what was attached to it. Qahtani is still there–I was wondering if there was a time earlier in the process when people advocated not charging Qahtani with this bunch, but they had decided at least to charge him.
Reserve Air Force Officer Hartmann was brought in not because the combined services JAG officers were too few, or unschooled, or busy with other matters. He was brought in because they were unwilling blithely to ignore the law and traditions of their services in fealty to a single political party. They quietly and professionally rebelled from those demands, within the best traditions of their services, a step not taken lightly or without knowledge of its potential consequences.
JAG officers take seriously their services’ obligation to obey the commands of civilian government, regardless of which party from time to time has control over it. But without the law, including the UCMJ, they’re just mercenaries for hire at a tuppence wage compared to their former peers at Blackwater. They take their obligations seriously because they represent people who face death and injury traveling to work every day, who must be able coldly but reservedly to send men and women to their deaths on short notice because their country’s interests demand it.
Corporate lawyer Mr. Hartmann marches to a different drumbeat, that of money, power and the conflation of business and government that generates it. In that world, law lowers profits, except when it can be used to attack an enemy. How fitting that this refreshing resistance to partisan political gamesmanship places Mr. Hartmann at odds with professional service personnel.
I think that we’re going to lose every one of these cases, even the ones where we should be able to prove guilt. I don’t see how the court can accept evidence obtained under torture and I don’t see how the other evidence can’t be irrevocably tainted. Bush will hold them regardless, but what’s Obama to do? He’ll be roasted alive if he releases any of the truly guilty.
Boxturtle (President Obama, the Executive Desk is buried under that Reeking Pile President left for you)
I haven’t the information to know who Mr. Berrigan’s clients might have been, nor do I know the specific rules governing the return of prosecution evidence, communications or draft charges. bmaz or lhp or someone else should chime in here.
But Berrigan certainly had obligations to defendants whose information he was given. He didn’t pick up that information off the street or from prosecution counsel in the bar. He acquired it in service to the defense. He would have been obligated, ie, not to disclose that information and to use it and his best abilities to argue in their favor.
That he immediately advised the prosecution he had acquired this information and promptly sought advice from his governing bar about his obligation to return it, if any, speaks volumes. Even if ultimately proven wrong, he did the right thing at the right time. Something one could rarely say about any lawyer working for George Bush. Bush, of course, immediately sought advice from his DOJ lawyers about whether his verschaerfte Vernehmungen were legal. Except in his case, he told them what to say. A different use of the law entirely.
In the military legal world, there isn’t the professional and social separation that’s typical of prosecutors and defense counsel in the civilian world. It’s a bit more like English barristers in that a JAG could be prosecuting one case and later defending another. They also report to a common chain of command.
That said, there are rules that define their responsibilities when fulfilling each role. As quoted in EW’s piece, one of them prohibits those senior in the chain of command from exercising undue influence over prosecution or defense counsel’s work. In effect, it prohibits putting a thumb on the scale of justice.
Hartmann was brought in because he’s outside the normal chain of command and not beholden to it or its traditions for his career, money or future. In practice, he worked for its political heads, part of Cheney’s shadow government. Even who Hartmann technically worked for and when is fuzzy, something not often seen in an organization with bright line command structures.
As counsel for the Convening Authority, Hartmann should have operated like a judge’s chief clerk, focusing on the administration, processes and functioning of the CA, including its interaction with both prosecution and defense.
Instead, Hartmann acted like a typical Bush lobbyist brought in to run an agency whose regulations threatened the profits of his corporate clients. Via his work for the CA, which gave him authorized access to certain aspects of both the prosecution’s and defense’s work, he attempted to control one and stifle the other. He came late in the game and got caught. Had he joined a few years earlier, had Bush not dilly-dallied as usual, we’d have never heard of Hartmann, only the “convictions” of the “worst of the worst”.
The letter of appointment of Hartmann, dated October 3, 2007, recites that he is to supervise the Chief Prosecutor. It then says:
The letter of appointment of Morris Davis, Chief Prosecutor was signed the next day. It says:
These remarkable instructions were given by Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense. No wonder Davis resigned.
(The documents are at the link in the main post.)
Thanks for that. That chain of command imposes on the CA, not just its counsel, an impossible conflict between objectively finding facts and determining law, and zealously advocating exclusively the prosecution’s case. It was one of the ways Rumsfeld’s team tried to control the verdicts. Interesting that England and Haynes felt unable to impose on defense counsel that same chain of command.
It speaks volumes about how much political control the administration sought over a process that ought to have been about determining criminal liability involving novel, complex and difficult facts. It reveals that they intend the process to avoid planting political and legal liability for serial heinous acts at the feet of the Bush administration.
The state secrets side of the showTrials is going to have a new crimp from the inadvertency factor behind the email; maybe defense needs to examine the still sealed relevancy of the evidentiary issue of accidentality from alHaramain, the wiretap without warrant case.
I dunno, maybe I am missing something here, but why is the LA clamoring sou loudly to get the “charges returned”? Seems kind of hard to unring that bell now. Maybe the defense attorneys ought to just draft up a couple of cute little motions, maybe some type of civil suit too, and attach the damn thing to all of them as an exhibit; kind of constructively interplead the thing a few different ways so that it is of record and then say “By the way, you want this thing back? Here it is; thanks dude”!
You note:
In the military legal world, there isn’t the professional and social separation that’s typical of prosecutors and defense counsel in the civilian world. It’s a bit more like English barristers in that a JAG could be prosecuting one case and later defending another. They also report to a common chain of command.
Not exactly so. One has to look closely at the ”rating chain”, i.e., who writes the individual lawyer’s evaluation reports. In the ordinary case, the prosecution lawyers work for the Staff Judge Advocate, the CG’s chief legal advisor. Their evaluations go in a chain to the SJA. OTOH, defense counsel work for what used to be called the ”Trial Defense Service”, which has a separate rating chain and chain of command running back to the head of TRial Defense Service back at Main JAG in DC. Defense counsel, ordinarily, are therefore not subject to any pressure – real or imagined – from the local commander or the SJA. Unlike the prosecutors, who work for the local commander through the SJA. Judges, too, are an entirely different chain, also separate from any command or rating by the local commander or the SJA.
While individual lawyers (particularly when they are junior) will often spend part of a tour prosecuting and part defending, at any particular time all their work is either prosecuting or defending.
I’d suggest its a little more like a small-town bar association, where everyone knows everyone and they all fight with each other in a relatively-collegial manner, changing sides as the needs/objectives of their clients dictate.
The point of all of which is creating an environment and structure where this takes place:
That said, there are rules that define their responsibilities when fulfilling each role. As quoted in EW’s piece, one of them prohibits those senior in the chain of command from exercising undue influence over prosecution or defense counsel’s work. In effect, it prohibits putting a thumb on the scale of justice.
You get it a little wrong when you say:
Hartmann was brought in because he’s outside the normal chain of command and not beholden to it or its traditions for his career, money or future.
It’s not the chain of command he was outside of. Rather, it was the trial side of the JAG community as a whole that he was outside of. And, he was brought in for precisely that purpose – so he could be Dick’s minion carrying the Torture Corps plan into effect. This, of course, was correct, too.
In practice, he worked for its political heads, part of Cheney’s shadow government. Even who Hartmann technically worked for and when is fuzzy, something not often seen in an organization with bright line command structures.
The fuzziness of the organizational chart is a hallmark of a Cheney operation – both in this dimension and not in it, at the same time. Just like his Fourth Branch concept, and giving orders which must be obeyed, in the absence of any authority to do so.