They’re Still Paying for Intell Pork
Steven Aftergood has an important post describing the squabble between the intelligence appropriations subcommittees and the intelligence committees. He explains how, even though the intelligence committees are trying to exercise more oversight over intelligence activities, the appropriators (which have increasingly become the defense subcommittee appropriators, as more intelligence activities have moved under DOD) have undercut those efforts.
The efficacy of intelligence oversight in the Senate has beendrastically undermined by procedural hurdles that enable the DefenseAppropriations Subcommittee to overrule actions taken by the SenateIntelligence Committee, Senators complained earlier this month. Toremedy this concern, a new bill has been introduced that would transfer budget appropriations authority to the Intelligence Committee.
This year, the Senate Intelligence Committee presented "four major oversight initiatives in its [authorization] bill," said Sen. Christopher S. Bond (R-MO)(pdf) at a Committee hearing on November 13. But in each case, "actionsby the appropriations committee were completely dissimilar."
AMemorandum of Agreement between the Committees that was supposed toimprove coordination between the authorizers and the appropriators hasfailed in every significant respect, he said.
Aftergood links to a Kit Bond statement, complaining about the problem. Bond explains how much more oversight SSCI has over programs than the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee (SAC-D).
We have almost 50 professional staff on this Committee who spend all their time doing nothing but intelligence oversight, day in and day out. The Defense Appropriations Committee has fewer than one half dozen staff who write the intelligence appropriation which is fewer than 1/10th of their bill.
[snip]
Our Committee has held scores of intelligence oversight hearings this year; the Defense Appropriations Committee has held notably few. I think the disparity is clear and speaks for itself. What I’m saying is, let’s effectively bring the oversight power to bear on the budget; right now it is disjointed.
[snip]
But that is my point, that Committee is consumed with defense matters, not intelligence matters. That Committee is wrapped up in a nearly half a trillion dollars appropriations bill, with less than one tenth of it comprising the National Intelligence Program that the SSCI oversees. SAC-D as currently constructed cannot give intelligence the attention it deserves with all its other responsibilities.
And then Bond complains of the unauthorized programs that remain in the 08 budget.
For example, this Committee is currently conferencing our FY08Intelligence Authorization Act with the House, and we’re looking at anumber of issues where our bill is disjointed from the FY08 DefenseAppropriations Act. As recently as a few hours ago, my staff wasreceiving calls from intelligence officials worried about a number ofpotential “A not A†(appropriated but not authorized) issues. That’snot a showstopper in most fields, but when it comes to nationalsecurity and intelligence, it usually does not make a whole lot ofsense.
That’s the kind of thing, of course, that got Duke Cunningham in trouble.
Curiously, Bond describes a Memorandum of Agreement reached between the two committees–but without his involvement, as ranking member of the SSCI.
Mr. Chairman, we discussed this issue at the beginning of this Congress, and you believed the best road ahead was to sign a Memorandum of Agreement with the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Appropriations Committees promising better coordination. I expressed to you my disagreement with that option because I believed the MOA was weak and would not affect real change.
Despite stating that we would only move forward together on this issue, you went ahead and drafted and signed an MOA over a recess when I was overseas on a trip. Upon return, Senate counsel informed me that the MOA was invalid as drafted for several reasons that you probably would not like me to lay out here, and I have always considered it a dead document.
Now that’s a story I’d like to know more about. It sounds like Daniel Inouye (SAC-D Chair), Ted Stevens (SAC-D Ranking Member and one of the most corrupt Members of Congress), and Jello Jay Rockefeller (Chair, SSCI, whom Bond is addressing here) got together to try to fix this problem precisely when Bond couldn’t be there. Why am I not surprised that Jello Jay negotiated a MOA that is useless, at best? (Suck it up, Kit, we know what it’s like to be inconvenienced by someone rolling Jello Jay, too.)
Now, I rarely find myself aligning with Kit Bond. And, as Aftergood notes, there are problems with giving particularly the Senate Intelligence Committee unfettered oversight over anything, at least so long as Jello Jay is in charge.
But significantly, the intelligence oversight committees, which havebeen criticized for ineffective leadership on several controversialpolicy fronts, did not play a leading role in intelligence budgetdisclosure either.
But the continued use of intelligence earmarks to authorize unnecessary intelligence programs is a real source of graft in this country, with the added concern that some of these earmarks may be going towards surveillance of American citizens, as it was with CIFA. So while I can’t say I’m comfortable that Kit Bond is championing this issue (Dear Santa–about that new SSCI Chair I asked for for Christmas? I’ve been good … can I open my presents early?), it is an issue that needs to be resolved.
EW, do you think Bond is genuinely trying to exert some fiscal restraint, or do you think he wants the authority to earmark his own pet projects for his own campaign contributors? Not sure I’m prepared to wrap my brain around the image of Kit Bond, Good Governance SuperHero quite yet
phred
I think he really wants to exercise oversight. So part of it is doubtless a power issue–that the SAC-D gets to choose the earmarks, not the SSCI. But I do believe that he’s trying to get to the problem of Duke Cunningham, money appropriated for projects with no real need.
Thanks EW, lets hope he succeeds…
Earmarks. The original issue of earmarks came into being because of the Intelligence Committee and the planning and funding of the Afghanistan war. USAID(CIA) money going to pals of the intelligence committee and professional associations. PC.
The earmarks for the Intellignce Committee were negotiated to gifts. Shays was re-elected and the earmark issue went everywhere but intelligence. The Intelligence Committee decided money and earmarks should be monitored by the Intelligence (Sub) Committee.
CIA hires families. It breaks all the laws corporations follow. Last we checked, the phone company checks to see if they are hiring family members. The NSA scandal and the other things Plame complained about were handled by moving CIA(analysts( to DoD – NSA and DIA(not operations because DIA, supposedly, isn’t allowed the same US operations as CIA (Plame domestic survellaince and NSA assets; CIA always had a domestic mandate like NSA and, arguably DIA). Plame’s dad was NSA, Air force. Joe’s dad was a diplomat(CIA?), Spain.
The directors of CIA all have Air Force backgrounds. The speical ops and intelligence relationship between the military and the CIA was traditionally here. When Congress tried to close CIA, democrats, who create and run all federal employment, decided CIA should move to DoD. A legacy of jobs for families that was sent to ’retire’ with DoD like most Congressional agencies.
DoD is supposed to monitor the Intelligence Committee earmark appropriations to CIA(USAID)? It’s a legacy from the Intelligence Committee who doesn’t want earmarks or a monitor. DoD’s job is not to monitor the Intelligence Committee, who decided they should monitor themselves. The original concept for the planning and funding of the Afghanistan war should be taken into account. It’s not USAID’s job to monitor covert CIA funding to US NGOs who are friends with the Intelligence Committee.
The Intelligence Committee doesn’t need memorandums of understanding with themselves, they need a monitor assigned to audit all those appropriations and DoD is not the monitor; they already ’inherited’ the Intelligenc Committee’s and Congress’ CIA.
Congress is going to have to assign an outside government monitor, not another agency from Congress or DoD. Theoutside monitor is going to assign earmarks and monitor the ethics of the covert funding. Thefirst step is going to have to be a study of the planning and funding of the Afghanistan war and, until this is dealt with, Congress, the Intelligence committee, will continue to monitor itself.
This chicanery is distressing. It would be bad enough if we were talking about sneak appropriations for activities that are open to public scrutiny, but when the members of intelligence committees and subcommittees start to act slick, they deprive Congress and the people of the only control we have over â€intelligenceâ€, which includes the most dangerous, damaging, and crazy actions this asshole government takes in our name. When â€intelligence†gets act, it does so on incomplete information and analysis–lack of comprehension of the current situation, inability to predict the future (consequences).
It’s the institutionalization of a system that enables rogues to do harm and protects them from control or consequences. It stinks, and we pay for it, in every sense of the word.
Upon return, Senate counsel informed me that the MOA was invalid as drafted for several reasons that you probably would not like me to lay out here…
Why does OLC get all the â€effective†legel counsel while the Senate has none.
Kit Bond is not a Bush Republican. Let’s see if he can make headway on funding intelligence with less waste and no graft.
Dear Santa–about that new SSCI Chair I asked for for Christmas?
You have been good. You deserve the whole set. Let it so that the time for thanks has passed and the time for giving is upon us.
LOL
A very good question on both points, Neil. You think maybe Bridge to Nowhere Stevens didn’t want this MOA to work? And Jello Jay couldn’t do the bare minimum to stop him from spiking it?
Thanks EW. If snark and cynicism lead to asking a good question, I’ll take full credit; otherwise credit is due to those who research and unveil the methods of operation and political motivations of governemnt officials… â€some people†have a real knack for it.
So, EW, what exactly is it that I should be asking my Senator, Daniel Inouye, to do, or to not do? Maybe I’m just being dense today, but I don’t see the action piece here.
Bob in HI
Bob
I’d first ask why his subcommittee keeps allocating money for things that the Intell Committees don’t think are needed.
Then I’d ask him how he’s going to fix that in the future, and stop wasting your money.
Thanks. I get the picture now. Inouye and Stevens have been close for a long time because of the Alaska & Hawaii statehood thing. Inouye better watch out that Stevens doesn’t become a tar baby.
Bob in HI