Way at the back of the DOJ IG Report on January 6 showing that there were roughly 26 informants present at the attack, only three of whom had been tasked with telling their handlers what was going down, is the FBI response.

Here’s the signature block.

These are normally signed. For example, the report on subpoenas to Congress and journalists was signed by Brad Weinsheimer, the top career official at DOJ.

But on the day Chris Wray announced his upcoming departure, no one at FBI wanted to take responsibility for their response.

The response disputes a key finding of the Report: DOJ IG concludes (after a close review of emails that went out) that no one bothered to ask field offices if their informants knew anything about the event.

[T]he FBI did not take a step that could have helped the FBI and its law enforcement partners with their preparations in advance of January 6. Specifically, the FBI did not canvass its field offices in advance of January 6, 2021, to identify any intelligence, including CHS reporting, about potential threats to the January 6 Electoral Certification. Several FBI officials told the OIG that it is common practice for the FBI to ask field offices to canvass their sources for information—in advance of a large event, such as the Inauguration, the Super Bowl, or other events with significant attendance and to report that information to the requesting field office, which, in this instance, would have been the WFO. FBI Deputy Director Paul Abbate, who was Associate Deputy Director at the time, described the lack of a canvass prior to January 6 as a “basic step that was missed,”

The FBI, however, says,

[T]he FBI continues to disagree with certain of the factual assertions in the Report regarding the manner of specific steps, and the scope of the canvas undertaken by the FBI in advance of January 6, 2021, a time period during which the Report recognizes as including multiple field offices providing information in response to direction from Washington Field Office and FBI Headquarters.

Among the things that an FBI informant knew but — not having been asked by his or her handler — did not report until after the riot? That the informant reported on the meeting between Stewart Rhodes and Enrique Tarrio in a parking garage.

During the course of the FBI’s January 6 investigation, the FBI learned that on the night of January 5 the CHS was in contact with Tarrio and reported on a meeting with Tarrio and Rhodes, which became a subject matter of the Tarrio prosecution

An earlier report from this informant, claiming 100 Proud Boys would make the trip and they were beginning to get cranky, did get filed in DC on January 4. But not the detail that Stewie and Enrique were in cahoots — a meeting that remains unexplained to this day, a piece of intelligence that might have led to a different approach to policing the militias or the Trump associates they had in common, people like Roger Stone and Alex Jones.

The FBI also didn’t share another informant’s tips about Rhodes’ plans to travel to DC for January 6.

On December 15, the Field Office 1 CHS reported to the Field Office 1 Handling Special Agent and the Field Office 1 RA 1 Special Agent that Rhodes intended to travel to DC for the events of January 6. This was the first time the Field Office 4 CHS provided reporting that specifically referenced January 6. According to the FD-1023 documenting this contact, the Field Office 1 CHS reported that Rhodes had been “trying to attract Oath Keepers who are current law enforcement members to travel for events on that day so they can carry concealed firearms legally.” In addition, the FD-1023 stated, “Rhodes has made recent public statements suggesting Oath Keepers and the militia can be called up on [sic] to assist the current president to stay in office and resist perceived deep state enemies.” The Field Office 1 CHS reported that the CHS “[doesn’t know of] specific plans by Rhodes or any of his associates to instigate any acts of violence,” but was “very concerned that extremist members of Oath Keepers or other groups may become involved in unplanned violent activity on January 6.

This information, including that Rhodes was planning to travel to DC for January 6, was recorded in Field Office 1 case files on December 22 but was not emailed or otherwise provided to WFO. The Field Office 1 handling agent told the OIG that the Field Office 1 RA 1 Special Agent, as the assessment’s case agent, took the lead in communicating with WFO and that she may have sat in on conference calls with WFO, but she did not initiate any contact with WFO.

[snip]

The Field Office 1 RA 1 Special Agent told the OIG that even though this source reporting was properly documented and was not “dynamic” information, “this was one where I kick myself every day” for not emailing a copy of the reporting to WFO and DTOS. The Field Office 1 RA 1 Special Agent said that given that Rhodes had been present for the MAGA I and MAGA II election protests and was so visible about his objections to the election results, and given Field Office 1’s many communications with DTOS and WFO about Rhodes, he would have expected DTOS and WFO to be made aware that Rhodes was planning to be in DC on January 6.

We determined that the last reporting from the Field Office 1 CHS before January 6 was on January 4 when the Field Office 1 CHS told the Field Office 1 handling agent that the Oath Keepers “contingent headed to DC is 200+ strong.” The FD-1023 includes the statement that the “CHS did not have anything more detailed to provide.” This reporting also was not provided to WFO or filed in any WFO case file. The Field Office 1 CHS did not travel to DC for the events of January 6.

The report is, nevertheless, unbelievably soft on the FBI, which built and sustained a phone dragnet for fourteen years after 9/11 because the FBI missed one phone call involving Osama bin Laden. Here, FBI’s informants gave it multiple warnings about plans men since convicted of sedition had on January 6. And a number of those warnings weren’t shared.

Instead of hammering the FBI for missing such leads from its informants, the report concluded that the FBI didn’t miss anything “critical” by failing to call on its extensive informant network to find out what they knew.

Although WFO and DTOS did not direct field offices to canvass their CHSs in advance of January 6, our review of documented CHS reporting in FBI field offices as of January 6 did not identify any potentially critical intelligence related to a possible attack on the Capitol on January 6 that had not been provided to law enforcement stakeholders prior to January 6. For example, the FBI had received CHS reporting about online threats to the Electoral Certification that included maps of the Congressional tunnels. WFO distributed this intelligence through the established January 6 coordination mechanisms. Moreover, we found that the USCP, the MPD, the USPP, DHS, and the Supreme Court Police all learned about similar intelligence in advance of January 6 through their own intelligence gathering mechanisms and other established coordination efforts. 95 Additionally, our review of information in the FBI’s possession as of January 6, in addition to the then-documented CHS reporting, did not identify any potentially critical intelligence that had not been provided to, or was not otherwise known to, law enforcement stakeholders prior to January 6. We also took note of the fact that the extensive previous oversight (by Congress, the GAO, and other Inspectors General) of the events of January 6, including preparation by law enforcement in advance of January 6, did not identify potentially critical intelligence that was not shared by the FBI in advance of January 6. [my emphasis]

This applies a wildly different standard for white seditionists than it did, for decades, for Muslim men.

And yet, having been treated with an incredibly lax standard, the FBI still refuses to own up to their January 6 failures.