No. First Hunter made an Alford plea. Then the prosecution said they would not accept it. Then Hunter made just a guilty plea. Thinking the WaPo link was not updated when the story was.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/09/05/hunter-biden-alford-guilty-plea-taxes/

Error Prone (“EP” herein) –

I’m so impressed you answered one of your own questions! The case of John Eastman is one you can follow to understand disbarment procedures in California. As to your other questions, I’ll try to be brief.

Two things, to start:
A- Hunter Biden apparently did not have a pre-arranged plea deal worked out with the government in this California tax case before he pled guilty today, and I have not seen a transcript of the proceedings, so we are relying on press reports at the moment, to extract what we know.
B – Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 governs plea bargains in federal court.

EP Q1) “Has Hunter an appeal left over motions deni[ed] in the tax case?”
Ans.: As far as we know, Hunter has not waived his right to appeal adverse earlier rulings nor waived his right to direct appeal his soon-to-come conviction (adjudication of guilt by the judge) based on his guilty plea.
– Hunter appealed at least 2 issues before trial: Scarsi’s denial of Hunter’s motions to dismiss based on alleged [1a] vindictive prosecution and [1b] failure to recognize his Immunity-under-prior-plea-agreement, but these appeals were rejected by the 9th Circuit in May, because his appeals were premature.* But now that he has pled, once the judge sentences him and renders final judgment, yes, Hunter can appeal these adverse 1a and 1b rulings, if Rule 11(a)(2) conditions are met.
– Rule 11(a)(2) says Hunter can reserve “in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion,” but “with the consent of the court and the government” and we are not sure what prosecutors consented to. Under this rule, a plea is considered “conditional” and defendents who prevail here may then simply withdraw their guilty plea after their successful Rule 11(a)(2) appeal.

EP Q2) “It seems … [Hunter] still can appeal the gun charges [in Delaware] where he has preserved the record.”
Ans.: Yes.

EP Q3) “It seems with a plea he’s negated any/all tax appeals…”
Ans.: Entering a plea of guilty does not automatically mean a defendant has waived his right to appeal a conviction nor waived his right to appeal any pretrial adverse ruling (see Rule 11(a)(2) discussion, supra).
– Rule 11(e) governs appeals of convictions. It states that after a plea is accepted by a court and can no longer be withdrawn, a judgment of guilt can be “set aside only by direct appeal” or collaterol attack.**
– Rule 11(b)(1)(N) governs any waiver a defendant might make of the right to appeal and the Rule’s use of the conditional “if any” makes clear that such a waiver is something that would be negotiated in advance between the government and defendant, and made clear to the defendant in court during his plea colloqui.***
– Since Rule 11(c)(1) prohibits Judge Scarsi from participating in plea negotiations, and no prior agreement was reached with prosecutors, unless their was an adjournment and side negotiations with prosecutors (which we would likely need to read the transcript to ascertain), I think it is most likely that Hunter DID NOT waive his right to appeal his upcoming ‘final’ adjudication of guilt.

It might seem counterintuitive that a person would plead guilty and then appeal a conviction that was rendered based on his guilty plea, but prosecutors have to follow rules when they indict and try a defendant. “The amount of evidence” and the nature of judge-decided admissible evidence against a defendant is something that may prompt a guilty plea in the first place. But, rulings a judge makes on motions to limit evidence (motions in limine) might actually be wrong — the judge might actually agree to allow in evidence which is impermissible. But defendant’s cannot appeal this in nearly all cases until after judgment is final.

In Hunter Biden’s case, he stated he did not want to put his family through additional embarrasment and Marcy has posted about evidence the judge was going to allow that she views as improper. Marcy has also argued persuasively that elements charged in the indictment are improper (e.g., careful jockeying around with dates to get the case in under the statute of limitations), which could mean an appeals court could potentiallly view that not all charges in this case should have been brought in the first place. Biden appears to have calculated he has lost his ability to persuade the judge that some evidence should not be brought before a jury and some charges should not have been brought in the first place, but given his lot, it’s better to accept guilt BASED ON WHAT PROSECUTORS HAVE BEEN PERMITTED to argue/charge, and take your chances with the appeals court.

______________
* Biden tried to appeal Scarsi’s rulings before his case was tried and final judgement rendered. This is called an interlocutory appeal, and is governed by caselaw in each circuit under what is known as the Collateral Order Doctrine.
** The government challenged Biden’s interlocutory appeal with a collaterol attack, arguing that the court did not (yet) have jurisdiction to hear an appeal at this stage, because the issues Biden raised were not “immediately appealable collateral order[s].” The Appeals Court agreed.
*** The plea colloqui involves a frank discussion between the judge and an under-oath defendant and is governed by Rule 11(b)(1), which spells out procedures a judge must follow in considering whether to accept a defendant’s plea of guilt. This involves, among other things, the judge informing the defendant of:
– 11(b)(1)(B) to (E) – his constitutional rights that are relevant in the trial context;
– 11(b)(1)(F) – the rights he is waiving with this plea, which are essentially and ONLY the right to a (speedy) jury trial and all the rights that go along with that (right to confront witnesses, testify on his own behalf, etc.); and
– 11(b)(1)(G) to (M) [and (O) if defendant is a non-citizen] – the charges and potential penalties the defendant may face once adjudged to be guilty.

Funny how these things work – two nights ago, when I was reading the russian influence indictment EW reported on, some of the language reminded me of George Santos. As I popped down the rabbit hole, I briefly “went right”, into EW.net’s archive, and found, yes, Vekselberg/Intrater and UAE have their ties.

But then I “went left”, and looked into Santos’s role as a “yacht broker”, specifically for his Miami donor, Mayra Ruiz.

She and her (maybe ex?) spouse John don’t have donations showing up in the FEC database this cycle, but in 2022 they made prominent donations to both Santos and Hageman, and other Trumpworld names, like Grassley and Dr. Oz. They also donated generally and locally 2022/2020/2016.

The Ruizes also share many of the same traits that set me off when it comes to Trumpworld megadonors: They apparently have a healthcare data-mining business (including medicare data), which is really a cratered SPAC (Nasdaq lifw) under investigation by the FEC for its sus’ filings, along with private equity ties, questionable real estate deals, and an outsized public image.

I don’t think I even believed in phenomena like “projection as a defense mechanism” until folks like Hageman and Santos, et al, were revealed to exist.