Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise Insinuates David Weiss Lied to Congress

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I hope that I was duly cautious in my discussions about Abbe Lowell’s request to subpoena Donald Trump, Bill Barr, Jeffrey Rosen, and Richard Donoghue.

I stated that “That political argument” Lowell was making about Trump’s hypocrisy “won’t work.”

I described that several aspects of the proposed subpoenas asked for the impossible.

These are impossible subpoenas, insofar as they ask for compliance according to an impossible timeline and ask for compliance that may not legally be available (indeed, to the extent Trump has items in his possession, for various reason they may be covered by the Mar-a-Lago protective order). To the extent subpoenas ask for things covered by various privileges, they would pose impossible challenges to overcome. To the extent the subpoenas ask for the perfect phone call in which Trump demanded Zelenskyy’s help with an investigation of Hunter Biden, they are impossible subpoenas because the White House altered that record in real time.

I similarly noted that Lowell didn’t mention, at all, the precedent that would make this request impossible.

Lowell doesn’t mention Armstrong, the precedent that usually makes it impossible for defendants to get discovery in selective prosecution challenges.

I gave all those warnings, in part, to make as clear as I could that this request likely won’t work.

But I also gave these warnings for another reason: Abbe Lowell is no dummy. He knows these precedents. He knows the significance of Armstrong. His silence about it ought to have raised questions — it certainly did for me — about what he was trying to accomplish with this motion.

But that may be instructive. Before Lowell is making a request for discovery based on a selective and/or vindictive prosecution claim, he is first asking for subpoenas, without fully laying out whether this would be a selective or vindictive or political influence prosecution claim.

I lay that out because David Weiss’ response — signed by “Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel” Leo Wise, the third title Wise has adopted over the course of his seven month involvement in this case — goes to great length (twice the length of Lowell’s 16-page motion) to cite those precedents over and over and over. 48 times, Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise invokes Armstrong.

Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise is absolutely right about all these precedents.

Where he struggles, unsurprisingly, is in characterizing Lowell’s intent. He claims to be so sure that this request is exclusively about a selective or vindictive prosecution claim that he spends 17 pages arguing that Lowell has not met a selective or vindictive prosecution standard in the subpoena request before he gets around to arguing what is before him: a request for subpoenas.

Along the way, Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise lectures Abbe Lowell, twice, that selective and vindictive prosecution claims are pretrial motions, not trial defenses.

Defendant contends that the requested material “goes to the heart of his pre-trial and trial defense that this is, possibly, a vindictive or selective prosecution that arose out of an incessant pressure campaign that began in the last administration, in violation of Mr. Biden’s constitutional rights.” ECF 58, at 14. It is worth noting from the outset that defendant misunderstands the difference between pretrial arguments to dismiss an indictment and trial defenses. It is black-letter law that claims of vindictive and selective prosecution are not trial defenses and may only be brought and litigated pretrial. They are not defenses and, therefore, are never argued to trial juries.

[snip]

As a preliminary matter, the government notes that defendant’s description of this claim as a “trial defense” is erroneous. “A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.”

In the process, Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise makes an important false representation. He claims that selective and vindictive prosecution is the “sole” reason Lowell is asking for subpoenas.

Defendant’s motion gives, as the sole justification for these subpoenas, that they are in support of his “pre-trial and trial defense that this is, possibly, a vindictive or selective prosecution.” ECF 58, at 14. [my emphasis; note, because Wise uses italics a lot, I’ve taken the painful step of using underline to emphasize throughout this post]

Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise ignores at least three other descriptions of why Lowell wants the subpoenas, all of which precede that language on page 14 that invokes a trial defense.

In this case, production of documents by each of the Subpoena Recipients prior to trial may be used either in pre-trial pleadings or in a pre-trial evidentiary hearing on Mr. Biden’s motions to dismiss the Indictment (or, potentially, another issue).

[snip]

The information Mr. Biden seeks from the Subpoena Recipients is relevant and material to a fundamental aspect of issues in his defense that will be addressed in pre-trial motions and possibly as impeachment of a trial witness, should the case get that far: whether this investigation or prosecution arose because of or in response to any Executive Branch official or other outside influences placing undue pressure on government officials to investigate, formally or informally, or prosecute Mr. Biden.

[snip]

All the information sought from the Subpoena Recipients would be admissible in pre-trial motions or an evidentiary hearing or, depending on the author and recipient, to impeach a trial witness. [my emphasis]

Impeaching a witness is the antecedent to that reference to a trial defense.

Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise appears to know that.

When Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise finally gets around to arguing about subpoenas, rather than selective and vindictive prosecution, he seems to admit that he has read those references to impeachment, because he cites the part of Nixon that distinguishes between evidentiary subpoenas (which you can get pretrial) and impeachment ones (which you can only get at trial).

Accordingly, courts have concluded that “[t]he weight of authority holds that in order to be procurable by means of a Rule 17(c) subpoena, materials must themselves be admissible evidence.” United States v. Cherry, 876 F. Supp. 547, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing cases). Indeed, in Nixon itself, the Supreme Court noted that even though, “[g]enerally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is insufficient to require its production in advance of trial,” the “other valid potential evidentiary uses for the same material” rendered it properly obtainable through Rule 17(c). 418 U.S. at 701. Applying Nixon’s standard, the Third Circuit held that potential impeachment material without an independent basis for admissibility could not be produced to the moving party before the witness testified inconsistently at trial, even if the material had some exculpatory value. See United States v. Cuthbertson (Cuthbertson II), 651 F.2d 189, 192, 195 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Cuthbertson I, 630 F.2d at 144-46).

Reading Armstrong and Nixon together compels the conclusion that Rule 17(c) may not be used to discover material for pre-trial collateral attacks. Nixon unambiguously imposed limitations on Rule 17(c) subpoenas to “evidentiary” and admissible materials for use at trial, which closes off criminal discovery on collateral, pre-trial issues. See 418 U.S. at 699; see generally Fed. R. Evid. 104, 1101(d) (providing that courts are not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence other than privilege in various non-trial stages of criminal cases). Then, in Armstrong, although it proceeded on the undecided assumption that some discovery might be available on an adequate showing, the Supreme Court nonetheless unequivocally held that the defendant’s “defense” does not encompass collateral selective-prosecution attacks on the indictment. 517 U.S. at 463 (“[I]n the context of Rule 16 ‘the defendant’s defense’ means the defendant’s response to the Government’s case in chief.”); cf. supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. Put simply, because Rule 17 is not “a means of discovery in criminal cases” (Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699), defendants may not use it to investigate whether some material that might be useful to some pre-trial motion a defendant may make exists in the files of the government or a third party. Instead, Rule 17(c) is a limited, trial-focused mechanism for procuring known, identifiable evidence. [underlines my own; bolded reference to a note that Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise thought better of, his]

Only in reading Armstrong and Nixon together — along with citing an SDNY District opinion in Donzinger that is not remotely precedential in this case — does Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise address the request before him. But in doing so, he confesses that his earlier representation — that the “sole” reason Lowell asked for these subpoenas was for pretrial motions to dismiss — was false. Maybe that’s why he decided to lecture Lowell that selective and vindictive prosecution are not trial defenses: to cover up his later admission he knows there’s something more here, impeachment of some witness Lowell doesn’t identify (but which might be related to Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise’s recent promotion).

Because Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise misrepresents what Lowell is trying to do here, much of his 32-page response resembles a quixotic effort (in the literal, literary sense) to beat down an imaginary windmill he has not yet come before. Over and over, Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise argues that Abbe Lowell, whom he has lectured about how one uses a pretial motion to dismiss, has not met the standard for selective and vindictive prosecution claims he won’t argue until next week.

In seeking discovery for a claim of selective prosecution, defendant fails to identify even one similarly situated individual who was not prosecuted for similar conduct. This omission alone precludes his request for discovery. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).

[snip]

Defendant’s motion does not even attempt to make a showing of similarly situated individuals who were not prosecuted. It discusses no comparators at all, much less articulates the basis on which a court could find that they are “similarly situated” to the defendant but for a protected characteristic. [my underline, Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise’s italics]

Of course Lowell did not discuss comparators! He’s likely to do that next week. This is not (as Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise describes it here) a request for discovery. It’s a request for subpoenas.

I suggested that one reason Lowell may have done this, file a motion for subpoenas before filing the motions to dismiss, is to invite Weiss’ team to lay out their argument. If that was part of the goal, whooboy did Lowell hit paydirt in several specific arguments Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise made.

For example, Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise’s argument against vindictive prosecution was comparatively thin. As I laid out here, if Hunter Biden makes such a claim, he would argue that David Weiss entered into a Diversion Agreement that Leo Wise, then a garden variety AUSA, told Judge Maryanne Noreika on July 26, was a “contract between the parties … in effect until it’s either breached or a determination, period,” a contract, period, which then-Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise breached (Lowell will argue) when he indicted the President’s son in retaliation for Hunter’s not guilty plea to the tax charges. Merits aside, such a claim is pretty obvious to me. But Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise complains that Hunter Biden never identifies what right — the right to plead not guilty — he is being punished for.

Defendant never squarely identifies what right he is purportedly being punished for asserting. But Goodwin makes clear he is not entitled to a presumption of vindictiveness here, and that, in the absence of one, the prosecutor remains entitled to a presumption of regularity, which can be rebutted only by clear evidence that his motivation was “solely” to punish the exercise of a legal right, rather than the usual prosecutorial interests. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 nn.11–12, 384 n.19. Defendant here offers nothing more than speculation and cannot meet the heightened standard necessary to obtain discovery on such a claim.2

2 The government notes that none of the charges in the indictment carry a mandatory minimum, and the two false-statement charges carry equal or lower statutory penalties to the information’s unlawful-possession charge. See ECF 40; compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), with § 924(a)(8).

Again, Lowell’s filing was no more the vindictive prosecution claim than it was the selective prosecution one: Abbe Lowell will presumably describe that right — pleading not guilty — next week.

It’s telling that Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise never mentions the Diversion Agreement. Nor does he consider whether a Diversion Agreement — that contract, period — situates the decision to indict Hunter anyway in a pretrial or post-resolution posture. I don’t know the answer to that but Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise better be prepared to address it after Abbe Lowell does file his motion to dismiss next week.

Yet Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise does that while he makes a premature argument that he didn’t punish Hunter Biden by adding two felony charges that turn his previous 10 year maximum exposure into 25 years. He’s only pretending he doesn’t know what’s coming, it seems.

With regards to the selective prosecution claim, in addition to the standard boilerplate arguments, Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise anticipates that Hunter Biden might argue he’s in a class of one — that his theory of selective prosecution will be different than claims based on racial discrimination. In obligingly providing Lowell his thinking on the matter, Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise revealed that the citations he will invoke if and when Lowell does make this argument next week really aren’t all that apt to this case.

Defendant has the burden to plead a theory of selective prosecution that would allow discovery, and he has not done so. The government briefly notes that other theories of selective prosecution fit his case even less. For example, in some cases, a defendant may not need to show these elements if the Executive Branch’s action was “based on an overtly discriminatory classification”; in those circumstances, the overtly discriminatory classification itself satisfies the showing of discriminatory intent. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 n.10 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), which invalidated a state law that prohibited African-Americans from serving on juries). But defendant’s motion contains no argument or evidence in support of such a claim. Instead, the arguments he advances appear to fall within the ordinary formulation of selective prosecution, which requires proof of both disparate treatment and discriminatory intent.

Alternatively, a defendant could theoretically seek to advance a selective-prosecution claim based on post-Armstrong/Wayte cases addressing what has been termed a “class-of-one equal-protection claim.” See, e.g., Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam). But after the Supreme Court decided Olech, the Court rejected the class-of-one theory in a context where the government exercises broad discretion—namely, when the government acts as an employer and makes personnel decisions. See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008). The Court observed that “some forms of state action … by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments,” and “in such cases the rule that people should be ‘treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions’ is not violated when one person is treated differently from others, because treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted.” Id. at 603. Notably, to illustrate this point, the Supreme Court used an example where only some drivers who are exceeding the speed limit are stopped. “[A]n allegation that speeding tickets are given out on the basis of race or sex would state an equal protection claim. But allowing an equal protection claim on the ground that a ticket was given to one person and not others, even if for no discernible or articulable reason, would be incompatible with the discretion inherent in the challenged action.” Id. at 604.

Courts of appeals have extended Engquist’s limitation on class-of-one theories in various contexts where the government exercises broad discretion. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. Hebert, 828 F.3d 1245, 1255 (10th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases). And as Engquist’s example of stopping speeders illustrates, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that “in the criminal-law field, a selective prosecution claim is a rara avis” and is so “[b]ecause such claims invade a special province of the Executive—its prosecutorial discretion.” Reno v. Am.- Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463– 65). Cf. United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 901 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A] class-of-one equal protection challenge, at least where premised solely on arbitrariness/irrationality, is just as much a ‘poor fit’ in the prosecutorial discretion context as in the public employment context” considered in Engquist). In addition to Rivera, in the context of parole decisions for sex offenders, the Third Circuit has recognized the force of Engquist’s limitations on equal protection challenges where the “state action … involves ‘discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments’ [that] necessarily results in different treatment among those subject to the discretionary action.” Stradford v. Sec. Penn. Dept. of Corrections, 53 F.4th 67, 76 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603–04). Engquist, Rivera, and Stradford provide no home for a class-of-one theory in the context of this case.

A class-of-one selective prosecution claim made by the son of the President is in no way going to be based on a theory of arbitrariness.

In fact Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise recognizes that, elsewhere. When he tries to argue that the subpoena recipients had no role in the charges in this case, he mentions that private citizen Hunter Biden happens to be the son of the President.

In any event, both vindictive- and selective-prosecution claims turn on the actual intent of the specific decisionmaker in a defendant’s case: here, the Special Counsel. But not only does defendant’s motion fail to identify any actual evidence of bias, vindictiveness, or discriminatory intent on the Special Counsel’s part, his arguments ignore an inconvenient truth: No charges were brought against defendant during the prior administration when the subpoena recipients actually held office in the Executive Branch. Instead, every charge in this matter was or will be brought during the current administration—one in which defendant’s father, Joseph R. Biden, is the President of the United States and Merrick B. Garland is the Attorney General that was appointed by President Biden and who personally appointed the Special Counsel. Defendant has not shown, nor can he, how external statements by political opponents of President Biden improperly pressured him, his Attorney General, or the Special Counsel to pursue charges against the President’s son.

[snip]

Defendant focuses his narrative of selective prosecution largely on the actions and motivations of non-prosecuting officials in the previous administration prior to any charges being brought. However, after a change in administrations—to one headed by defendant’s father, who leads a competing political party—the President’s current Attorney General personally exercised his discretion to direct “a full and thorough investigation” of these matters and conferred on the Special Counsel statutory and regulatory authority to prosecute this case. See Order No. 5730-2023 (Aug. 11, 2023) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533 and 28 C.F.R. pt. 600). 1 Thus, defendant’s claim of selective prosecution must contend with the presumption of regularity not only for the Special Counsel’s decision to prosecute but also for both the Attorney General’s decision to direct a full and thorough investigation and the Attorney General’s determination that the prosecution warrants the greater authority and independence of the Special Counsel’s Office. On those points, in addition to offering no evidence that the now-Special Counsel had any animus or improper motivation against defendant, he offers no evidence that the current Attorney General acted out of any improper motive in empowering the Special Counsel to continue pursuing prosecution. [my emphasis]

The defendant is the son of the President?!?!?! Wow. You don’t say?!?!?!

I’m not certain, but I don’t think this has been stated explicitly in this case before. Hunter’s motion to do his arraignment by video described him as a Secret Service protectee, for example, but didn’t explicitly say why.

We have now taken judicial notice that Hunter Biden has some kind of familial tie to the Chief Executive.

And this is where Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise’s efforts to disclaim any influence Donald Trump, Bill Barr, Jeffrey Rosen, and Richard Donoghue had on this case gets interesting.

Never mind that Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise sort of ignores the issue that one of the intended subpoena recipients, Donald Trump, appointed Weiss; if Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise wants to treat justice as a matter of competing parties, as he does here, then Weiss is a member of the other party.

The other things that Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise does in these passages is to assert the presumption of regularity to Merrick Garland’s decision to honor a promise he made — to a Republican Senator — in his confirmation hearing, to appoint Weiss Special Counsel if Weiss ever asked to be so appointed.

That is, Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise relies on Garland’s role — as an appointee of the defendant’s father, one who couldn’t fire Weiss without risking accusations of criminal obstruction and impeachment — to vouch for David Weiss’ presumption of regularity. But he does so in a filing where he argues that senior DOJ officials who, Lowell has already shown, were personally involved in the prosecution, along with the President who appointed David Weiss, had a non-prosecutorial role.

Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise is trying to have it both ways: arguing that Merrick Garland is a part of this prosecution but Donald Trump, Bill Barr, Jeffrey Rosen, and Richard Donoghue are not.

Weiss has told Congress at least four different times that Merrick Garland exercised no supervisory role in this case.

Indeed, he has barely spoken to the man. Weiss told House Judiciary Committee, “I’ve never had any direct communications with the Attorney General, save my communication in requesting Special Counsel authority in August of 2023.” Nor has he had contact with the Deputy Attorney General, nominally his direct supervisor. “I have never spoken with [Lisa] Monaco. … Never.”

Rather than being overseen directly by any political appointee, Weiss’ “point of contact for the last year, year and a half ,” the Special Counsel explained, “has been Associate Deputy Attorney General Weinsheimer.” Brad Weinsheimer was first promoted to that position by Jeff Sessions in 2018.

Weiss’ appointment gets perilously close to violating Morrison v. Olson, because neither Biden nor Garland could fire Weiss, could ever have fired Weiss, without being accused of criminal obstruction. Yet now Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise is claiming that Merrick Garland’s decision, made in response to a request Weiss made after Congress floated accusations of obstruction anyway, to give him even more independence is proof that Weiss wasn’t responding to political pressure.

Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise is now suggesting that all Weiss’ claims that Garland had no role were false. He is basing much of his claim that Weiss was not influenced by politics on a reporting structure that has never existed under the Biden Administration, as Weiss has said over and over.

Contrast that with Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise’s wildly misleading attempt to argue that Bill Barr’s DOJ had no improper influence on this case, the only treatment Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise gives the specifically identified documents in Lowell’s motion.

Defendant’s attempts to manufacture discriminatory treatment or intent on behalf of the U.S. Attorney fall apart under the most minimal scrutiny. First, defendant obliquely references that “IRS files reveal that [Richard Donoghue] further coordinated with the Pittsburgh Office and with the prosecution team in Delaware, including issuing certain guidance steps regarding overt steps in the investigation.” ECF 58, at 2-3 & n.3. Looking behind the defendant’s ambiguously phrased allegation reveals the actual “overt steps” involved: (1) the U.S. Attorney making an independent assessment of the probable cause underlying a warrant and (2) a direction by Mr. Donoghue that the Delaware investigation receive the information from the Pittsburgh team, which was being closed out. See ECF 58, at 3 n.3 (citing memorandum of conference call). Assessing the validity of a warrant and merely receiving information from other investigating entities does nothing to show any disparate treatment or animus. Next, defendant alleges that “certain investigative decisions were made as a result of guidance provided by, among others, the Deputy Attorney General’s office.” ECF 58, at 3 n.4. In fact, the source cited revealed that the guidance was simply not to conduct any “proactive interviews” yet. Likewise, defendant’s last attempt to create a link involved guidance not to make any “external requests (outside of government),” which followed the long-standing Department of Justice policy to avoid overt investigative steps that might interfere with ongoing elections. See ECF 58, at 3 n.5; cf., e.g., Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses 40 (2d ed. 1980). In other words, the most defendant claims is that the Deputy Attorney General’s office was aware of and involved in some specific investigatory decisions in the most banal fashion possible—by waiting to take specific investigative steps at certain times out of caution.

I have no fucking clue what warrant Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise is mentioning here; the word “warrant” doesn’t appear in Lowell’s filing (it may be a reference to other documents at the main Ways and Mean link for IRS documents). But what Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise is doing is suggesting that the Pittsburgh effort to share dirt from Russian spies with David Weiss’ investigative team is the same action as Richard Donoghue’s order before the election not to take overt investigative steps. There’s not a shred of evidence they’re related.

As noted, that’s the only specific rebuttal Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise attempts to Abbe Lowell’s description of several different kinds of influence on this case. Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise only makes a general allusion to Donald Trump’s public comments: “how external statements by political opponents of President Biden improperly pressured him.” He certainly doesn’t deny that those threats contributed to the threats made against Weiss and the rest of the investigative team, threats that Weiss described to Congress.

And aside from describing that Lowell wants to subpoena Bill Barr, Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise never mentions him. Indeed, I think Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise trips up in not mentioning him.

Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise claims that Lowell has referenced, “a direction by Mr. Donoghue that the Delaware investigation receive the information from the Pittsburgh team, which was being closed out.” The problem is, unless I’m missing something, there is nothing in the record that describes the investigation was being closed out. Here’s what Lowell referenced:

[I]t has been reported and revealed in the now-public IRS investigative files concerning this case (released by the House Ways and Means Committee1 ) that, separately, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under then Attorney General Barr opened a dedicated channel at the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Pittsburgh to receive information about Mr. Biden coming from then President Trump’s personal attorney, Rudolph Giuliani, and his associates. 2 That effort to review and vet any material was coordinated by then U.S. Attorneys Richard Donoghue (E.D.N.Y.) and Scott Brady in Pittsburgh (W.D.P.A.). When Mr. Donoghue was elevated to serve as Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General at the DOJ in July 2020 (and later, in December 2020, Deputy Attorney General under Mr. Rosen), IRS files reveal that he further coordinated with the Pittsburgh Office and with the prosecution team in Delaware, including issuing certain guidance regarding overt steps in the investigation. 3

2 See, e.g., Letter From Asst. Att’y Gen. Stephen E. Boyd to Hon. Jerrold Nadler (Feb. 18, 2020) (available via https://www.justice.gov/) (“[T]he Deputy Attorney General has also assigned Scott Brady, the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to assist in the receipt, processing, and preliminary analysis of new information provided by the public that may be relevant to matters relating to Ukraine.”); Material From Giuliani Spurred a Separate Justice Dept. Pursuit of Hunter Biden, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/us/politics/hunter-biden-justice-department-pittsburgh.html.

3 Gary Shapley Aff. 3, attach. 6 (IRS CI Memorandum of Conversation, Oct. 22, 2020), (“Pittsburgh read out on their investigation was ordered to be received by this prosecution team by the PDAG.”), available at https://gopwaysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/T87-Shapley-3_Attachment-6_WMRedacted.pdf.

Gary Shapley’s memo — the only description of how and why this was shared with the Hunter Biden team — only says that Donoghue ordered Weiss’ team to be briefed on it.

One of the most authoritative descriptions of how it got passed on came from … intended subpoena recipient Bill Barr, in an interview with Margot Cleveland.

It’s not true. It wasn’t closed down,” William Barr told The Federalist on Tuesday in response to Democrat Rep. Jamie Raskin’s claim that the former attorney general and his “handpicked prosecutor” had ended an investigation into a confidential human source’s allegation that Joe Biden had agreed to a $5 million bribe. “On the contrary,” Barr stressed, “it was sent to Delaware for further investigation.”

While Lowell hasn’t (yet) included this in his filings, Barr’s communications with Cleveland would be among the key things Lowell might obtain with a subpoena. They are critically important, too, because they prove that the Attorney General himself was involved in this process — that the interference in the Hunter Biden investigation went beyond the DAG’s normal interest in supervising US Attorneys.

And as I’ve mentioned before, Barr’s public intervention came at a critical time. He butted in while Lesley Wolf was still involved with this prosecution, before Weiss reneged on the plea deal negotiated by Wolf, and before David Weiss told Lindsey Graham that the FD-1023 obtained via the process to launder information from Russia spies into the investigation of Donald Trump’s opponent’s son was part of a still-ongoing investigation.

Your questions about allegations contained in an FBI FD-1023 Form relate to an ongoing investigation. As such, I cannot comment on them at this time.

In a filing that entirely ignores Lowell’s citation from Barr’s book, Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise ignores the public evidence that Bill Barr not only remains involved in this case, but that David Weiss responded to pressure elicited by Barr’s public intervention, and did so by stating that that was part of the ongoing investigation into Joe Biden’s kid.

Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise’s silence about Barr makes me wonder if the subpoena to him poses a particular risk for Weiss, as if before Weiss made that comment to Lindsey, he got a phone call that would be covered by the subpoena. In any case, whereas Weiss went years before his first contact with Merrick Garland about this case, he did tell HJC that, “I had conversations with Attorney General Barr, and I don’t want to get into the content of those conversations, because they’re with the AG.”

In any case, I’m genuinely shocked by the flopsweat that this subpoena request from Lowell produced. Indeed, that is one reason I’m so interested in Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise’s fancy new title.

Though Lowell never said it, I suspect the likely witness Hunter Biden’s lawyer wants to impeach at trial is David Weiss himself.

Weiss is the single solitary witness who can attest to how and why the prosecution transitioned from Lesley Wolf to Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise. He is the single solitary witness who can claim that that wasn’t a result of either political pressure directly or the pressure created by credible threats of violence targeted at him, his investigative team, and their families.

But Weiss has also now committed to the continued influence of Scott Brady’s task on the ongoing investigation into Hunter Biden. Brady told the House Judiciary Committee that he and Weiss spoke, personally, every four to six weeks between around January 10 and the final briefing in October. He described making “other recommendations about possible investigative avenues that we would recommend that they take.”

And by blabbing to Margot Cleveland, Bill Barr has made public that he was also in the thick of all that.

Weiss is in a position where he has no one to blame. He really can’t — and never could — borrow presumption of regularity from Merrick Garland, because his continued tenure always came on the threat of obstruction charges (and impeachment). He can’t — and never could — invoke Garland’s DOJ to claim his prosecution is not political, because Garland has made a point to be hands off, as Weiss has affirmed to Congress.

But he also is totally in the thick of the wildly inappropriate scheme that Bill Barr set up, one that catered to laundering claims Donald Trump’s personal lawyer had obtained from, among others, a Russian spy.

And that, I suspect, is why Principal Senior Assistant Special Counsel Leo Wise got another promotion: because Weiss himself now poses a threat to this prosecution.

Update: Added specifics about Weiss’ testimony as to contacts with Garland, Lisa Monaco, Brad Weinsheimer, and Bill Barr.

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NYT Covers Up the Still-Ongoing Trump-Russian Effort to Frame Joe Biden

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The reason I have so little patience for NYT’s decision to dedicate the resources of three senior reporters to warn about the dangers of a second Trump term is not that I disagree about the second term. They’re right that it would be far worse.

It’s that the same reporters continue to downplay Trump’s past corruption — some of which Maggie Haberman specifically enabled — and outright ignore the ongoing effects of it.

Imagine how much healthier American democracy would be if the NYT dedicated just half of the time and space that went into the eight, often repetitive stories on this topic to instead lay out how the ongoing effort to impeach Biden is a continuation of Trump’s efforts, made with the assistance of men now deemed to be Russian spies by both the US and Ukraine, to frame Joe Biden?

  1. December 4: Why a Second Trump Presidency May Be More Radical Than His First
  2. November 15/December 2: How Trump and His Allies Plan to Wield Power in 2025
  3. November 11: Sweeping Raids, Giant Camps and Mass Deportations: Inside Trump’s 2025 Immigration Plans
  4. November 1: Some of the Lawyers Who May Fill a Second Trump Administration
  5. October 31: If Trump Wins, His Allies Want Lawyers Who Will Bless a More Radical Agenda
  6. July 17: Trump and Allies Forge Plans to Increase Presidential Power in 2025
  7. June 21: Few of Trump’s G.O.P. Rivals Defend Justice Dept. Independence
  8. June 15: The Radical Strategy Behind Trump’s Promise to ‘Go After’ Biden

NYT appears not to have assigned a single reporter to chase down the following allegations that have come out of the GOP impeachment effort:

  • Bill Barr’s DOJ shut down a corruption investigation into Mykola Zlochevsky — which had been opened in January 2016, while Biden was VP and Hunter was on the board of Burisma — in December 2019, right in the middle of an impeachment defense claiming to prioritize the investigation of Burisma’s corruption.
  • Days later, Barr set up a rickety effort to ingest the dirt Rudy Giuliani had obtained, including from known Russian agent Andrii Derkach and possibly from Burisma itself, without being forced to prosecute Rudy for soliciting dirt from known Russian agents. One of several details we’ve learned since NYT’s superb past reporting on this effort (besides that Scott Brady’s testimony completely conflicts with that past NYT report), is that Brady mined information from the newly closed Zlochevsky investigation to obtain an FD-1023 recording Zlochevksy making new claims about Joe Biden around the same time in 2019 as Barr shut down the investigation into Zlochevsky, claims that were utterly inconsistent with what he had said months earlier.
  • Hunter Biden’s lawyer claims, backed by newly disclosed communications, that Tony Bobulinski falsely told the FBI on October 23, 2020 that he had personally attended a February 2017 meeting at which he saw CEFC’s Chair hand Hunter Biden an enormous diamond. That meeting with the FBI took place one day after attending the October 22, 2020 debate with Donald Trump. Weeks later, according to Cassidy Hutchinson, Bobulinski and Mark Meadows had a covert meeting at a campaign stop; she claims she saw Trump’s chief of staff hand Bobulinski, “what appeared to be a folded sheet of paper or a small envelope.”
  • Separately, Hunter Biden partner Rob Walker described the concerns he and Hunter had about Bobulinski’s business ties to Russians, possibly including Viktor Vekselberg.
  • In addition to the informant report on Zlochevsky’s changed claims about Biden, there were three other dodgy informant reports shared with the Hunter Biden team: from two Ukrainians that seem tied to the Rudy effort, from Gal Luft at meetings where — he has since been accused — he lied about his ties to CEFC, and from Bannon associate Peter Schweizer (the latter of which this important NYT story on Tim Thibault did address).
  • Throughout this period, the IRS supervisor on the investigation documented repeated examples of improper influence on the investigation. In a recent subpoena request, Hunter’s attorney noted that Trump’s improper effort to influence the investigation continues to this day.

In short, basic reporting on Republican efforts to impeach Biden show that it, along with key parts (though not necessarily all) of the investigation into Hunter Biden, are simply a continuation of an effort Trump started in 2018 to frame Joe Biden. That is an effort that involved people that both the US and Ukraine have labeled as Russian spies.

Aside from some key articles (linked above), NYT has covered none of this.

Instead, NYT claims the exact opposite. It claims that the effort to gin up a criminal investigation into Joe Biden didn’t succeed.

And neither effort for which he was impeached succeeded. Mr. Trump tried to coerce Ukraine into opening a criminal investigation into Mr. Biden by withholding military aid, but it did not cooperate.

It’s right there, the full-time pursuit of three different House committees, ongoing, with an FD-1023 about Zlochevsky’s changed claims about Biden and Bobulinksi’s FBI report that seems to have close ties to Trump (in which Bobulinski was represented by a known Maggie Haberman source).

NYT tells you the first term wasn’t that bad, because Trump’s efforts failed. Yet what failed was NYT’s reporting on ongoing events.

NYT tells this fairy tale even as they continue to whitewash Bill Barr’s efforts. In a recent 4,000-word story, in which they claimed that the commutation of Jonathan Braun’s sentence “stood out” more than the pre-trial pardon of Steve Bannon issued the same day, NYT gives Barr two paragraphs to claim he tried to clean up pardons.

William P. Barr, a Trump attorney general who had left by the time of the Braun commutation, said when he took over the Justice Department he discovered that “there were pardons being given without any vetting by the department.”

Mr. Barr added that he told Trump aides they should at least send over names of those being considered so the department could thoroughly examine their records. While the White House Counsel’s Office tried to do so, the effort fell apart under the crush of pardon requests that poured in during the final weeks before Mr. Trump left office, according to people with direct knowledge of the process.

It is true that of the eight pardons given before he arrived, there were some doozies, including Joe Arpaio, Dinesh D’Souza, Scooter Libby, and the ranchers whose arson cases sparked the Malheur occupation.

But Barr was utterly complicit in the most abusive pardons Trump gave. Less than two months after he was confirmed based off repeated assurances that giving a pardon in exchange for false testimony was obstruction, Bill Barr wrote a memo declining to prosecute a crime in process, the effort to use pardons to ensure that Paul Manafort, Roger Stone, Mike Flynn, and others continued to lie to cover up Trump’s ties to Russia in the 2016 campaign. The Barr memo did not once mention pardons, even though that was a key thrust of the second volume of the Mueller Report (something Charlie Savage has also noted).

Of course, NYT joins Barr in that complicity. This story finally mentions one of those pardons in its discussion of Trump’s abuse.

His lawyers floated a pardon at his campaign chairman, whom Mr. Trump praised for not “flipping” as prosecutors tried unsuccessfully to get him to cooperate as a witness in the Russia inquiry; Mr. Trump later did pardon him.

But it does not mention that Manafort specifically lied about why he briefed Konstantin Kilimnik campaign information, an act that the Intelligence Community later stated as fact resulted in the sharing of campaign information with Russian intelligence. This is a topic about which NYT has a still uncorrected story, hiding the tie to Oleg Deripaska.

It’s not that Trump pardoned Manafort for “not flipping.” It’s that he pardoned Manafort after he lied about why the campaign manager shared information that Russian spies could use in their attack on US democracy.

And the very link NYT relies on here mentions the Stone pardon, a commutation and then pardon that halted a still ongoing CFAA conspiracy investigation between Trump’s rat-fucker and the Russians (another detail NYT has never reported).

Yes, I absolutely agree. A second Trump term would be worse.

But repeating that, over and over, even while misinforming readers about the ongoing five year effort to frame Joe Biden is not the best way to prevent a second term.

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When John Eastman Acknowledged that Candidate Trump Spoke in His Personal Capacity

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In Sri Srinivasan’s opinion in Blassingame holding that presidents, when speaking as candidates, are not immune from civil suit, he pointed to a key moment in the 2020 transition period to illustrate the distinction he was making between when a president running for re-election speaks as an office-seeker, rather than an office-holder: When Trump intervened in the Texas v. Pennsylvania lawsuit.

As an example, consider a situation directly germane to the cases before us in which President Trump publicly volunteered that he was acting—and speaking—in an unofficial, private capacity. In the period after the 2020 election and before January 6, the Supreme Court considered an effort by Texas to challenge the administration of the election in several battleground states in which then-President-elect Biden had been declared the winner. Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 22O155 (U.S. 2020). President Trump moved to intervene in the case. In doing so, he specifically explained to the Supreme Court (and captioned his filing accordingly) that he sought to “intervene in this matter in his personal capacity as a candidate for re-election to the office of President of the United States.” Motion of Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, to Intervene in his Personal Capacity as Candidate for ReElection, Proposed Bill of Complaint in Intervention, and Brief in Support of Motion to Intervene 14, Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 22O155 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2020) (Trump Mot. to Intervene). He relatedly elaborated that he wished “to intervene to protect his unique and substantial personal interests as a candidate for re-election to the Office of President.” Id. at 24.

President Trump, then, affirmatively communicated to the Supreme Court (and the public) that he was acting and speaking in that matter in his “personal capacity” as a candidate for reelection—indeed, he explained that his reason for wanting to participate in the case was a “substantial personal” one rather than an official one. That stands in sharp contrast with other cases in which he—like all Presidents—had filed briefs in the Supreme Court in his “official capacity as President of the United States.” See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at II, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965). But while President Trump’s effort to participate in Texas v. Pennsylvania was made in an expressly and self-consciously personal, unofficial capacity, the content of his speech in his submission undoubtedly involved a matter of significant public concern: his challenge to the election results in various pivotal states, whose “electors [would] determine the outcome of the election.” Trump Mot. to Intervene 27.

As that example illustrates, an immunity for all presidential speech on matters of public concern—without regard to the context in which the President speaks—would be grounded purely in “the identity of the actor who performed it” rather than “the nature of the function performed.” Clinton, 520 U.S. at 695 (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229). Such a result is “unsupported by precedent.” Id. And it is unsupported by the basic object of granting a President official-act immunity: assuring that the President is not “unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties.” Id. at 694 (emphasis added) (quoting Nixon, 457 U.S. at 752 n.32). That concern necessarily has no salience when the President acts—by his own admission—in an unofficial, private capacity.

b.

As President Trump’s intervention motion in Texas v. Pennsylvania highlights, whether the President speaks (or engages in conduct) on a matter of public concern bears no necessary correlation with whether he speaks (or engages in conduct) in his official or personal capacity. And because it is the latter question that governs the availability of presidential immunity—as a matter both of precedent and of the essential nature of an immunity for (and only for) official acts—we must reject President Trump’s proposed public-concern test as illsuited to the inquiry. [my emphasis; links added]

Remember that time, weeks before the actions alleged in these lawsuits, Srinivasan might have been nudging the six Republican appointees to the Supreme Court, where even Donald Trump admitted that sometimes when the president speaks, he speaks only in his personal capacity?

It was more than that, though, and in ways that might be significant to both the civil cases and Jack Smith’s case.

This was not just Donald Trump acknowledging that, at that moment in December 2020 when he asked the Supreme Court to make him the winner of the 2020 election, he was speaking in his personal capacity. It was John Eastman, Counsel of Record on that motion, who described Trump as such. Eastman filed that motion to intervene, representing Trump in his personal capacity, in a period when he was discussing with Clarence Thomas’ spouse about lawsuits to challenge the results of the election (though she told the January 6 Committee she had no involvement “at all” in Texas v. Pennsylvania). Even Republican members of Congress got into the act, starting with now-Speaker Mike Johnson and including Jim Jordan and Scott Perry.

When Ken Paxton asked the Supreme Court to throw out the votes of four swing states, a bunch of people who would go on to play key roles in the attack on Congress were party to an action in which Co-Conspirator 2 described that Defendant Trump spoke in his personal capacity.

In days ahead, we’ll learn more about how the DC Circuit civil decision being sent back to Amit Mehta will intersect with Tanya Chutkan’s criminal decision that former president Donald Trump is entitled to no immunity as former president. These two decisions may literally and figuratively pass each other in the halls of Prettyman Courthouse, as one decision heads back to the older District chambers and another heads up to the fancier Circuit chambers.

Srinivasan’s opinion is limited, inviting very specific fact-finding.

As I described, in a passage citing the Blassingame decision released just hours earlier, Chutkan very pointedly stopped short of that specificity. She declined to weigh in on whether a former president’s immunity from criminal prosecution would be different if he was acting “within the outer perimeter of the President’s official” duties than if he was engaged in official acts, effectively inviting Srinivasan and his colleagues to do that.

Similarly, the court expresses no opinion on the additional constitutional questions attendant to Defendant’s assertion that former Presidents retain absolute criminal immunity for acts “within the outer perimeter of the President’s official” responsibility. Immunity Motion at 21 (formatting modified). Even if the court were to accept that assertion, it could not grant Defendant immunity here without resolving several separate and disputed constitutional questions of first impression, including: whether the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” includes within its “outer perimeter” at least five different forms of indicted conduct;5 whether inquiring into the President’s purpose for undertaking each form of that allegedly criminal conduct is constitutionally permissible in an immunity analysis, and whether any Presidential conduct “intertwined” with otherwise constitutionally immune actions also receives criminal immunity. See id. at 21–45. Because it concludes that former Presidents do not possess absolute federal criminal immunity for any acts committed while in office, however, the court need not reach those additional constitutional issues, and it expresses no opinion on them.

5 As another court in this district observed in a decision regarding Defendant’s civil immunity, “[t]his is not an easy issue. It is one that implicates fundamental norms of separation of powers and calls on the court to assess the limits of a President’s functions. And, historical examples to serve as guideposts are few.” Thompson v. Trump, 590 F. Supp. 3d 46, 74 (D.D.C. 2022); see id. at 81–84 (performing that constitutional analysis). The D.C. Circuit recently affirmed that district court’s decision with an extensive analysis of just one form of conduct—“speech on matters of public concern.” Blassingame v. Trump, Nos. 22-5069, 22-7030, 22-7031, slip op. at 23–42 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 1, 2023).

Chutkan’s decision might well be sufficient. There are plenty of things a president might do, claiming to do so in his official capacity, which would also break the law; DOJ raised five pretty familiar looking examples in their response to Trump’s bid for absolute immunity.

DOJ points to the possibility that a President might trade a pardon — a thing of value — as part of a quid pro quo to obtain false testimony or prevent true testimony.

[snip]

  • A President ordering the National Guard to murder his critics
  • A President ordering an FBI agent to plant evidence on his political enemy
  • A bribe paid in exchange for a family member getting a lucrative contract
  • A President selling nuclear secrets to America’s adversaries

It would be nice if first DC Circuit and then SCOTUS could put this matter to bed, so it stops holding up Trump cases.

But judges like to move cautiously, testing the easy cases before they test the harder ones. With the Srinivasan decision in hand, the DC Circuit might treat the criminal appeal differently than they otherwise might.

For example, they might note, as DOJ did in its response, that five of six Trump described co-conspirators are also private citizens: Trump’s personal attorney Rudy Giuliani, Eastman representing Trump in his personal role, Sidney Powell, whom Trump recent said would be conflicted from representing him personally), Ken Chesebro who also claimed to be representing Trump personally, and Boris Epshteyn, who nominally remained an employee of the campaign.

If invited to do further briefing in light of Srinivasan’s opinion, DOJ might note that after SCOTUS denied Texas v. Pennsylvania cert, Trump’s campaign lawyers gave up the fight, as the January 6 Committee Report describes, ceding the fight to Rudy and the other co-conspirators.

Not everyone on the campaign was eager to pursue the fake elector plan. OnDecember 11th, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a high-profile lawsuit filedby the State of Texas challenging the election results in Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin.42 After that decision, the Trump Campaign’s senior legal staffers said that they reduced their involvement in thefake elector effort, apparently because there was no longer a feasible scenario in which a court would determine that President Trump actually won any of the States he contested.43 Justin Clark, who oversaw the Trump Campaign’s general counsel’s office, said that he basically conveyed, “I’mout,” and encouraged his colleagues on the legal team to do the same.44 Findlay told the Select Committee that “we backed out of this thing,” and Morgan, his boss, said he had Findlay pass off responsibility for the electorsas “my way of taking that responsibility to zero.”45

Clark told the Select Committee that “it never sat right with me that there was no . . . contingency whereby these votes would count.”46 “I hadreal problems with the process,” Clark said, because “it morphed into something I didn’t agree with.”47 In his view, the fake electors were “not necessarily duly nominated electors” despite being presented as such.48 Hesaid he believed he warned his colleagues that “unless we have litigationpending like in these States, like I don’t think this is appropriate or, you know, this isn’t the right thing to do.”49

DOJ might also note that, as charged in the indictment, the suit played a specific role in the Georgia allegations, when Chris Carr refused Trump’s request that he join in Texas’ lawsuit, because none of Trump’s claims had merit.

And it’s not just Trump’s personal lawyer co-conspirators. The invocation of Texas v. Pennsylvania even weighs heavily on the role Jeffrey Clark, then serving as Acting Assistant Attorney General at DOJ and so in a far better position to claim to be acting in an official role, played in the alleged conspiracy.

That’s because Trump’s bid to replace Jeffrey Rosen with Clark was directly tied to an effort to get DOJ to file a similar lawsuit. Here’s how Jeffrey Rosen described it to the January 6 Committee.

Q Okay. And want to talk to you also about the December 27th call where | believe you conferenced in Mr. Donoghue. ~ And that involved the President as well. In Mr. Donoghue’s notes, he references John Eastman and Mark Martin and has a note that says: P trusts him.

What do you remember about that aspect of the conversation?

A So I think that day someone had sent over to us a draft Supreme Court brief modeled on the Texas v. Pennsylvania case that the Supreme Court had rejected. And I was I think Rich Donoghue and Steve Engel and I had a meeting that we were there for t0 address an oversight set of issues that had produced some controversy that Members of Congress who – I won’t get nto all that, other than that Mr. Meadows had asserted to me that the thing had – that he and AG Barr had resolved it. But now AG Barr was gone, and it wasn’t resolved, and he wanted to talk to me about getting it resolved.

But at that discussion Mr. Meadows raised with us: ~ Did you guys see the Supreme Courtbrief that was sent over?

And I think we said: Haven’t read it carefully, but it doesn’t look viable.

And he responded in some sense — and, again, I’m paraphrasing, because I don’t I’m repeating the substance rather than the words was: Well, Mark Martin and John Eastman, who are, you know, these great legal scholars, think it’s great idea.

And we said: Well, you know, we’ll get back to you. But preliminary take is it has problems, that it doesn’t look like a good idea to us. But we’ve only had it 2 hours or something like that, you know, whatever the timeframe was, which it was relatively brief.

Trump followed up twice, pushing DOJ to sue as the government.

What I remember better was that, on Wednesday, after the Kurt Olsen incident, I spoke to the President. I think that was just me, or Rich may have been in my office, but I don’t think it was on the speakerphone. Some of these were on speakerphone with me and Rich, and some, it was just me, but Rich could’ve been in my office.

And the way I remember it is, on Wednesday, I wound up telling the President, “This doesn’t work. ~ There’s multiple problems with it. And the Department of Justice is not going to be able todo it” And–

In the same exchange, there was discussion of whether a DOJ attorney, like Jeffrey Clark, could represent the president in his personal capacity.

Q Okay. So is it fair then to say that this was not partof the Department’s official businessatthe time?

A Yes

Q And, to your knowledge, can Jeff Clark as the assistant — Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division, can he represent the President in a personal capacity while also maintaining his role at the Department of Justice?

A Let me just make sure I understand the question. You’re saying, can he outside of his DOJ role represent the President in a personal capacity? And I’m trying what I’m trying to distinguish is sometimes the President or others get sued in their individual capacity. But they have some form of governmental immunity or the like. And so the government can represent them as individuals. That’s not what you’re getting at. You’re talking about, can a – can someone who’s a government employee, You know, have like a side gig representing a private person?

But then, after Jeffrey Rosen refused to make DOJ Trump’s own personal law firm, Trump took steps to make Jeffrey Clark, who was willing to do that, Acting Attorney General.

This application may even have critical import to the application of 18 USC 1512(c)(2) and (k) to Trump’s actions. Weeks before Trump and Eastman allegedly conspired to obstruct the vote certification on January 6, Eastman described that Trump had “unique and substantial personal interests” in throwing out the votes of four states that voted for Joe Biden. That’s the kind of admission from co-conspirator 2 that would make any analysis of Trump’s corrupt purpose in obstructing the vote certification quite easy.

Srinivasan’s use of Trump’s motion to intervene was, at one level, a very convenient use of Trump’s own legal claims — made before a conservative Supreme Court that will eventually answer both of these questions — against him.

But it maps onto the criminal case, too, in ways that DC Circuit might choose to apply as a way to tiptoe their way into sanctioning the first prosecution of an ex-president for actions he took as an office-seeker, rather than an office-holder.

Update: Ben Wittes and Quinta Jurecic similarly discuss how these two rulings work in tandem.

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Advent Week 1: Got Yer Stollen Election Right Here, Bub

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[NB: check the byline, thanks. /~Rayne]

We’re already deep into the holiday season, barreling toward the winter solstice and the darkest part of the night for the northern hemisphere.

Some of us observed Diwali, the five-day Hindu festival of lights which began on November 12.

Some of us observed Thanksgiving a week ago this past Thursday – and before that, in Canada on Monday, October 9.

Ahead of us lies Hanukkah beginning this coming Thursday, December 7, the last candle to be lighted on December 15.

Christmas falls on Monday, December 25 with the winter solstice before it on December 21.

Boxing Day on the 26th coincides with the beginning of Kwanzaa, the end of which coincides with New Year’s Day – seven days, seven candles marking the principles of Kwanzaa in between.

Busy, busy, busy between now and the end of the year setting things alight to stave off the darkness.

This year’s Christian observation of Advent – the four Sundays marking the time until Christmas – will be very short since Christmas is observed the Monday immediately following the last Sunday of Advent. As a child my Catholic family observed Advent with calendars marking down the days and a candle-decked wreath lit each night at dinner as one of us kids would recite an Advent prayer.

A short advent like this meant my youngest sibling would get the full benefit of the shortest week. They’d only have to recite their prayer once whereas the other three siblings would have to do the entire week at dinner each night, lighting a respective number of candles on the wreath counting down the weeks.

I disliked being first as the oldest child because it meant the first candle lit would be the shortest by Christmas. If only life was as simple as that, if my only annoyance was a stubby guttering candle.

If I’d known more then about all the holidays during which candles and lamps were lighted, I would have committed to bonfires from the end of October to New Year’s Day.

~ ~ ~

Speaking of burnt offerings, I’m going to turn up the heat.

I’m sick and tired, utterly fed up with that orange-tinted fiberglass-haired scofflaw’s continued Big Lie about the 2020 election.

It’s been more than three years since Donald Trump lost the popular vote and weeks shy of three years since he and his conspirators whipped up an insurrection to obstruct the House’s electoral vote count.

And yet he just won’t stop cramming his Big Lie in every too-willing journalistic orifice he can reach. As recently as this past Tuesday by way of his feckless lawyers on a fishing expedition he demanded materials from active criminal investigations to support his Big Lie.

Less than three weeks ago Trump’s Big Lie bullshit was amplified by that hack House Speaker Mike Johnson who tossed his Christian beliefs aside to kneel and kiss the ring of his GOP grift master:

Asked about Trump’s efforts to challenge his loss in 2020 — including recent reporting in which his former allies said Trump planned to refuse to leave his office — Johnson was unwavering.

“It can’t be about personalities, it’s got to be about policies and principles,” Johnson said, arguing that Trump’s were superior to Biden’s.

Asked again about Trump’s frequent, false claims that the election was stolen through widespread fraud, Johnson said, “I take him at his word, I do believe that he believes that.”

Pressed on Trump’s well-documented airing of lies and misleading statements, Johnson said, “There are a lot of people in Washington who say things that are not accurate all the time.”

But he maintained that Trump’s views about the 2020 election results are “deep in his heart.”

“He just felt like he was cheated in that election,” Johnson said, “and I think that’s a core conviction of his.”

That’s not how this works. That’s not how any of this works in a democracy. Johnson is wholly unqualified to represent his constituents because he thinks the outcome of voting is voided by a single man’s “policies and principles” – which in Trump’s case are jokes because he has no principles or policies except propping up his ego and assets.

If it’s the season to bring light to darkness and make the season bright, let’s torch his Big Lie.

~ ~ ~

To that end we’re going to have a stollen election this Advent season – a start on Festivus for the Rest of Us who reject the Big Lie and enjoy baked goods.

Your challenge should you choose to accept it:

– Find a baked holiday bread or cake which must include dried or candied fruit in the dough/batter. By find I mean locate a recipe;

– Share the recipe you want to see made, or are going to make in this month’s Advent posts;

– Find a baked holiday bread or cake containing dried or candied fruit which you have bought in the past or are going to buy this year to enjoy at home or share as a gift with friends;

– Share details about the source or the baker from whom you’ve purchased this baked treat;

– Tell us about any background behind this baked good whether you’ve made it, are going to make it, are going to buy it, have bought it in the past.

Links to photos and recipes are greatly appreciated though you should note that links may take time to clear moderation.

The last weekend of Advent we’ll revisit these panettone, babka, fruit cake, panetón, christopsomo, pan de natale – whatever your cultural heritage calls it – we’ll vote on one which sounds the most delicious and appealing.

Let’s light a candle and let the stollen election begin!

~ ~ ~

This is an open thread.

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James Comer’s War on Christmas: The Burial Ground of a Dick Pic Impeachment

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Republicans have rolled out a shiny timeline in support of their impeachment stunt.

It is riddled with unsubstantiated and at times, false claims. As one example, it states as fact that a $40,000 loan repayment James Biden made in 2017 — when Joe Biden was a private citizen — was money laundered from China.

It juxtaposes a misleading (but potentially caveated) answer at the October, 22 2020 debate from Biden with Tony Bobulinski’s interview with the FBI the next day, but doesn’t mention that Trump hosted Bobulinski at that debate and then, according to Cassidy Hutchinson’s book, Mark Meadows handed him something at a covert meeting weeks later.

It doesn’t, however, mention Tony Bobulinski in its report about a meeting between Hunter and CEFC Chairman Ye Jianming on February 16, 2017 (the date of the meeting may not even be correct).

In the testimony Bobulinski gave to the FBI between attending the debate with Trump and having a covert meeting with Mark Meadows, he claimed to have attended that February 2017 meeting and seen Hunter receive a diamond.

BOBULINSKI first met in person with members of the BIDEN family at a 2017 meeting in Miami, Florida. BOBULINSKI, GILLIAR, WALKER, HUNTER BIDEN, and YE all attended the meeting. Also in attendance was Director JIAN ZANG (“ZANG”), a CEFC Director involved in forming new businesses and capitalizing them at the request of CEFC. At the meeting, BOBULINSKI witnessed a large diamond gemstone given as a gift to HUNTER BIDEN by YE.

Perhaps the silence about Bobulinski arises from the fact that Hunter Biden has claimed Bobulinski not only wasn’t at the meeting, but didn’t yet know of James Gilliar’s business ties to him. Rob Walker, who was at the meeting testified, twice, that he didn’t see a diamond pass hands at the meeting.

Walker has read about RHB receiving a diamond from people with CEFC, but he never saw the diamond.

And James Biden testified that an associate of Ye gave Hunter a diamond at his office (not the meeting) — but it ended up being worthless.

James B did recall RHB receiving a diamond from the Chinese but that they found out it was not valuable. RHB said that he received the diamond from an associate of the Chairman at his office [redacted] James B stated that the Chinese always gave something as a welcome gift. RHB was originally told that the diamond was worth $10,000, but James B took it to a friend of his and found out that it was worthless. James B is only aware of one diamond and was not aware of a larger diamond.

All this changes Biden’s statement at the debate significantly; Trump was working off a Bobulinski claim that isn’t backed by the available records.

And then weeks later (again, according to Hutchinson’s book), Trump’s Chief of Staff handed Bobulinski something that might be an envelope.

Much of the timeline focuses on Burisma owner Mykola Zlochevsky’s years-long effort to kill legal investigations into his corruption.

Unsurprisingly, the Republican timeline makes no mention of the investigation that — per Chuck Grassley — DOJ opened into the owner of Burisma in January 2016.

Likewise, James Comer forgot to mention that — again, per Chuck Grassley — Donald Trump’s DOJ shut down that investigation into Zlochevksy in December 2019, even while justifying his Perfect Phone Call with Volodymyr Zelenskyy with a claim to be concerned about corruption at Burisma.

Comer’s timeline definitely doesn’t mention that (per Chuck Grassley) Bill Barr’s DOJ shut down an investigation into Zlochevsky when it discusses that Zlochevsky was offering bribes to shut down investigations.

Maybe in addition to impeaching Trump for whatever he handed Bobulinski to make claims about big diamonds he couldn’t see, James Comer should open an impeachment investigation into why Bill Barr’s DOJ shut down that Zlochevsky investigation — and whether there’s a tie between the closure of the investigation and Zlochevksy’s new claims about Biden?

Wow. James Comer’s case for impeaching Donald Trump just keeps getting stronger and stronger!

Admittedly, Comer does take a break from substantiating an impeachment case against Trump by providing scandalous details about Biden … inviting his son to a party.

A party!! Joe Biden invited his son to a Christmas party!?!?!

This is truly scandalous stuff, particularly when contrasted to Bill Barr’s noble efforts to shut down an investigation into Zlochevsky at the same time that Trump was claiming publicly to support an investigation into Zlochevksy and Zlochevksy was, apparently, offering billions to those who shut down such investigations.

A Christmas party!

How dare a good Catholic like Joe Biden invite his own family member — his son!! — to a party at his residence? Surely the 18 Republicans from districts Biden won will be happy to explain their vote to impeach because they’ve decided to declare War on Christmas?

This impeachment gets better every day.

There’s one more utterly ridiculous detail I’m rather obsessed about. In addition to proposing to impeach Joe Biden because he invited his kid to a party, James Comer thinks it’s scandalous that Vadym Pozharskyi sent Hunter notice that his father was traveling to Ukraine.

Wow. Scandal. Pozharskyi knew and shared details about when Biden was traveling to Ukraine.

But I’m interested for a different reason. You see, this claim is almost certainly sourced to the copy of the “laptop” that House Republicans won’t explain — at least not on the record — how they obtained. In addition to the email from 2016 that was resent on September 1, 2020 when the hard drive was in Rudy Giuliani’s possession, this email is one with which I’m obsessed.

Here’s how it appears at BidenLaptopEmails dot com.

The President of the US-Ukraine Business Council got the alert from the White House, he sent it to Burisma, and Pozharskyi sent it — at least by all appearances — to just Devon Archer and Hunter.

As I circled, whoever’s email box this appeared in recognized Pozharskyi’s email not as “Burisma,” but instead as “Burials.” The email also had an identity for Hunter associated; most other emails that he received don’t identify himself.

There’s just one other email in the public set like this — an important one.

It was a thread sent over one week — from November 11 ET through 18, 2015. On it, Pozharskyi, Eric Schwerin, Archer, and Hunter discuss bringing in Blue Star Strategies — they’re the ones who tried to fix Zlochevsky’s legal troubles, with some initial but ultimately short-lived success.

This effort, outsourced as it was, was undoubtedly one of the sleaziest things Hunter was involved in. But the GOP didn’t include this email in their timeline (probably because it makes clear that Hunter did a pretty good job of firewalling off the legal influence peddling).

Anyway, from this email, it appears that it is Schwerin’s email account that, for a few days only, recognized Burisma as “Burials.” Only, he’s not listed as being on the other one.

I really have only suspicions about what explains this anomaly. I care about it, for two reasons. First, because the anomaly, especially on one of about ten or so that really get into Burisma’s efforts to suck Hunter and Archer into this corruption, does raise questions about the provenance of the set of emails loaded up on a laptop attributed to Hunter Biden.

Also because, according to a spreadsheet Joseph Ziegler was generous enough to share with the world, this is among the not quite 10% of emails that the IRS used in its own influence peddling investigation that they sourced to the laptop when it should have been included in returns from warrants obtained from Google on both Hunter and Schwerin’s Rosemont Seneca emails.

There’s a lot in Comer’s timeline that makes a great case for impeachment — of Donald Trump.

There’s a lot in his timeline that shows he continues to rely on fraudsters to make his case.

There’s a lot that tries to criminalize … Christmas!

And then there’s this, an email probably obtained from the famous “laptop,” one that raises some real questions about what got packaged up on a laptop attributed to Hunter Biden.

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Judge Tanya Chutkan Had to Tell Trump That, “There is no ‘Presidential Immunity’ Clause”

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Less than twelve hours after the DC Circuit ruled that an office-seeker does not enjoy presidential immunity from civil suit, Judge Tanya Chutkan issued her order ruling that Trump does not enjoy presidential immunity for crimes committed while president.

Her opinion can be summed up in one line.

[T]he United States has only one Chief Executive at a time, and that position does not confer a lifelong “get-out-of-jail-free” pass.

The timing of Chutkan’s decision is almost certainly not accidental. The key issue in this opinion, absolute immunity, has been fully briefed (as Trump noted on November 1 when he asked to stay all other proceedings until this was resolved) since October 26.

Chutkan said she was ruling now because the Supreme Court requires immunity to be resolved as early as possible.

Defendant has also moved to dismiss based on statutory grounds, ECF No. 114, and for selective and vindictive prosecution, ECF No. 116. The court will address those motions separately. The Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (citations omitted). The court therefore rules first on the Immunity Motion and the Constitutional Motion—in which Defendant asserts “constitutional immunity from double jeopardy,” United States v. Scott, 464 F.2d 832, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

She did not source that cite to Trump’s request for a stay, nor did she say she was also ruling on Trump’s motion to dismiss on Constitutional grounds, which includes a Double Jeopardy claim, because Molly Gaston asked her to,

But by ruling as she did (without a hearing), she simply mooted Trump’s request to stay any further proceedings with a minute order.

MINUTE ORDER as to DONALD J. TRUMP: In light of the court’s [172] Order denying Defendant’s [74] Motion to Dismiss Based on Presidential Immunity; Defendant’s [128] Motion to Stay Case Pending Immunity Determination is hereby DENIED as moot.

This puts the onus on Trump to appeal, which he reportedly will (though he has dilly-dallied on some of these motions, so we’ll see how much time he kills in the process).

It seems clear that Chutkan waited for Blassingame, the civil immunity opinion, because she found a way to cite it twice and still release her own opinion on the same day.

But it also seems likely that Judge Chutkan and her clerks simply reviewed that opinion to make sure nothing wildly conflicted with her already completed opinion, because her opinion doesn’t incorporate details of the absolute immunity argument — such as the significance of the fact that five of six co-conspirators described in the indictment (everyone but Jeffrey Clark) is a private citizen, which would be important if the DC Circuit applied any of their civil immunity test to the criminal context.

Indeed, one of Chutkan’s citations to Blassingame effectively admitted she didn’t get into its test — whether Trump was acting in his official role when he did the things alleged in the indictment.

Similarly, the court expresses no opinion on the additional constitutional questions attendant to Defendant’s assertion that former Presidents retain absolute criminal immunity for acts “within the outer perimeter of the President’s official” responsibility. Immunity Motion at 21 (formatting modified). Even if the court were to accept that assertion, it could not grant Defendant immunity here without resolving several separate and disputed constitutional questions of first impression, including: whether the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” includes within its “outer perimeter” at least five different forms of indicted conduct;5 whether inquiring into the President’s purpose for undertaking each form of that allegedly criminal conduct is constitutionally permissible in an immunity analysis, and whether any Presidential conduct “intertwined” with otherwise constitutionally immune actions also receives criminal immunity. See id. at 21–45. Because it concludes that former Presidents do not possess absolute federal criminal immunity for any acts committed while in office, however, the court need not reach those additional constitutional issues, and it expresses no opinion on them.

5 As another court in this district observed in a decision regarding Defendant’s civil immunity, “[t]his is not an easy issue. It is one that implicates fundamental norms of separation of powers and calls on the court to assess the limits of a President’s functions. And, historical examples to serve as guideposts are few.” Thompson v. Trump, 590 F. Supp. 3d 46, 74 (D.D.C. 2022); see id. at 81–84 (performing that constitutional analysis). The D.C. Circuit recently affirmed that district court’s decision with an extensive analysis of just one form of conduct—“speech on matters of public concern.” Blassingame v. Trump, Nos. 22-5069, 22-7030, 22-7031, slip op. at 23–42 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 1, 2023).

Instead, Chutkan argued — in language that likely preceded the Blassingame opinion, in a section on whether holding a former President criminally accountable will pose some of the harms to the presidency and government that suing a current or former President might — that no matter what the analysis is for civil immunity, criminal immunity is different.

The rationale for immunizing a President’s controversial decisions from civil liability does not extend to sheltering his criminality.

[snip]

For all these reasons, the constitutional consequences of federal criminal liability differ sharply from those of the civil liability at issue in Fitzgerald. Federal criminal liability will not impermissibly chill the decision-making of a dutiful Chief Executive or subject them to endless post-Presidency litigation. It will, however, uphold the vital constitutional values that Fitzgerald identified as warranting the exercise of jurisdiction: maintaining the separation of powers and vindicating “the public interest in an ongoing criminal prosecution.” 457 U.S. at 753–54. Exempting former Presidents from the ordinary operation of the criminal justice system, on the other hand, would undermine the foundation of the rule of law that our first former President described: “Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, [and] acquiescence in its measures”—“duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true liberty.” Washington’s Farewell Address at 13. Consequently, the constitutional structure of our government does not require absolute federal criminal immunity for former Presidents.

The analysis has to be different of course. If you can be impeached for using your office to extort campaign assistance, it should not be the case that you cannot, though, be criminally charged for that extortion.

This is an opinion about whether impeachment provides the sole recourse for holding a former President accountable.

Judge Chutkan provides a very neat solution to that problem, by noting that impeachment is just one of two ways to remove a President who has misused his office.

[T]here is another way, besides impeachment and conviction, for a President to be removed from office and thus subjected to “the ordinary course of law,” Federalist No. 69 at 348: As in Defendant’s case, he may be voted out. The President “shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Without reelection, the expiration of that term ends a Presidency as surely as impeachment and conviction. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (Marshall, Circuit Justice) (“[T]he president is elected from the mass of the people, and, on the expiration of the time for which he is elected, returns to the mass of the people again.”). Nothing in the Impeachment Judgment Clause prevents criminal prosecution thereafter. [my emphasis]

Because voters saw fit to remove Trump, Chutkan held, he can now be charged criminally.

Chutkan punts the other questions upstairs to the DC Circuit and from there to SCOTUS.

And while I think Chutkan’s analysis of the two impeachment issues — immunity and double jeopardy — is sound, I do worry that her treatment of several other issues — the things Trump included in his motion to dismiss on Constitutional grounds besides double jeopardy — got short shrift as a result.

Those issues have only been briefed since November 22. She and her clerks probably wrote that part of the opinion over Thanksgiving weekend. And far less of her opinion addressed those issues — seven pages for the First Amendment issues and four for matters of fair notice — than addressed the impeachment issue:

Background (what the indictment really charges) 1

Standard 5

Executive Immunity 6

    • Text of Constitution 6
    • Structure (concerns of public policy, addressing Fitzgerald) 14
      • Burdens on the Presidency 15-20
      • Public Interest 20-25
    • History 25-29
    • Summary 29-31

First Amendment 31

    • Core political speech of public concern 33
    • Statements advocating govt to act 35
    • Statements on 2020 Election 37

Double Jeopardy 38

Due Process 44 (4 pages)

Importantly, while she noted at the outset of her opinion (in the five page “background” section) that Trump totally misrepresented the indictment against him, she didn’t lay out how, in addition to speech-related actions charged as conspiracies, there are some actions that are more obviously fraud, such as the effort to counterfeit elector certificates or the knowingly false representations about Mike Pence’s intent. Trump’s misrepresentation of the indictment is really egregious, but Chutkan barely explains why that’s a problem in this opinion.

Both the First Amendment issues and the notice issues (particularly on 18 USC 1512, though there’s readily available language on 18 USC 241 charge in the Douglass Mackey case) have been addressed repeatedly in other January 6 cases. Since those cases will be appealed on a more leisurely pace than this one, I worry that the issues are not fully addressed. And those are the issues about which Clarence Thomas and Sammy Alito were most likely to intervene in any case.

This is an opinion about holding a former President accountable before he becomes President again. The danger is real: On the same day two courts ruled that Trump didn’t have absolute immunity for his conduct while he was President, his Georgia lawyer argued that if he wins in 2024, he can’t be tried on that case until 2029.

But for now, the matter has been sent to the DC Circuit to deal with.

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DC Circuit Rules that a President’s Speech as Candidate Is Not Official

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The DC Circuit just ruled that three lawsuits against Donald Trump (and others) for actions on January 6 can move forward.

Chief Judge Sri Srinivasan wrote the majority opinion, joined by Greg Katsas and Judith Rogers. He wrote:

When a sitting President acts in his capacity as a candidate for re-election, he acts as office-seeker, not office-holder.

But Katsas — a former Trump White House counsel and a Trump appointee — may have summarized the holding best.

Today, we do not definitively resolve that question. Instead, we hold only that we cannot resolve it on a motion to dismiss. Our conclusion rests on two propositions persuasively established by Chief Judge Srinivasan’s lead opinion. First, in certain limited contexts, courts may reliably conclude that a sitting President is speaking only in a private capacity as a candidate for re-election or as the leader of a political party. These include instances where the President speaks at a party convention, in a presidential debate, in a political advertisement, at a campaign rally, or at a party fundraiser. Second, the operative complaints plausibly allege that the January 6 speech involved this kind of purely private campaign speech. In particular, the complaints allege that the January 6 rally was organized by campaign staff and funded by private donors, and was neither facilitated by White House staff nor paid for with congressionally appropriated funds. Given those allegations, which remain to be tested on summary judgment or at trial, we cannot resolve the immunity question in President Trump’s favor at this stage of the case.

Trump never argued that his actions were official. Instead, he said that when a President speaks on matters of public interest, even as a candidate, he is entitled to immunity.

But all three judges rejected that view.

Srinivasan engaged in an extended discussion of how unfair it would be for a former President running to be elected President again if he were running against the sitting President — that is, the presumed state of the 2024 race. Under Trump’s scheme, Biden would be immune for anything he said as a candidate; Trump would not.

Under President Trump’s proposed public concern test, if the candidate happens to be the sitting President (but not if she is a former President or any other candidate), her speech in the ad would be official—even though it is plainly campaign speech in a campaign ad given in her private capacity as candidate. A sitting President then would be absolutely immune from defamation liability for something she may have said about her opponent in the campaign ad, whereas a former President would face liability for saying the very same thing in the very same ad.

The pro-incumbent imbalance would be especially stark if the former and current Presidents were to run against each other. In that situation, one candidate, the former President, would face civil damages liability for statements on matters of public concern in campaign ads or in an acceptance speech at a party convention. But the competing candidate, the sitting President, would be wholly insulated from damages liability for making the very same statements on the opposing side of the very same race. We see no basis for giving an incumbent President that kind of asymmetrical advantage when running against his predecessor.

This case — and Trump’s criminal case, presumably — will now focus on certain aspects of January 6 to test whether this was a campaign event or an official event. It will pivot on who paid for what and who organized the event.

There’s a big problem with this opinion. A sitting President cannot be prosecuted if he spends official resources for campaign events. Trump’s White House was repeatedly found to have broken the Hatch Act, and the President and Vice President are not covered by it. So a future Donald Trump (and indeed, all Presidents to some degree) will now have an incentive to bill taxpayers for all events so as to enjoy presidential immunity.

But for now, it’ll go back before Judge Mehta for a renewed discussion about whether this was an official presidential event or a campaign event.

Update: Fixed Judith Rogers/Janice Rogers Brown for probably the 100th time in my life.

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Hunter Biden Gets a Step Closer to Vindicating Twitter’s Takedown Decision

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Yesterday, as things moved closer to an expulsion vote for George Santos, activist “Anarchy Princess” taunted Santos staffer, Vish Burra, about whether he hacked Hunter Biden’s phone.

AP: Like the same way that you got into Hunter Biden’s stuff?

VB: [laughter]

AP: Yeah, didn’t you hack Hunter Biden’s shit, his phone or something?

VB: [turns to camera] Yeah, and I’d do it again.

Burra, who in 2020 was the producer of Steve Bannon’s podcast, has previously described “extracting” the contents of the “laptop” and took credit for hooking Bannon up with Emma-Jo Morris, who published the initial NY Post story.

Hunter Biden described Burra’s past claims in his lawsuit against Rudy Giuliani and Robert Costello for unlawfully accessing and manipulating his data.

As further evidence of Defendants’ illegal hacking of Plaintiff’s data, it recently has come to light that Defendant Giuliani apparently worked directly with Steve Bannon and Vish Burra to access, manipulate, and copy Plaintiff’s “laptop,” which Burra has dubbed the “Manhattan Project” because he and others “were essentially creating a nuclear political weapon,” referring to Burra’s work with Defendant Giuliani and others (Steve Bannon and Bernie Kerik) to manipulate the “laptop.”

But Burra has not, as far as I know, confessed to “hack[ing] Hunter Biden’s shit.”

Yesterday — whether in jest or not — he did.

Later that same day, Matt Taibbi and Michael Shellenberger had their semi-annual appearance before Jim Jordan’s Weaponizing Government committee.

At the hearing, Dan Goldman had this exchange with Shellenberger about the “Hunter Biden” “laptop:”

DG: You’ve talked about the Hunter Biden laptop, and how the FBI knew it existed. You are aware, of course, that the laptop, so to speak, was actually — that was published in the New York Post was actually a hard drive that the NY Post admitted — here! — was not authenticated as real. It was not the laptop the FBI had. You’re aware of that, right?

MS: It was the same contents.

DG: How do you know?

MS: Because it’s the same —

DG: You would have to authenticate it to know it was the same contents. You have no idea.

MS: [inaudible] conspiracy. Are you suggesting the NY Post participated in a conspiracy to construct the contents of the Hunter Biden laptop?

DG: No, sir, the problem is that hard drives can be manipulated by Rudy Giuliani or Russia.

MS: What’s the evidence that that happened?

DG: Well, there is actual evidence of it, but the point —

MS: There’s no evidence of it. You’re engaged in a conspiracy theory.

Miranda Devine (who keeps dog-whistling about Hunter Biden’s “expensive” lawyers) and the House GOP all seem to think this was a very clever exchange, as that’s the clip they all sent out to froth up the rubes.

Goldman is right: You’d need to authenticate the contents of the “laptop.” As I have shown, even the FBI had not checked whether anything was altered on the laptop they received while in John Paul Mac Isaac’s custody, ten months after receiving it. Their computer guy was still suggesting ways to do that on October 22, 2020, over a week after the NY Post story was published. At the time, Lesley Wolf — the villain of the Republican story — was in no rush to do so.

Understand, though: the critical question here is not whether the hard drive was authenticated. The question is whether it was hacked. Here’s how Vijaya Gadde described the decision to take down the original NY Post link in October 2020.

For example, on October 14th, 2020, the New York Post tweeted articles about Hunter Biden’s laptop with embedded images that look like they may have been obtained through hacking. In 2018, we had developed a policy intended to, to prevent Twitter from becoming a dumping ground for hacked materials. We applied this policy to the New York Post tweets and blocked links to the articles embedding those source materials. At no point did Twitter otherwise prevent tweeting, reporting, discussing or describing the contents of Mr. Biden’s laptop.

If the data in NY Post’s hands was hacked, then according to Twitter’s terms of service, links to it should have been taken down.

If the data in NY Post’s hands was hacked, then the takedown that Republicans claim was a violation of their speech was, in fact, adherence to Twitter’s terms of service as they existed at the time.

And Hunter Biden’s lawsuit alleges that Rudy Giuliani and Robert Costello unlawfully accessed — hacked — his data.

And yesterday, Burra — the guy who set up the tie between Bannon and the NY Post in the first place — laughingly agreed that he did hack Hunter Biden’s shit.

Now, Michael Shellenberger says there’s no evidence the data on the hard drive was altered by Burra and others. Miranda Devine says you have to take the word of the Bidens to believe that happened.

They said that the same day Burra laughingly said he would hack Hunter Biden again.

More importantly, you don’t have to go to the Bidens for evidence that the hard drive was altered. You can go to Garrett Ziegler, whom Hunter Biden has also accused of hacking his shit.

In the set of emails publicly released by Ziegler at BidenLaptopEmails dot com, there is an email from Hunter Biden’s Rosemont Seneca email account (hosted by Gmail), that was sent on September 1, 2020 ET (September 2 GMT).

It’s a resent version of an email sent in 2016 (DDOS says that a footer was also altered).

If everything John Paul Mac Isaac says is true, if everything Rudy Giuliani says is true, this “laptop” was in the custody of Rudy Giuliani (or Robert Costello, on Rudy’s behalf) on the date it was sent. Whoever resent this email — and it was sent over a year after Hunter left Burisma — it was added to the “laptop” while it was in Rudy’s custody.

I’ll leave it to the lawyers and the tech people to explain how an email set from an account hosted by Gmail was added to the hard drive from which Garrett Ziegler obtained his copy. I’ll leave it to the lawyers to argue about whether it would necessarily require unauthorized access to Hunter Biden’s Gmail or iCloud account for that email to be on the hard drive.

But it’s something that could not have been on the laptop when someone — allegedly Hunter Biden — dropped off a laptop at John Paul Mac Isaac’s shop on April 12, 2019. By all understandings of the dissemination of various hard drives — which Thomas Fine has illustrated this way — it would have been on what NY Post worked from on its October 14, 2020 story.

There’s no evidence, Michael Shellenberger said. You’re supposed to take the words of the Bidens, Miranda Devine said.

And on the same day they made those claims, Vish Burra said, of hacking Hunter Biden’s stuff, “Yeah, and I’d do it again.”

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Boris Epshteyn’s Absence and Presence in Trump’s Alleged Crime Spree

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ABC had a story yesterday revealing details about Trump attorney Jennifer Little’s role in the former president’s stolen document case. Most commentators are focused on the warning that Little testified she gave Trump: that failing to comply with a subpoena would be a crime.

But the backstory it tells is more interesting to me. It describes that Little — who continues to represent Trump on the Georgia case, though specialists in Georgia’s RICO law have also joined that team — was hired (the implication is, for the Georgia investigation) in March 2021 and only a year later did some other things for him.

Little was first hired by Trump in March 2021, only a couple of months after he left the White House, and shortly after authorities in Georgia launched their election-related probe. But more than a year later, she ended up briefly helping Trump with other matters.

When DOJ subpoenaed Trump in May 2022, Little suggested bringing in someone, “who had handled federal cases,”  which is reportedly why Evan Corcoran — someone totally inappropriate to a classified documents case, but someone who was then representing Steve Bannon in his contempt case — was brought in. In any case, I’m fairly certain Trump was already represented by people who had federal experience.

Little attended a May 23 meeting and, per ABC’s report, told Trump to take the subpoena seriously.

Four months later, believing Trump still possessed even more classified documents, the Justice Department issued its subpoena to him. Little suggested retaining an attorney who had handled federal cases before, so Corcoran was then hired, and she essentially handed over the matter to him, sources said.

On May 23, 2022 — 12 days after receiving the subpoena — Little and Corcoran met with the former president at Mar-a-Lago. It was Corcoran’s first time meeting Trump in person, and Little allegedly wanted to help ease Corcoran into his new role.

But, as sources described it to ABC News, Little told investigators she had a bigger purpose in going to that meeting: She wanted to explain to Trump that whatever happened before with the National Archives “just doesn’t matter,” especially because Trump never swore to them, under the penalty of perjury, that he had turned everything over, sources said. But whatever happens now has “a legal ramification,” Little said she tried to emphasize to Trump, according to the sources. [emphasis of passive voice my own]

That means that Little — and not Boris Epshteyn, as I and others had suspected — is Trump Attorney 2 in the indictment.

The indictment describes that Little and Evan Corcoran informed Trump about the subpoena, after which he authorized Corcoran, not Little, to accept service. The two lawyers met with Trump together on May 23.

53. On May 11, 2022, the grand jury issued a subpoena (the “May 11 Subpoena”) to The Office of Donald J. Trump requiring the production of all documents with classification markings in the possession, custody, or control of TRUMP or The Office of Donald J. Trump. Two attorneys representing TRUMP (“Trump Attorney 1” and “Trump Attorney 2”) informed TRUMP of the May 11 Subpoena, and he authorized Trump Attorney 1 to accept service.

54. On May 22, 2022, NAUTA entered the Storage Room at 3:47 p.m. and left approximately 34 minutes later, carrying one of TRUMP’s boxes.

55. On May 23, 2022, TRUMP met with Trump Attorney 1 and Trump Attorney 2 at The Mar-a-Lago Club to discuss the response to the May 11 Subpoena. Trump Attorney 1 and Trump Attorney 2 told TRUMP that they needed to search for documents that would be responsive to the subpoena and provide a certification that there had been compliance with the subpoena. TRUMP, in sum and substance, made the following statements, among others, as memorialized by Trump Attorney 1:

a. I don’t want anybody looking, I don’t want anybody looking through my boxes, I really don’t, I don’t want you looking through my boxes.

b. Well what if we, what happens if we just don’t respond at all or don’t play ball with them?

c. Wouldn’t it be better if we just told them we don’t have anything here?

d. Well look isn’t it better if there are no documents?

56. While meeting with Trump Attorney 1 and Trump Attorney 2 on May 23, TRUMP, in sum and substance, told the following story, as memorialized by Trump Attorney 1:

[Attorney], he was great, he did a great job. You know what? He said, he said that it – that it was him. That he was the one who deleted all of her emails, the 30,000 emails, because they basically dealt with her scheduling and her going to the gym and her having beauty appointments. And he was great. And he, so she didn’t get in any trouble because he said that he was the one who deleted them.

TRUMP related the story more than once that day.

57. On May 23, TRUMP also confirmed his understanding with Trump Attorney 1 that Trump Attorney 1 would return to The Mar-a-Lago Club on June 2 to search for any documents with classification markings to produce in response to the May 11 Subpoena. Trump Attorney 1 made it clear to TRUMP that Trump Attorney 1 would conduct the search for responsive documents by looking through TRUMP’s boxes that had been transported from the White House and remained in storage at The Mar-a-Lago Club. TRUMP indicated that he wanted to be at The Mar-a-Lago Club when Trump Attorney 1 returned to review his boxes on June 2, and that TRUMP would change his summer travel plans to do so. TRUMP told Trump Attorney 2 that Trump Attorney 2 did not need to be present for the review of boxes.

This section of the indictment relies heavily on Corcoran’s notes. Perhaps the only thing that relies on Little’s testimony is the description that Trump told her she did not have to be present to review the boxes — in retrospect, a weird decision, since the task of reviewing the contents of 35 or so boxes in one day is pretty daunting.

The indictment does not include the warning that ABC describes Little giving.

But, she told Trump, if there are any more classified documents, failing to return all of them moving forward will be “a problem,” especially because the subpoena requires a signed certification swearing full compliance, the sources said.

“Once this is signed — if anything else is located — it’s going to be a crime,” sources quoted Little as recalling she told Trump.

The sources said that when investigators asked Little if those messages to Trump “landed,” she responded: “Absolutely.”

The former president said something to the effect of, “OK, I get it,'” the sources said she recalled to investigators.

ABC notes in the story that they previously broke the news of Corcoran giving Trump warnings, warnings which also don’t appear in the indictment.

ABC News reported in September that, according to the notes and what Corcoran later told investigators, Corcoran had warned Trump that if he didn’t comply with the subpoena, he could face legal trouble and that the FBI might search his estate.

As I noted, I and others had previously assumed that Attorney 2 was Boris Epshteyn. That’s because he was centrally involved in this process: he had previously been credited with hiring Corcoran (which is why I bolded the passive voice reference above), he was reported to have recruited Christina Bobb to be the fall-gal on the false declaration, he pushed an aggressive strategy, and then he attempted to retroactively claim that at the time he was doing that, he was representing Trump as a lawyer, not a political consultant.

Remarkably, reporting on Boris’ role in all this has completely disappeared from the story.

Reports obviously sourced to witnesses friendly to the defendant are often an attempt to share information otherwise covered by a protective order with those potentially exposed: it’s a way to compare stories without leaving an obvious trail of witness tampering.

And this story, revealing details of testimony that would be of interest to the quasi-lawyers who were also involved in this process but who weren’t even mentioned in the indictment, comes just weeks after another such leak, of the video testimony from flipped witnesses in the Georgia case.

There may have been two leaks: one, of just the depositions of Jenna Ellis and Sidney Powell, to ABC, and a second, of fragments of the depositions of all four known cooperating witnesses, to WaPo. The lawyer for Misty Hampton, implicated with Powell in the Coffee County plot, admitted to leaking the videos, or at least some of them. But that doesn’t explain why there appear to be two sets of videos.

The ABC set describes Jenna Ellis describing first learning about the fake elector plot from an text thread Epshteyn initiated.

Ellis, who in her remarks alternated between speaking on and off the record with prosecutors, instead discussed only the context surrounding the two incidents she couldn’t divulge, including saying that she first learned about the concept of the fake electors plot from Giuliani and current Trump adviser Boris Epshteyn.

“There was one group [text] thread that Boris initiated when — which was the first time that I learned of it — asking me to just join a phone call,” Ellis told prosecutors, who then stopped her from discussing the details of the call.

The WaPo report includes a version of that.

The former Trump attorney also told prosecutors that she was asked to join a Dec. 7, 2020, conference call with Giuliani and two other Trump campaign officials — Mike Roman, who is also charged in the Georgia case, and Epshteyn — as they talked “legal strategy” with several Republicans who were slated to serve as Trump electors in Pennsylvania.

Ellis said she had not initially been privy to the “fake elector plot” and believed “it had been shielded from me specifically” — though she did not elaborate on why. Ellis said she became aware of the effort when she was added to a group text chain about the plan that included Giuliani, Epshteyn, Roman and Eastman.

It also adds Kenneth Chesebro’s description that Epshteyn, not Rudy Giuliani, was quarterbacking Trump’s efforts to undermine the election.

At one point, a prosecutor asked Chesebro who he thought was “quarterbacking” the Trump campaign’s legal efforts — Giuliani, Eastman or Epshteyn. Chesebro replied that it appeared to be Epshteyn. Epshteyn declined to comment.

Remember: Epshteyn is not charged in the Georgia indictment; Epshteyn is unindicted co-conspirator 3. Mike Roman is charged for the coordinating that both accomplished.

Epshteyn is, however, believed to be co-conspirator 6 in the DC indictment.

I suggested during the discussions about a protective order in DC that Epshteyn may have been the person prosecutors had in mind when objecting to including “other attorney[s] assisting counsel of record” in the case, not least because Trump attorney Todd Blanche also represents Epshteyn.

Epshteyn is not just someone who is known to have been closely involved in the fake elector conspiracy, but he is someone who in the stolen document case served as an “other attorney assisting counsel of record.” Crazier still, Epshteyn shares an attorney with Trump: Todd Blanche, who represents Trump in the Alvin Bragg case, the stolen documents case, and now the January 6 case. Epshteyn, who has never filed a notice of appearance for Trump, has followed him around to his various arraignments as if he is family.

If DOJ has a specific concern about Trump sharing discovery with Epshteyn — who has been centrally involved in Trump’s efforts to combat his legal jeopardy by attacking rule of law — this is the kind of objection they might raise.

I had already contemplated whether some of the exhibits submitted with a discovery motion (which on reflection, was submitted by Blanche) were intended to share information, including details about what Trump is trying to obtain under CIPA. For example, the initial 49-page discovery memo included with the motion would be really valuable to any unindicted co-conspirators who might find a way to access the unredacted copy submitted under seal. Aside from references to the general January 6 database (which is mentioned at more length in another file submitted), it is otherwise only cited for references to this redacted paragraph that by context appears to pertain to discovery relating to the Secret Service.

The motion itself has helpful details about how prosecutors on one Jack Smith investigation sat in on interviews of witnesses in the other Jack Smith investigation.

For example, the Special Counsel’s Office used the same grand jury in this District for matters relating to both cases. Assistant Special Counsel John Pellettieri has appeared on behalf of the Office in this case and in the Florida Case. Senior Assistant Special Counsel (“SASC”) Thomas Windom, who has entered a notice of appearance for the prosecution in this case, participated in at least 27 of the interviews described in discovery produced in the Southern District of Florida. SASC Julie Edelstein, counsel of record in the Florida Case, participated in 29 of the interviews that have been produced in discovery in this case. Jay Bratt, also counsel of record in the Florida Case and Counselor to the Special Counsel, participated in 10 of the interviews that have been produced in discovery in this case. Notwithstanding the clear overlap of personnel and intermixed responsibilities, the Office has sought to artificially narrow its definition of the prosecution team to an unidentified subset of individuals who, apparently in its sole judgment, “are working on this case.” Ex. D. Not so. As the entire Office has participated in this prosecution, both in fact and by General Garland’s Order, the entire Office is subject to the prosecution’s discovery obligations.

This is likely highly misleading: for people who are witnesses in both cases — as, for example, Molly Michael and Alex Cannon would be — DOJ shared both sets of witness 302s in both places (and so some of the Edelstein and Bratt interviews would simply be stolen document interviews shared in January 6 discovery and some of the Windom interviews would be the counterpart). But it is also likely the case that some prosecutors sat in on interviews that would touch on investigative subjects of interest.

Then there’s Blanche’s treatment of it. After objecting back in September when DOJ submitted a filing along with the motion to seal it, that’s what Trump did here (for which Judge Chutkan scolded them), so if DOJ had any objection to the non-redactions in these filings, it would have been too late.

Boris Epshteyn, who was the focus for months of reporting about his role in Trump’s twin federal indictments, has all but disappeared. Indeed, ABC’s scoop about Little makes clear that his reportedly significant role in the stolen documents case never even made the indictment.

But as other recent leaks make clear, his role in both alleged felony conspiracies remains significant.

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Donald Trump Insists He’s Too Special To Use Same Database 1,200 Other January 6 Defendants Have Used

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In addition to his claim that he needs a bunch of intelligence so he can try to distinguish his influence operations from those of Russian spies, Donald Trump also submitted a filing claiming that Jack Smith has not done an expansive enough search on discovery.

To understand how frivolous this filing is, consider that it complains that Jack Smith has not included DC USAO materials on the January 6 investigation in its discovery to Trump.

Since the Order, the Special Counsel’s Office has enjoyed constructive access to USAODC documents. In an August 11, 2023 discovery letter, the Office wrote that the USAO-DC “maintains a separate database of materials comprising discovery in the criminal cases related to the breach of the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.” Ex. G at 6. The letter stated that the “investigative team” in this case had “accessed certain materials within that database and has taken into its possession certain materials that the investigative team may rely upon or use at trial.” Id. Given these alignments, there is no question that the USAO-DC is part of the prosecution team.

Twice over the course of these discovery letters, DOJ has told Trump if he wants access to the full database provided to all the other January 6 defendants, he can get it.

As we advised you, in the course of our investigation, we accessed certain materials within that database, took into our possession certain materials that we may rely upon or use at trial, and produced them to you in discovery in our case. In our August 11 letter, we also offered to facilitate your access to the USAO database. We reiterate that offer now.

In response, Trump complained about DOJ’s unwillingness to identify everything in the database that might be helpful.

Seeking to avoid that obligation, the prosecution’s November 25 letter again directed our attention to a “a separate database of materials comprising discovery in criminal cases related to the breach of the Capitol on January 6, 2021.” Ex. F at 3; see also Ex. G at 6. Like SASC Windom’s “full access to the FBI’s trove of evidence about Oath Keeper and Proud Boy extremists involved in the riot,” Doc. 116-1 at 9, the Office’s conceded access to the USAO-DC’s database further supports President Trump’s position that the USAO-DC is part of the prosecution team.

However, it is not enough for the prosecution to offer the defense access to materials produced in those cases. “The government cannot meet its Brady obligations by providing [the defendant] with access to 600,000 documents and then claiming that [the defendant] should have been able to find the exculpatory information in the haystack.” United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 14, 29-30 (D.D.C. 1998). In United States v. Saffarinia, the court relied on Hsia and agreed with the defense that “the government’s Brady obligations require it to identify any known Brady material to the extent that the government knows of any such material in its production of approximately 3.5 million pages of documents.” 424 F. Supp. 3d 46, 86 (D.D.C. 2020); see also United States v. Singhal, 876 F. Supp. 2d 82, 104 (D.D.C. 2012) (directing prosecutors to disclose the “identity (by Bates number) of the specific witness statements and documents” that are “producible as Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) documents material to preparing the defense, regardless of whether those documents are inculpatory or exculpatory”). The discovery in this case dwarfs that at issue in Hsia and Saffarinia, and the prosecution must identify information that is subject to Brady by doing more than pointing to another huge database.

This issue has already been litigated, repeatedly, in other January 6 cases. His demand for more is a demand to be treated better than the people at the Capitol, the people actually depicted in and/or who took the video.

The argument itself is largely an attempt to exploit the fact that the defendant was once the President and so interacted with all parts of government. As DOJ quipped in an October 24 letter:

To point out but a few of the exceedingly broad errors in your assertion, the prosecution team does not include the almost three million civilian, active duty, and reserve members of the Department of Defense; the 260,000 employees of the Department of Homeland Security (or its CISA component); or the Intelligence Community writ large. Furthermore, your attempt to serve Rule 17(c) subpoenas, ECF No. 99—definitionally reserved for non-party witnesses—on the House Select Committee’s successor entity and a member of the White House Counsel’s Office confirms your understanding that those entities are not members of the prosecution team.

It is not rooted in the actual evidence in the case or — as with virtually all the filings Trump’s teams have made — the actual charges against him.

That said, the associated filings are of some interest. It’s just that Trump’s team submitted them in the least useful way possible. I’ve put them below, in order.

Reading them together reveals that some of what Trump requested in his unclassified discovery request last night — such as the request for the classified backup to the 2016 ICA or the opportunity for foreign powers to hack the 2020 election — were already covered in DOJ’s motion to strike his CIPA 5 request.

Reading them together also shows a progression. As I’ve noted, his original request asked for:

43. Please provide all documents relating to communications or coordination by the Special Counsel’s Office and DOJ with any of the Biden Administration, the Biden Campaign, Hunter Biden, the Biden family, the Biden White House, or any person representing Joe Biden.

In the first response, DOJ addressed that question (and question 37(b) for materials on Executive Privilege) by describing five Executive Privilege waiver reviews

37b. The defendant was party to five miscellaneous matters regarding assertion of the executive privilege. Attachments to filings in those five matters included letters from the incumbent White House declining to invoke executive privilege over certain witness testimony. The defendant already has those materials.

Trump must have made a follow-up at the November 21 meet-and-confer, because DOJ addressed it again, saying that whatever he wants is not in the prosecution team’s possession and not covered by discovery obligations.

Requests 33, 40, 42, 43, and 44 seek information that exceeds the scope of our discovery obligations, is not within the possession of the prosecution team, and/or does not exist.

One interesting redaction in this most recent exchange pertains to Trump’s request for injuries of law enforcement on January 6.

2. If you intend to introduce evidence at trial of any injuries sustained to law enforcement or anyone else at the Capitol on January 6, 2021, please provide all documents regarding those injured during the protest at the Capitol, including medical records.

DOJ’s response to that is entirely redacted, suggesting that DOJ may well submit records of injuries, such as the heart attack Danny Rodriguez caused after being especially riled up at Trump’s rally.

Finally, of significant interest: Trump asks for the identities of all the people who’ve flipped.

16. Please provide all documents regarding offers of immunity, forgoing of prosecution, diversion, USSG 5K1.1 reductions, or any other consideration to persons under investigation or charged regarding activities related to January 6th.

DOJ included that request among those about which it said Trump was not entitled to discovery.

Requests 15-19, 34-36. All of these requests—regarding the pipe bomb investigation, offers of immunity to January 6 defendants, “Antifa,” sources, and various named and unnamed January 6 offenders—appear to be focused on others’ actions related to the January 6 attack on the Capitol. Many of them request information that exceeds the scope of our discovery obligations and/or is not within the possession of the prosecution team. To the extent that we possess any such materials, we have produced them to you. Relatedly, in our meet and confer, you stated that you believe that in certain other cases, the Department of Justice has taken a position inconsistent with the indictment’s allegations that the defendant is responsible for the events of January 6. We disagree. The Department’s position in other January 6 cases that the defendant’s actions did not absolve any individual rioter of responsibility for that rioter’s actions—even if the rioter took them at the defendant’s direction—is in no way inconsistent with the indictment’s allegations here.

Trump continues to argue he’s better than the members of his mob. And he’s trying to avoid being held accountable for any near murders his incitement caused.

August 11 DOJ letter accompanying first classified discovery; includes redacted reference to Secret Service at 6,

October 6 Trump letter addressing Document 1 and Document 5

October 23 Trump discovery letter with seven requests redacted (Unredacted copy)

October 24 DOJ response to classified discovery letter, describing scope of prosecution team

November 3 DOJ response to October 23 discovery letter rejecting most requests and telling Trump where to find some of it in discovery; this has a number of specific references to the requests in the October 23 letter

November 15 Trump discovery letter making broad requests for January 6 discovery

November 25 DOJ response to November 15 letter and November 21 meet-and-confer, providing additional responses to October 23 requests

Exhibit H (sealed; pertains to reason Bill Barr changed Public Integrity’s approach to voter fraud claims)

Exhibit I (sealed; follow-up to letter Molly Gaston and JP Cooney sent about PIN)

Exhibit J (sealed; involvement of National Security Division in January 6 cases)

Exhibit K (sealed; involvement from FBI WFO on January 2)

Exhibit L (sealed; involvement from FBI WFO on January 3)

Exhibit M (sealed; reference to DHS I&A as attempt to get to CISA Election Task Force; ODNI involvement)

Exhibit N (sealed; related to DHS involvement in March 2021 report on 2020 election)

Exhibit O (sealed; related to DHS involvement on January 6)

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