Mark Meadows’ Proffer

I continue to dig through the document dump Judge Aileen Cannon finally released the other day.

The dump included 70 exhibits (some FOIAed documents) submitted in conjunction with Trump’s motion to compel discovery and a few exhibits submitted with the government’s response.

The most titillating of the latter set is a November 2022 interview with Person 16 (whom I suspect to be Eric Herschmann, in part because Herschmann relishes giving titillating interviews in which he calls other lawyers morons).

But for the moment, I want to look at Person 27’s December 2022 proffer.

While the government is coy about the identity of Person 16, they’re not hiding Person 27’s identity: It is Mark Meadows.

The passages below, matched to the corresponding exhibits, makes it clear that Person 27 is Trump’s former Chief of Staff. Said Chief of Staff briefly got involved in the document recovery effort after NARA first threatened to make a referral to DOJ, then threatened to deem the boxes Trump had taken destroyed. Said Chief of Staff traveled to Mar-a-Lago in October 2021 (at a time when discussing the January 6 investigation would have been fruitful) and while there asked if Trump wanted help searching boxes, only to be told that Trump didn’t need help returning documents he wanted to keep.

A succession of Trump PRA representatives corresponded with NARA without ever resolving any of NARA’s concerns about the boxes of Presidential records that had been identified as missing in January 2021. By the end of June 2021, NARA had still received no update on the boxes, despite repeated inquiries, and it informed the PRA representatives that the Archivist had directed NARA personnel to seek assistance from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), “which is the necessary recourse when we are unable to obtain the return of improperly removed government records that belong in our custody.” Exhibit B at USA-00383980; see 44 U.S.C. § 2905(a) (providing for the Archivist to request the Attorney General to institute an action for the recovery of records). That message precipitated the involvement of Trump’s former White House Chief of Staff, who engaged the Archivist directly at the end of July. See Exhibit 4 Additional weeks passed with no results, and by the end of August 2021, NARA still had received nothing from Trump or his PRA representatives. Id. Independently, the House of Representatives had requested Presidential records from NARA, further heightening the urgency of NARA obtaining access to the missing boxes. Id. On August 30, the Archivist notified Trump’s former Chief of Staff that he would assume the boxes had been destroyed and would be obligated to report that fact to Congress, DOJ, and the White House. Id. The former Chief of Staff promptly requested a phone call with the Archivist. Id.

[snip]

Fall passes with little progress in retrieving the missing records. In September 2021, one of Trump’s PRA representatives expressed puzzlement over the suggestion that there were 24 boxes missing, asserting that only 12 boxes had been found in Florida. Exhibit 7 at USA00383682, USA-00383684. In an effort to resolve “the dispute over whether there are 12 or 24 boxes,” NARA officials discussed with Su the possibility of convening a meeting with two of Trump’s PRA representatives—the former Chief of Staff and the former Deputy White House Counsel—and “possibly” Trump’s former White House Staff Secretary. Id. at USA-00383682. On October 19, 2021, a call took place among WHORM Official 1, another WHORM employee, Trump’s former Chief of Staff, the former Deputy White House Counsel, and Su about the continued failure to produce Presidential records, but the call did not lead to a resolution. See Exhibit A at USA-00815672. Again, there was no complaint from either of Trump’s PRA representatives about Su’s participation in the call. Later in October, the former Chief of Staff traveled to the Mar-a-Lago Club to meet with Trump for another reason, but while there brought up the missing records to Trump and offered to help look for or review any that were there. Exhibit C at USA-00820510. Trump, however, was not interested in any assistance. Id. On November 21, 2021, another former member of Trump’s Administration traveled to Mar-a-Lago to speak with him about the boxes. Exhibit D at USA-00818227–USA-00818228. That individual warned Trump that he faced possible criminal exposure if he failed to return his records to NARA. Id

[my emphasis, links added]

These passages, collectively, serve to rebut Trump’s claim that the involvement of Biden White House attorney Jonathan Su was in any way investigative or improper; the passage shows that Patrick Philbin involved Su, his successor as White House Deputy Counsel, and the White House had to further intervene when Meadows tried to reach out to a White House Office of Records and Management person, Person 40, directly.

This ABC story describing Meadows’ testimony, describing offering to help but being rebuffed, further corroborates that Person 27 is Meadows.

The former chief of staff also told investigators that shortly after the National Archives first requested the return of the official documents taken to Mar-a-Lago in 2021, he offered to Trump that he would go through the former president’s boxes to retrieve the official records and send them back to Washington. Meadows told investigators Trump did not accept his offer, according to sources.

So Government Exhibit C is a December 6, 2022 proffer from Mark Meadows.

I’m not so much interested in the content of that proffer. As ABC has reported, Meadows’ testimony was iterative, slowly evolving over at least three interviews as he was presented with more evidence of details that Jack Smith knew. Aside from a mostly redacted reference to Trump’s delegation of declassification authority (which may relate to the effort to declassify the Crossfire Hurricane binder and which might not be entirely true), the description of his trip to Mar-a-Lago to offer to help is the most interesting bit in this proffer.

But that’s the thing about proffers, offered by one of the best attorneys representing any Trumpster, George Terwilliger, offered before Beryl Howell overruled any Executive Privilege claims, and offered before the Georgia indictment made Meadows’ operative January 6 story told in DC less sustainable.

Proffers are the story you want to tell, not the full story.

As I wrote last August, after the first of ABC’s big scoops,

[T]his is not the testimony of a cooperating witness. It is the testimony of someone prosecutors have coaxed to tell the truth by collecting so much evidence there’s no longer room to do otherwise.

There are a number of things to which Meadows eventually testify, per ABC’s reporting, that are not in this proffer. The most notable pertains to his ghost writers, on which topic his testimony evolved to accept that they were probably right that Trump was sharing classified documents in 2021.

“On the couch in front of the President’s desk, there’s a four-page report typed up by Mark Milley himself,” the draft reads. “It shows the general’s own plan to attack Iran, something he urged President Trump to do more than once during his presidency. … When President Trump found this plan in his old files this morning, he pointed out that if he had been able to make this declassified, it would probably ‘win his case.'”

Sources told ABC News that Meadows was questioned by Smith’s investigators about the changes made to the language in the draft, and Meadows claimed, according to the sources, that he personally edited it out because he didn’t believe at the time that Trump would have possessed a document like that at Bedminster.

Meadows also said that if it were true Trump did indeed have such a document, it would be “problematic” and “concerning,” sources familiar with the exchange said. Meadows said his perspective changed on whether his ghostwriter’s recollection could have been accurate, given the later revelations about the classified materials recovered from Mar-a-Lago in the months since his book was published, the sources said.

According to ABC, where Meadows’ other testimony would evolve to is that he would have been more diligent than Trump returning stolen documents.

Meadows also told investigators that he would have responded differently than Trump when the National Archives first asked Trump to return all remaining presidential records in his possession, and would have been very diligent in his handling of the initial search for documents to return to NARA, sources familiar with the matter said.

It’s unclear if there’s an “if” involved in this conditional statement, such as “if he knew Trump was stealing classified documents.”

That’s interesting, because in that proffer, Meadows claimed not to believe Trump had Presidential Records at all.

In July 2021, [Philbin] informed [Meadows] that NARA had contacted [Philbin] regarding missing boxes of documents. [Meadows] was already planning to travel to Mar-a-Lago for an unrelated meeting and offered to look for the missing boxes while [he] was there. [Meadows] was skeptical there were any presidential records as [he] believed, based on [his] experience with FPOTUS at the White House, that the boxes likely only contained newspapers.

Again, there’s a pretty big chance that this particular claim evolved, just like Meadows’ explanation for why he edited a really damning description from his ghost writers. The proffer is a baseline, a place from which prosecutors could slowly coax testimony closer to the truth, all the while locking in useful testimony to rebut Trump’s most outlandish claims. In this case, after all, the testimony is critical to rebutting Trump’s complaints about the involvement of Su, whether or not the testimony was entirely forthcoming, even while not giving anything away.

And I’m interested in it for that reason as well.

This proffer doesn’t tell us how Meadows would later testify. It doesn’t give anything away.

Robert Mueller’s team tried to flip witnesses against Trump, only to find that Trump bought them off with pardons — something that Person 16 describes already got promised to Walt Nauta. Here, there’s a far larger cast of characters, including people like Meadows who are central to all of Trump’s suspected crimes and also likely to welcome an offer of a pardon in exchange for loyalty. This slow squeeze is a different approach.

And along the way, Jack Smith got useful testimony — testimony that will give him what he needs to go to trial — but testimony that also can be used to inch closer to the truth.

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Trump’s Attorney-Client Leak Privilege

Pursuant to Judge Cannon’s order, her clerk has finally unsealed the substance of a complaint from Stan Woodward floated last summer: That, in a August 24, 2022 meeting, Jay Bratt insinuated that if Walt Nauta didn’t cooperate against Trump, then he’d lose his opportunity to be a Superior Court Judge. Here’s the letter presenting Woodward’s side of the story and here’s Jay Bratt’s explanation.

In his explanation of the dispute for Judge Cannon, Woodward repeatedly denied being the source for leaks to the press because “we litigate our cases in Court.” He even explained that multiple people got ahold of a longer letter including his complaint, but reporters, “agreed not to disclose defense counsel’s identity at defense counsel’s request because, we litigate our cases in Court.” That’s the same reason Woodward provided for not correcting Trump’s Truth Social attacks,

alleging prosecutors with the special counsel’s office had attempted to ‘bribe & intimidate’ a lawyer representing a witness in the case and claimed that the lawyer had been offered an, ‘”important judgship” in the Biden administration’ if the client ‘”flips” on President Trump.’

As Stan Woodward tells it, he spent a whole lot of time instructing journalists precisely how they should report on these allegations, but without correcting any false claims made by Trump.

It turns out, though, that Woodward’s complaint is not the only one Trump used in a bid to get grand jury testimony unsealed back in June 2023, after getting a target letter. Trump made a bunch of allegations:

  • Brett Reynolds was anxious to get Kash Patel to testify under the schedule when Beryl Howell had ordered it to occur even after Patel hired Stan Woodward just as the Oath Keeper trial tied up his schedule for months
  • Prosecutors asked Chamberlain Harris for a password to the laptop on which she had some classified information and she provided it
  • They gave Margo Martin somewhere between 72 hours and six days notice for a grand jury subpoena
  • They obtained a warrant for Carlos De Oliveira’s phone after having issued a subpoena for content because he hadn’t turned over a message from Nauta instructing him to cover up a July 10, 2022 return to Mar-a-Lago by Nauta and Trump
  • Tim Parlatore invoked attorney-client privilege 45 times during a grand jury appearance

It’s the last one that is the most remarkable. As Jack Smith explained — before even addressing the Woodward claims — the reason Parlatore was testifying before the grand jury in the first places was because Trump refused to have a real custodian of records attest to the thoroughness of the searches of Trump’s other properties for remaining stolen documents. As a result, Parlatore agreed to sit for a grand jury interview at which he would make item by item privilege claims about the thoroughness of the search he had overseen.

It was the same stunt Trump pulled with Christina Bobb in June 2022.

That part of Jack Smith’s response provides a ton more details about Parlatore’s efforts to string out prosecutors in fall 2022.

Trump made claims of abuse about one question in particular: whether Trump was the source for false claims Parlatore made about how cooperative Trump was during the June 2022 Jay Bratt visit, at which Parlatore was not present.

At one point, Parlatore ciaimed attorney-client privilege after being asked whether the former President was the source for Parlatore’s testimony about statements the former President purportedly made to government investigators about being cooperative. GJTr.40. The prosecutor then asked if a client could waive privilege and questioned why the former President had not allowed Parlatore to testify as to these conversations if he (the former President) meant to be cooperative, but the government prosecutor also quickly made clear that she was “absolutely not saying” that waiver of privilege is required to be cooperative and that, consistent with her earlier statement, she did not mean to “induce any waivers.”GJTr.40-43. Nonetheless, Parlatore on several occasions accused the government prosecutors of “trying to improperly invade the attorney/client privilege.”GJTr.45. see also GJTr.77. After one such accusation, a government prosecutor conveyed to Parlatore that “if [he] want[ed] to invoke the privilege, [he] can just say that” instead of casting aspersions about “what the people on this side of the table are and are not trying to do.”

In short, it was designed to create the opportunity to claim abuse, and Trump then claimed it.

What’s so interesting about the allegation — besides all the details of Parlatore stringing along prosecutors — is that shortly before this complaint, Parlatore loudly left Trump’s team and fairly routinely ran his mouth about details of Trump’s legal team. That is, Parlatore was more forthcoming with CNN than he was with the grand jury. And per a Hugo Lowell story, Parlatore shared a transcript of this grand jury appearance before Trump demanded a transcript of this grand jury appearance.

It’s all so predictable and obvious.

But … eight months later, it still seems to work wonders for Aileen Cannon.

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Trump’s Nuclear Documents Were Mixed with Post-Presidential Press Clippings

Some of the most interesting documents from the exhibits released with Trump’s motion to compel discovery yesterday pertain to the review of the original 15 documents returned in January 2022. This email thread within NARA describes an initial review of the documents. And these tables describe what the FBI found on initial review.

Together, they go a long way to describing why FBI had to pursue a criminal, rather than just a countrintelligence, investigation.

The initial review was written on January 18, the same day the 15 boxes arrived in DC. That initial review and a follow-up confirmed that NARA had received the things they had originally asked for: the weather map that Trump had altered, plus an accordian folder including the other documents they were seeking.

There was one accordian folder in the mess so it stood out. It contained, among other things, the Obama letter and North Korea correspondence. We need to verify that all of the correspondence is in there. But I think we are in good shape.

But even before discovering that, the person who wrote the memo described how an initial glance revealed classified documents, and a closer look after moving the boxes to a SCIF revealed news clippings that post-dated Trump’s presidency.

My plan was to glance into each box before I shelved it so I could give y’all a high level overview. As I fanned through the pile of newspapers at the top of the first box, I found several unfoldered classified docs in between some of the newspapers. So I took all the boxes to the SCIF. The first box I picked up in the SCIF had a newspaper on top that was post 1/20/2021. At that point I decided to take a closer look in each box to see if there are other issues that you three, David, and Deb might want to know about sooner than later.

From the start then, NARA knew that someone else at Mar-a-Lago had been accessing classified information after the end of his presidency.

For comparison, the FBI found that there were post-VP folders in a box with the Afghan documents at the core of Robert Hur’s investigation into Biden’s classified documents, but those were separate folders.

The person described that most of those classified documents — as claimed by Trump’s lawyers — were “state briefing papers and briefing cards” prepping Trump to talk to foreign leaders. But they “saw several docs that I think are PDBs” and “also found an incredibly sensitive SAP [Special Access Program] document.”

The person also found several things that Congress had requested.

I did see some material related to 1/6 and COVID. And at close glance I believe one of the classified docs is responsive to a third Congressional request. So we will need to review all of these boxes.

In other words, from the start there were two reasons for NARA to look more closely: the classified documents, but also the documents that Congress had already requested.

The FBI report, done a month later, provides three tables categorizing the classified documents found in those boxes. The single SAP document found by the NARA person, for example, is a 6-page memo dated to 2019.

In box 3, the FBI found three FRD (Formerly Restricted, an Atomic Energy Act designation that Presidents cannot override by themselves) documents totalling 57 pages.

All the FRD documents date to November 12, 2019, so they may pertain to Iran’s decision to resume enrichment at their Fordow facility announced on November 6.

Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said on Nov. 6 that 696 of the centrifuges allowed at Fordow would be used for enriching uranium up to 4.5 percent uranium-235, slightly above the 3.67 percent U-235 limit set by the deal. The remaining 348 machines will be used for medical isotope production, he said.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed in its Nov. 11 report that Iran began enrichment at the site on Nov. 9.

This is the fourth step Tehran has taken in breach of its JCPOA commitments over the past six months. In May 2019, Rouhani said Iran would “reduce compliance” with its nuclear obligations under the deal in response to the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the deal in May 2018 and its reimposition of sanctions in violation of the accord. (See ACT, June 2019.)

The other parties to the deal (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the European Union) criticized Iran’s decision, but said they remain committed to preserving the nuclear deal.

In a Nov. 11 joint statement, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, the UK and the EU foreign chief said the Fordow decision “represents a regrettable acceleration of Iran’s disengagement” from its commitments under the nuclear deal.

The FBI noted that the single NATO document, a slide dated two days after the FRD ones, would trigger treaty obligations.

I argued in October 2022 that Trump’s strategy with these 15 boxes curated personally by Trump appear to mirror Trump’s disinformation strategy generally: to bury his crimes behind literal and figurative press clippings. It sounds like these initial documents actually had a higher proportion of press clippings than the documents ultimately seized in the Mar-a-Lago search.

But he tripped up: By including post-presidential clippings amid his nuclear documents, Trump gave investigators more reason to look, rather than less.

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Trump’s White House Didn’t Archive Twitter DMs

After a long wait, Judge Aileen Cannon has finally docketed the exhibits behind Trump’s motion to compel discovery in the Trump stolen documents case. Much of the dispute centers on claims that the Archives exhibited political bias because they wanted to archive Trump’s presidential materials.

As such, the exhibits include details about NARA’s efforts to archive the Twitter accounts Trump and others used during their tenure. NARA would later send Carol Maloney a version of this in 2022, which focused attention on tweets that people like Ivanka had deleted.

As that letter revealed, the exhibit reveals that Trump didn’t start automatically preserving tweets until 2018, but took quite some time to include everyone in the archiving process.

Whereas Ivanka’s deleted tweets seemed particularly important in 2022, Andrew Giuliani — who had contact with Kellye SoRelle — look more important from this vantage.

But the detail that takes on most new significance given what we’ve learned since is that the White House didn’t choose to archive DMs.

Again, this was in that 2022 letter to Maloney. But we now know that when Xitter tried to refuse to turn over material from Trump’s account, Jack Smith pointed to the incomplete nature of what NARA had as one of his bases for needing to go to Xitter directly.

I still doubt that was the most important item that Smith was looking for. But Trump’s earlier failures may have been part of what gave Smith cause to demand more important information on attribution from Elon Musk.

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Trial Attention: Don’t Let a Pecker Distract from More Important Stories

In my opinion, Donald Trump’s criminal trial, which starts in earnest today, is no more than the third most important thing happening to him this week. While I think charging Trump for alleged crimes for which his co-conspirators have already been punished and in which Bill Barr’s DOJ tampered has merit, and while I don’t think you can separate the allegations here from his other attempts to cheat to win elections, I believe the Trump Organization fraud case and the outcome of the January 6 case (and his claim to absolute immunity generally) have far more impact on Trump’s ability to continue to wreak havoc.

So I think Tish James’ bid to have Knight Specialty Insurance disqualified for providing Trump’s appeal bond and SCOTUS’ review of Trump’s absolutely immunity claims are far more important events this week than the Alvin Bragg trial.

The same is true of last week. Jury tampering — abetted by Jesse Watters and other Trump allies — will be an urgent, ongoing concern. But there are a slew of events — the UAW’s election win in a southern VW plant, the House’s passage of Ukraine funding (and follow-on repercussions we’re likely to see from it), continuing Israeli and Iranian tensions and attacks on Palestinians, the likelihood SCOTUS will narrow the application of the obstruction statute in the context of January 6, even the planned withdrawal of US troops from Niger — will be far more important to the fate of the US and the world than whether Trump glowered or slept or farted in the courtroom.

All of which is my way of saying: beware of letting this trial drown out more important events. Yes, it is unprecedented to see Trump subjected to discipline. But this trial is sucking up far, far too much attention that might better be directed elsewhere — and all that attention is one of the reasons why jury and witness tampering are such a risk.

I will be monitoring it in passing, but will rely on the very good journalists who are in the courtroom rather than covering it myself. Adam Klasfeld (with support from Just Security) is, as always, one of the best journalists providing live trial coverage, Lawfare has a full trial team covering it, NBC’s Lisa Rubin and Katie Phang have been offering useful expectation setting.

David Pecker may testify as soon as today about how he conspired with Trump and Michael Cohen to manage media focus during the 2016 election. This trial may have very much the same effect.

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WaPo Gives Bill Barr Platform to Attack Joe Biden without Mentioning Barr’s Role in Framing Biden

WaPo wrote a story on Bill Barr’s statement on Fox News that he would support Trump over Biden because Biden would represent a “continuation of the Biden administration is national suicide.”

On Wednesday, Barr maintained that voting for Trump would still be “Russian roulette” but claimed that a “continuation of the Biden administration is national suicide, in my opinion.”

Nothing in this story is news. It was always clear Barr was going to vote against Democrats, whom he decries (though the article notes that last July, he claimed to not know).

Much of the story simply regurgitates Barr’s own propaganda about how he is a “vocal critic” of Trump, without mentioning that before he criticized Trump’s Big Lie, Barr kicked it off, by attacking mail-in ballots. It doesn’t mention that the same people, Rudy Giuliani and Sidney Powell, whose election lawyering Barr attacked, Barr protected and enabled as Attorney General, shielding Rudy from any legal consequences for soliciting campaign dirt from known Russian spies, and helping Sidney Powell attempt to reverse the prosecution of Mike Flynn.

Crazier still, it makes no mention — none! — of the side channel Barr set up to funnel that dirt Rudy obtained from known Russian spies.

As I’ve reported repeatedly, in January 2020, Bill Barr ordered Scott Brady to conduct a side review of the dirt Rudy Giuliani collected from Russian spies and others. Via still unexplained circumstances, that side channel resulted in a claim from Alexander Smirnov being shared first with Brady, and then with Hunter Biden prosecutor David Weiss, a claim that Joe Biden had accepted a bribe from Burisma. After having received the lead in 2020 and not pursued it, Weiss revisited it after Barr made public comments last summer, as Republicans in Congress were chasing the claim.

That push to review what is now known as the Smirnov allegation resulted in David Weiss reneging on the plea deal he made with Hunter Biden and chasing the Smirnov allegation, only to discover Smirnov made it all up.

WaPo knows these details. A long piece on Smirnov described the side channel, though did not mention that Brady claimed to have verified precisely the travel details that Weiss alleges debunk Smirnov’s claims.

In October 2023, several months after Grassley’s release, Scott Brady, the former U.S. attorney for the western district of Pennsylvania, appeared before the GOP-controlled House Judiciary Committee to answer questions about the claims. Brady, who did not respond to a request for comment, had been tasked in 2020 by then-Attorney General William P. Barr to review information about Biden gathered in Ukraine by Trump attorney Rudy Giuliani.

Brady characterized the bribery claims as not thoroughly vetted as of 2020. At the same time, he told the committee that it was “correct” that the FBI considered that person credible at the time of the allegations.

And a piece from Devlin Barrett, listed as a contributor to this story, wrote a piece that obscured rather than highlighted the insanity behind Weiss’ decision to renege on the scope of the plea deal he made with Hunter to chase Smirnov’s allegations anew (Devlin did not mention Barr’s role in pitching the allegation in both 2020 and 2023).

Smirnov’s account was passed along to investigators in Delaware who were involved in the Hunter Biden investigation — a move which years later led to the charges against Smirnov, these people said.

U.S. authorities said that when agents questioned Smirnov again in 2023, he repeated some past lies, changed other parts of his story and offered new falsehoods after claiming to have met with Russian officials.

Bill Barr’s decision to set up a side channel to funnel dirt collected by Donald Trump’s lawyer on Trump’s opponent’s son to prosecutors already investigating Hunter Biden led directly to Joe Biden being framed. And it remains unexplained how Scott Brady came to find the lead — or whether it has anything to do with DOJ’s reported closure of an investigation into Mykola Zlochevsky in this same period.

At this point, Barr’s role in setting up a side channel that led to Biden being framed ought to be included in all discussions of his animus to Biden or his decision to back Trump. All the more so given that Jerry Nadler referred Scott Brady to at least DOJ IG for investigation of the way he misled Congress about his vetting corroborating Smirnov’s claims. After all, such an investigation may lead to places that scrutinize Barr’s own actions.

Sure Barr is going to back Republicans over Joe Biden, the guy he helped frame. But if the investigation into how that side channel ended up framing Biden gets very far, Barr may have far more self-interested reasons in ending Democratic control of DOJ.

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Elon Musk’s Xitter Stalls a Criminal Investigation, Again

On Friday, DC Chief Judge James Boasberg released a redacted version of a March 29 opinion on another attempt by Xitter to refuse compliance with legal process based on a complaint about a gag order (formally, a non-disclosure order, referred to as an NDO below). Kyle Cheney, who first posted on it and who tends to have a good read on these things, noted that it seems important.

As you recall, Xitter successfully delayed Jack Smith’s access to Trump’s Xitter account for 23 days in January and February of last year (from when then-Chief Judge Beryl Howell approved the warrant on January 17 until when Xitter finally complied on February 9), then spent several more months arguing that it should be able to inform Trump they had provided the information and should not have to pay fines for being in contempt.

This time around, Xitter delayed DOJ’s access to the mere subscriber records — that is, records showing who owns the accounts in question — for two Xitter accounts for over two months (January 25 through March 29 of this year) based on a similar complaint: that before it complied, it should be able to tell the subjects of the criminal investigation about the request.

While (as Cheney noted) there’s no clear tie to Trump, this investigation is focused on public figures of some sort.  We know that because Xitter argued that notifying the targets would not harm the investigation, and then claimed there was nothing publicly known about the targets to suggest informing them would lead to witness intimidation or any of the other bases DOJ provided for delaying notice for a year.

Judge Boasberg debunked Xitter’s claim. There was information in the affidavit, he said, even just “based on what is publicly known about the investigation’s targets,” to show that disclosure might result in witness intimidation. Xitter also complained that the government offered more information to justify its gag after Xitter challenged it, but Boasberg declined to “infer” from that the initial basis was lacking.

And while there’s no reason to believe that those public people have a tie to Trump, Boasberg cited last year’s legal dispute in three places to justify denying Xitter’s demand.

He invoked Yogi Berra (and the government’s filings) to explain why Xitter’s “imagined categorical prohibition on omnibus NDOs” was little different than the arguments it made last year.

On that question, much of X’s argumentation may be characterized by Yogi Berra’s immortal line, “It’s déjà vu all over again.” That is because the company mostly regurgitates the arguments that it made — which both this Court’s predecessor and the D.C. Circuit rejected — just last year in a case involving the same parties. See In re Sealed Case, 77 F. 4th 815, aff’g in the Matter of the Search; see also Redacted Gov’t Mot. at 13 (asserting that X “knows [its arguments] are losing arguments — having just had the D.C. Circuit reject them last year when it challenged a different NDO”); see also id., at 1, 7-8. The NDO at issue in In re Sealed Case accompanied a search warrant directing Twitter to produce information related to former President Trump’s account. See 77 F.4th at 821. Twitter challenged the NDO on much the same grounds as it does here, and the Circuit did not bite.

Boasberg likened Xitter’s glib offer to tell only the subjects of the investigation to Xitter’s similar offer last year to tell only Trump, which the DC Circuit rejected.

The company believes that “[a] less restrictive means of furthering the government’s interests . . . would be to permit X to disclose the Subpoena’s existence to the targeted users, while prohibiting disclosure . . . to anyone else.” Id. at 24. That is akin to asking for the donut minus the hole.

Indeed, the Circuit rejected an analogous alternative in In re Sealed Case. There, the company proposed notifying just Trump–the target of the warrant that the challenged NDO accompanied–of the warrant’s existence. Yet the Circuit considered that alternative a “nonstarter[]” because it “would not have maintained the confidentiality of the criminal investigation and therefore risked jeopardizing it.” In re Sealed Case. 77 F.4th at 831. Nor would it have safeguarded the security and integrity of the investigation, as the whole point of the nondisclosure was to avoid tipping off the former President about the warrant’s existence.” Id. at 832. X’s proposal here falls flat for precisely the same reason: permitting it to disclose the subpoena’s existence [redacted] would neither protect the investigation’s confidentiality nor safeguard its integrity. See Redacted Gov’t Mot. at 12 n.4.

[Paragraph redacted]

Notably, last year Xitter at least relied on a purported interest in preserving Executive Privilege. Here, there’s no such claim; just a specious argument that DOJ should have to get individualized NDOs for every subpoena it submits in this investigation, even if all of them ask for no more than basic social media account information. So this is not some protected class, like a member of Congress or staffer.

Perhaps Boasberg’s most interesting invocation of Xitter’s earlier attempt to tamper in the Trump investigation is where, in almost entirely redacted language, he compares the urgency of this investigation with that of Jack Smith’s investigation into, “activity intended to alter the outcome of a valid national election for the leadership of the Executive Branch of the federal government.”

He spends three (redacted) paragraphs describing the import of the investigation.

To be sure, the Government’s interest in In re Sealed Case “was particularly strong” because of the goal of the investigation at issue: “[T]o ferret out activity intended to alter the outcome of a valid national election for the leadership of the Executive Branch of the federal government . . . and to assess whether that activity crossed lines into criminal culpability.” In re Sealed Case. 77 F4th at 830. The United States does not purport to target election interference in this case. But it submits that its interest are nevertheless heightened here for another reason: [1.5 lines redacted] The Court wholly agrees based on the evidence outlined in the Government’s ex parte briefing. [3 paragraphs redacted]

Whether or not this has a direct tie to Trump, it’s worth noting that Musk met with Trump (on March 2) during the pendency of this fight; last year, Musk met with Jim Jordan twice during Xitter’s challenge to the Trump warrant.

Whatever that three paragraph description was, Boasberg described the type of investigation using a short word — four or maybe five characters. This could be a FARA investigation or a leak investigation, for example, or perhaps he cited code to describe it.

Update: I guess I should explain why I used Musk’s Council of Nicea tweets as my featured image? In this post (linked above), I noted that on the day Xitter started complying with the Trump warrant, Musk posted this tweet:

So I went to Musk’s tweets from the day after Boasberg’s order and noted that he tweeted obliquely about “trac[ing] to source documents.”

If this is a leak investigation, it could be a reference to an attempt to source a leak.

Timeline

December 11, 2023: Application for omnibus NDO

January 5, 2024: DOJ serves Xitter with subpoena for subscriber information

January 24: Xitter moves to vacate the NDO, review the affidavit, and stay compliance

January 25: Initial deadline for compliance

March 2: Musk meets with Trump in Florida

March 29: Boasberg orders Xitter to comply

April 12: Boasberg released redacted opinion

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Media Organizations Omit Mention of Trump’s Allegedly Criminal Exploitation of 2020 Debates

Twelve media organizations are clamoring for another set of debates between Donald Trump and Joe Biden. In their naive call for debates, they claim that because the stakes on this election are so high, “there is simply no substitute” for the candidates “debating” each other, presenting, “their visions for the future of our nation.”

With the contours of the 2024 general election now coming into clear focus, we – the undersigned national news organizations – urge the presumptive presidential nominees to publicly commit to participating in general election debates before November’s election.

General election debates have a rich tradition in our American democracy, having played a vital role in every presidential election of the past 50 years, dating to 1976. In each of those elections, tens of millions have tuned in to watch the candidates debating side by side, in a competition of ideas for the votes of American citizens.

Since 1988, the nonpartisan Commission on Presidential Debates has sponsored all presidential general election debates. The Commission has previously announced dates, times, and eligibility criteria for 2024 debates. Though it is too early for invitations to be extended to any candidates, it is not too early for candidates who expect to meet the eligibility criteria to publicly state their support for – and their intention to participate in – the Commission’s debates planned for this fall.

If there is one thing Americans can agree on during this polarized time, it is that the stakes of this election are exceptionally high. Amidst that backdrop, there is simply no substitute for the candidates debating with each other, and before the American people, their visions for the future of our nation. [my emphasis]

I mean, they’re not wrong that debates provide an opportunity to display a candidate’s vision for America.

In the first debate in 2020, for example, Biden asked Trump to disavow right wing violence, and instead, Trump told the Proud Boys to “Stand Back and Stand By.”

Stoking political violence certainly is part of Trump’s “vision for the future of our nation.”

Because of the way Trump’s comment drove recruiting for the Proud Boys, it made the opening arguments of the Proud Boy leaders’ sedition trial.

If we’re lucky enough to get a Trump trial for January 6 (one that would likely create scheduling difficulties for a debate in any case and as such Trump would use as another attempt to stall accountability), Trump’s call out to the violent militia that kicked off the attack on the Capitol will feature prominently again. Prosecutors have already informed Judge Tanya Chutkan they plan to use both Trump’s call out and his later coddling of Enrique Tarrio to show how, both before and after the attack, Trump encouraged that assault on democracy.

The Government plans to introduce evidence from the period in advance of the charged conspiracies that demonstrates the defendant’s encouragement of violence. For instance, in response to a question during the September 29, 2020, presidential debate asking him to denounce the extremist group the Proud Boys, the defendant instead spoke publicly to them and told them to “stand back and stand by.” Members of the group embraced the defendant’s words as an endorsement and printed merchandise with them as a rallying cry. As discussed below, after the Proud Boys and other extremist groups participated in obstructing the congressional certification on January 6, the defendant made clear that they were acting consistent with his intent and direction in doing so.

[snip]

Of particular note are the specific January 6 offenders whom the defendant has supported— namely, individuals convicted of some of the most serious crimes charged in relation to January 6, such as seditious conspiracy and violent assaults on police officers. During a September 17, 2023, appearance on Meet the Press, for instance, the defendant said regarding Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio—who was convicted of seditious conspiracy—“I want to tell you, he and other people have been treated horribly.” The defendant then criticized the kinds of lengthy sentences received only by defendants who, like Tarrio, committed the most serious crimes on January 6.

Effectively, this will make the Proud Boys quasi co-conspirators with Donald Trump at trial.

This is the kind of overt act in a criminal conspiracy to attack democracy itself that media outlets say is vital to our democracy.

But Trump’s exploitation of debates does not stop there.

Consider the allegations surrounding Tony Bobulinski, Fox News’ favorite source — at least, the favorite source who has not yet been indicted — for scandal-mongering about Hunter Biden.

For the third debate in 2020, after top Trump aides pitched Bobulinski tales to the WSJ based on laptop content that Hunter claims was stolen, Trump hosted Bobulinski as his guest. The very next day, Bobulinski marched into the FBI and is recorded as telling them a bunch of things that Bobulinski now claims he didn’t say — including that he saw Joe Biden get an enormous diamond from China. Weeks later, according to Cassidy Hutchinson, he had a secret meeting with Mark Meadows. Bobulinski doesn’t (now that Hutchinson released video evidence) deny the meeting; he denies he was handed something that might or might not be an envelope.

I guess framing your opponent’s son, like attacking democracy itself, is part of Trump’s vision for America. But actual journalists should not need — or want — a debate to serve as vehicle for that.

And while the circumstances around the third such instance of potentially criminal activity tied to a 2020 debate are less clear, one thing is not. As part of the Jeffrey Jensen effort to reverse the conviction of Mike Flynn, dates got added to the notes of Peter Strzok and Andrew McCabe — inaccurate dates in at least one case.

Based on that inaccurate date, first Sidney Powell (who was in contact with Jenna Ellis at the time) and then Trump himself falsely claimed that Joe Biden — and not Bob Litt, as other evidence makes clear — first raised concerns that Mike Flynn may have violated the Logan Act by undermining foreign policy before he became National Security Advisor.

Trump gleefully used that fraudulent claim in the first debate against Biden.

President Donald J. Trump: (01:02:22)
We’ve caught them all. We’ve got it all on tape. We’ve caught them all. And by the way, you gave the idea for the Logan Act against General Flynn. You better take a look at that, because we caught you in a sense, and President Obama was sitting in the office.

It was another instance of an attempt to falsely frame his opponent.

So let’s grant the media outlets that Trump has gleefully displayed his vision of America at the 2020 debates with Joe Biden by serially attempting to frame his competitor and inciting violence.

But what I don’t understand — what makes me genuinely embarrassed for the group of good journalists who work at some of these media outlets — is why they believe there is “no substitute” for debates to tell such a story.

Are you telling me the only way you can convey to voters that Trump’s vision for America is violence, fraud, and revenge is by giving him a platform to engage in such activities? Why wouldn’t you instead pursue aggressive journalism to tell more of these stories?

Twelve media outlets claim that the only way they can display Trump’s dystopian vision for America is by being complicit in it.

Update: Many people, in comments and on social media, reminded me that Trump willfully exposed Biden and others to COVID.

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Judge Maryellen Noreika’s Unconstitutional Concerns about Unconstitutional Concerns

On April 12, the same day that Judge Maryellen Noreika finally issued her opinions rejecting Hunter Biden’s motions to dismiss based on immunity and selective and vindictive prosecution, Hunter filed a notice of interlocutory appeal of all of Scarsi’s opinions. My Hunter Biden page has been updated to reflect these developments.

I think, but am not certain, that the notice of appeal came after Noreika released her opinions, and so might be a response to it.

It’s unclear what basis Lowell believes he has for an interlocutory appeal. At the initial appearance, Judge Scarsi had instructed Abbe Lowell to brief whether he could file such an appeal for the diversion agreement, which Lowell failed to do in his motions to dismiss. One possibility is that Lowell plans to argue that Delaware, as the first filed case, should have ruled first. He argued this in a February motion to continue the similar filings.

“[W]hen cases between the same parties raising the same issues are pending in two or more federal districts, the forum of the first-filed action should generally be favored.” Heieck v. Federal Signal Corp., 2019 WL 1883895, at *2 (C.D. Cal., Mar. 11, 2019). This approach maximizes judicial economy, avoids the possibility of inconsistent judgments, and minimizes any unnecessary burden on the two Courts’ or the parties’ resources.

If that’s the case, however, the facial similarity of the two diversion agreement opinions might doom an appeal that would be extremely unlikely to work anyway. Both judges ruled that because Probation did not sign the diversion agreement, it was not in place and so Hunter got no immunity from it. The rulings are not inconsistent on their key point (though are in other key ways).

That said, even though neither side formally called attention to Judge Scarsi’s rulings, Judge Noreika noted it in a really confusing footnote.

5 This Court recognizes that, relying largely on California and Ninth Circuit law, the judge overseeing tax charges brought against Defendant in the Central District of California decided that Probation’s approval is “a condition precedent to performance, not to formation,” and that the absence of Probation’s approval means that “performance of the Government’s agreement not to prosecute Defendant is not yet due.” United States v. Biden, No. 2:23-cr-00599-MCS-1, 2024 WL 1432468, at *8 & *10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2024). Neither of those issues nor that law was raised by the parties before this Court.

I don’t know what “law” she’s referring to — possibly the Ninth Circuit precedent Scarsi relied on? If that’s the case, then she would be affirming precisely the problem Lowell pointed out: by relying on different precedents, Scarsi has created inconsistency in the judgments.

But she’s flat out wrong that the government’s arguments about whether Probation’s signature was a condition precedent to the formation or the performance of the diversion agreement; it was central to the government’s response.

Applying contract law principles, the approval of U.S. Probation was a condition precedent to the formation of the contract. “A condition may be either a condition precedent to the formation of a contract or a condition precedent to performance under an existing contract.” W & G Seaford Assocs. v. Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc., 714 F.Supp. 1336, 1340 (D.Del.1989) (citing J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 11–5, at 440 (3d ed.1987)); Williston on Contracts §38.4. “In the former situations, the contract itself does not exist unless and until the condition occurs.” Id.; Willison on Contracts § 38.7.

There is a bigger difference between the two opinions, though: how they understand Probation’s decision not to sign the plea. As I’ve noted, Scarsi effectively rewrote one of the exhibits he relied on to claim that Probation was not part of revisions to the diversion agreement. As I’ll show, Noreika does not deny that Probation was a part of those revisions, but nevertheless, with no explanation, held that Probation didn’t approve the agreement.

And that’s important because Noreika doesn’t explain her own intervention in the approval of the diversion agreement, effectively intervening in a prosecutorial decision, a problem I pointed out in this post. Indeed, the opinion is consistent with Margaret Bray refusing to sign the diversion agreement because of some interaction Bray had with Judge Noreika before the hearing.

Before I explain why, let me emphasize, Hunter Biden is well and truly fucked. What I’m about to say is unlikely to matter, and if it does, it’s likely only to matter after two judges who seem predisposed against Hunter make evidentiary decisions that will increase the political cost of two trials, if and when juries convict Hunter, and after those same judges rule on whether Hunter can remain out on pretrial release pending the appeal of this mess, which Scarsi, especially, is unlikely to do. Worse still, after I laid out all the ways Judge Scarsi had made his own opinion vulnerable on appeal, he ruled against Abbe Lowell’s attempt to certify all the evidence Scarsi said had not come in properly. Scarsi is using procedural reasons to protect his own failures in his opinions. He’s entitled to do so; he’s the judge! So what I’m about to write does not change the fact that Joe Biden’s son is well and truly fucked.

Judge Noreika refashions her intervention in the plea hearing

In his omnibus ruling on Hunter’s motions to dismiss, Judge Scarsi only cited the plea hearing transcript six times, entirely focused on the end of the discussion (the Xs describe who is being quoted in the citation).

The parties submitted the Plea Agreement and the Diversion Agreement to United States District Judge Maryellen Noreika in advance of a scheduled July 26, 2023, Initial Appearance and Plea Hearing. (See Machala Decl. Ex. 1 (“Del. Hr’g Tr.”), ECF No. 25-2.) At the hearing, after questioning Defendant and the parties, the District Court Judge expressed concerns regarding both Defendant’s understanding of the scope of the immunity offered by the Diversion Agreement and the appropriateness of the District Court’s role in resolving disputes under the Diversion Agreement. (Del. Hr’g Tr. 103–08.) The District Court Judge asked the parties to rework the agreements and provide additional briefing regarding the appropriate role of the District Court in resolving disputes under the Diversion Agreement. (Id.) At the hearing, Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the tax charges then pending in Delaware. (Id. at 109.)

[snip]

6 This observation begs a question regarding another provision, the parties’ agreement that the United States District Court for the District of Delaware would play an adjudicative role in any alleged material breach of the agreement by Defendant. (Diversion Agreement § II(14).) The judge overseeing the action in Delaware questioned whether it was appropriate for her to play this role. (Del. Hr’g Tr. 92–104.) The Court is uncertain as to whether the parties understood the Probation Officer also to have a role in approving the breach-adjudication plan in her capacity as an agent of the court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3602. But these issues need not be resolved to adjudicate the motion.

[snip]

On July 26, 2023, the district judge in Delaware deferred accepting Defendant’s plea so the parties could resolve concerns raised at the plea hearing. (See generally Del. Hr’g Tr. 108–09.)

By contrast, Judge Noreika cited her own hearing transcript 33 times: 24 times in her background section, four times in her sua sponte section deeming the extent of Hunter’s immunity uncertain, three times in a sua sponte section that intruded on the Executive’s prosecutorial function where she said it would be unconstitutional to intrude on the Executive’s prosecutorial function, and twice more in a section misrepresenting the focus of Hunter’s judicial estoppel argument. 21 of her citations were substantially to her own comments in the hearing.

The degree to which this opinion makes claims about what Noreika actually did at the plea hearing matters. Not only does Noreika fluff the nature of her own intervention, but her discussion left out critical discussion about the nature of approvals required for the diversion agreement (including but not limited to those marked in blue above). That includes five complaints about the fact that she was not asked to sign the diversion agreement and a key intervention in which she expressed an opinion on the scope of the authority for Margaret Bray to intervene in the diversion agreement.

Additionally, in one place, she misrepresented the transcript in a way that minimized her own intervention.

That is, Noreika used her own opinion to refashion the intervention she made in the plea hearing.

The last example — when she misrepresented the transcript — is instructive. As noted, though neither side made this argument, Noreika nevertheless spent 2.5 pages arguing that the scope of the immunity grant in the diversion agreement was not sufficiently clear to be contractually enforceable. In it, she claimed that the uncertainty over the scope of the immunity, and not her own intervention, was the only reason the plea collapsed, a claim she carries over to the selective and vindictive prosecution opinion.

Then, she declined to accept Chris Clark’s oral modification of the immunity provision to include just gun, tax, and drug crimes.

Pressing the parties on their respective understandings of what conduct was protected by the immunity from prosecution led to a collapse of the agreement in court. (D.I. 16 at 54:10-55:22).

Apparently acknowledging that the immunity provision as initially drafted was not sufficiently definite, the parties attempted to revise the scope of the immunity conferred by the Division Agreement orally at the July 2023 hearing. (See D.I. 16 at 57:19-24 (“I think there was some space between us and at this point, we are prepared to agree with the government that the scope of paragraph 15 relates to the specific areas of federal crimes that are discussed in the statement of facts which in general and broadly relate to gun possession, tax issues, and drug use.”)). The Court recognizes that Delaware law permits oral modifications to contracts even where the contract explicitly provides that modifications must be in signed writings, as the Diversion Agreement did here. (See D.I. 24, Ex. 1 ¶ 19 (“No future modifications of or additions to this Agreement, in whole or in part, shall be valid unless they are set forth in writing and signed by the United States, Biden and Biden’s counsel.”)). That being said, although the government asserted that that oral modification was binding (D.I. 16 at 89:9-14), the Court has never been presented with modified language to replace the immunity provision found in Paragraph 15. [my emphasis]

This is a nutty argument to begin with: Neither side is arguing that gun crimes were not included in the diversion immunity (to which elsewhere she limits her review); neither is even arguing there was uncertainty as to the application of immunity to tax and drug crimes. The only uncertainty pertained to FARA (and that only because — as Noreika herself described it, Leo Wise “revoked” a signed agreement).

This discussion is especially problematic because, elsewhere, she left out a crucial part of her own invitation to clarify the immunity language, which the opinion describes this way:

The Court also suggested that the parties clarify the scope of any immunity conferred by the immunity provision of the Diversion Agreement. (Id. at 105:16-22).

Noreika’s reference to the government’s assertion that Chris Clark orally modified the scope of immunity by agreeing to limit it to tax, guns, and drugs pertains to this comment from Leo Wise:

Obviously this paragraph has been orally modified by counsel for Mr. Biden and we would — I’m not going to attempt to paraphrase it. I don’t want to make the record muddy. The statement by counsel is obviously as Your Honor acknowledged a modification of this provision, and that we believe is binding.

Importantly, when Noreika invited the parties to clarify the diversion scope (claiming all the while she was not trying to tell the parties how to negotiate), she treated the Clark comment as having been orally modified.

you might, though I’m not trying to tell you how to negotiate the Diversion Agreement, you might fix that one paragraph that you have orally modified today.

At the hearing, Noreika treated the diversion scope as orally modified, but in this opinion she not only omits mention that she did so, but she suggests that because the parties didn’t modify the contract about prosecution declination to her liking, then it is not binding.

She’s claiming to have no role in the drafting process, and then she’s demanding changes in the contract that she already said had been adopted, a contract in which she repeatedly says would be unconstitutional for her to intervene.

The logistics of the asymmetric knowledge of Margaret Bray’s non signature

All this matters because of something else: Judge Noreika’s opinion exhibits knowledge of something to which she was not a witness. It arises from the logistics from that plea hearing.

As I noted, while claiming he was ruling on the diversion agreement as an unambiguous contract, Judge Scarsi nevertheless relied on extrinsic evidence — a declaration from AUSA Benjamin Wallace. Before Wallace submitted the declaration before Judge Scarsi, Wallace withdrew his appearance before Judge Noreika, in a letter signed as a Delaware AUSA reporting to US Attorney David Weiss, someone who is no longer before that docket.

Given that Wallace referred to final agreements four times as drafts in the declaration, it deserves close scrutiny.

In it, Wallace described that before Judge Noreika took the bench and while Chris Clark and Leo Wise were signing the plea agreement and diversion agreement on July 26, he told Margaret Bray that she could soon sign the diversion agreement. According to Wallace, she “expressly declined to sign the draft diversion agreement.”

3. Before the District Judge took the bench, the parties signed the draft plea agreement in No. 23-mj-274 and the draft diversion agreement in No. 23-cr-61. Leo J. Wise, Special Assistant United States Attorney, signed on behalf of the government. Mr. Biden and his attorney, Christopher J. Clark, signed on behalf of Mr. Biden.

4. While Mr. Biden, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Wise were signing the two agreements, I approached the Chief United States Probation Officer for the District of Delaware, Margaret M. Bray, to tell her that the draft diversion agreement would be ready for her signature shortly. Ms. Bray expressly declined to sign the draft diversion agreement.

In the Los Angeles motions hearing, Abbe Lowell suggested there was something funny about this timing and asked a more important question: Why the head of Probation was not the one submitting the declaration.

MR. LOWELL: It probably — well, it matters in the following way. If what was happening was questions were being raised, and that’s why she didn’t do it, or for any other reason, after she manifested her agreement in what she sent to the court on July 20th or what the Government said, then it probably doesn’t matter.

I don’t think it really matters why at that moment and when it doesn’t — when it happened. I’m just saying that I think the sequence of what happened on July the 26th is murky, at best.

And I’d like to have Ms. Bray be the one to give a declaration, not somebody else that talks about what happened and when it happened and why it happened. I was there, so it would be good if the person who did it, did it. But that’s not what they submitted.

But Noreika’s opinion makes it clear why the timing and substance matters — and why Margaret Bray, the person that both Noreika and Scarsi have ruled effectively vetoed this agreement by not signing it, should have been the one submitting a declaration.

Assuming Wallace’s description of the timing is correct — that this happened while Clark and Wise were busy signing the documents themselves and before Judge Noreika entered the courtroom — then it would create an asymmetry of knowledge among the participants in the hearing. Bray, who never spoke at the hearing, would know she had refused to sign. Wallace would know and therefore did know when he made his single comment at the hearing: agreeing that if the immunity language had been included in the plea agreement rather than the diversion agreement, it would change the rule under which Judge Noreika was reviewing the plea agreement.

THE COURT: And if it were included in the Memorandum of Plea Agreement, would that make this plea agreement one pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(A)?

MR. WALLACE: It would.

Did Wallace make this comment because of something Bray told him before the hearing? Importantly, Noreika relies on this assent to use her own uncertainty about the proper clause under which to consider the plea to replace authority to alter the diversion. That is, Noreika effectively used Wallace’s assent to suggest she had the authority to draft the diversion agreement. If he learned that Noreika had a concern about that clause from Bray, it would amount to an ex parte communication between the prosecution and the judge.

Over the course of the hearing — most notably, between the time Leo Wise made a comment about the limits of Probation’s involvement and the time when Wise said the diversion agreement would only go into effect after Bray signed it — Wallace could have shared that knowledge with the other prosecutors. That is, it is possible but uncertain whether prosecutors used this asymmetric knowledge to get out of the plea deal.

But Hunter Biden’s team would never know this occurred, which is consistent with Chris Clark’s repeated statements that he believed Probation had already approved the diversion, which Weiss’ team did not dispute.

And, because all this happened before she took the bench, Judge Noreika should not have known that Ms. Bray refused to sign it. She should not have known it, that is, unless she and Margaret Bray had discussions before the hearing about Bray not signing the agreement.

If they did, then Bray’s failure to sign the diversion agreement would effectively serve as a proxy disapproval from Judge Noreika. It would amount to Judge Noreika, who is neither a party to this agreement nor someone authorized to approve or disapprove it, vetoing the agreement by instructing Bray not to sign it.

Noreika exhibited knowledge of Bray’s lack of signature

There are three times in Noreika’s opinion where she exhibits some knowledge that Bray had not signed that diversion agreement before the hearing.

First, in her treatment of Hunter’s half-hearted attempt to claim that judicial estoppel prevents the prosecution from had not started yet, she described believing at the time and still believing that the government did not believe the diversion period started until Bray signed the agreement.

As the Court understood that statement at the time, the government’s position was that the diversion period did not begin to run until Probation’s approval was given – approval to be indicated by a signature on the Diversion Agreement itself. That is, the Diversion Agreement would not become effective until approval through signature was given. That continues to be the Court’s understanding today.

Having such a belief at the time would only make sense if she knew the diversion had not yet been signed and, given the logistics, that would seemingly require having known before Bray told Wallace she would not sign it.

In her section rejecting Hunter’s argument that by recommending Hunter for diversion on July 19 and then, along with the parties, tweaking the diversion agreement, Noreika offered no reason why she was unpersuaded that Bray had indicated her assent by participating in those changes, something about which her courtroom deputy received emails.

Defendant nevertheless suggests that Probation’s approval may be implied from the fact that Probation recommended pretrial diversion and suggested revisions to the proposed agreement before the July 2023 hearing. (D.I. 60 at 18-19). The Court disagrees. That Defendant was recommended as a candidate for a pretrial diversion program does not evidence Probation’s approval of the particular Diversion Agreement the parties ultimately proposed. Probation recommended that Defendant was of the type of criminal defendant who may be offered pretrial diversion and also recommended several conditions that Probation thought appropriate. (D.I. 60, Ex. S at Pages 8-9 of 9). That is fundamentally different than Probation approving the Diversion Agreement currently in dispute before the Court. And as to Probation’s purported assent to revisions to the Diversion Agreement (D.I. 60, Ex. T at Page 2 of 28), Defendant has failed to convince the Court that the actions described can or should take the place of a signature required by the final version of an agreement, particularly when the parties execute the signature page. Ultimately, the Court finds that Probation did not approve the Diversion Agreement. [my emphasis]

Importantly, Noreika does not address the scope via which Probation, having already approved the parts they would oversee, could reject this deal.

But the most important evidence that Judge Noreika knew of something during the hearing to which she was not a direct witness was a question she posed — invoking the first person plural — suggesting that Probation should not approve the deal.

THE COURT: All right. Now, I want to talk a little bit about this agreement not to prosecute. The agreement not to prosecute includes — is in the gun case, but it also includes crimes related to the tax case. So we looked through a bunch of diversion agreements that we have access to and we couldn’t find anything that had anything similar to that.

So let me first ask, do you have any precedent for agreeing not to prosecute crimes that have nothing to do with the case or the charges being diverted?

MR. WISE: I’m not aware of any, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any authority that says that that’s appropriate and that the probation officer should agree to that as terms, or the chief of probation should agree to that as terms of a Diversion Agreement?

MR. WISE: Your Honor, I believe that this is a bilateral agreement between the parties that the parties view in their best interest. I don’t believe that the role of probation would include weighing whether the benefit of the bargain is valid or not from the perspective of the United States or the Defendant. (46)

Not only did Noreika suggest that some collective “we” had been reviewing diversion agreements together, but she suggested Bray could still reject the deal based on the scope of David Weiss’ prosecutorial decision. She suggested Bray could dictate to Weiss how much he could include in a declination statement.

This is precisely the kind of usurpation of the Executive’s authority that Noreika said would be unconstitutional. Which was precisely Leo Wise’s response: he responded that Bray did not have the authority to opine that the parties had entered into a contract that did not sufficiently protect the interests of the United States.

Shortly after that exchange, Judge Noreika started complaining that she was not asked to sign the diversion agreement.

I think what I’m concerned about here is that you seem to be asking for the inclusion of the Court in this agreement, yet you’re telling me that I don’t have any role in it, and you’re leaving provisions of the plea agreement out and putting them into an agreement that you are not asking me to sign off on. (50)

[snip]

But then it would be a plea under Rule (c)(1)(A) if the provision that you have put in the Diversion Agreement which you do not have anyplace for me to sign and it is not in my purview under the statute to sign, you put that provision over there. So I am concerned that you’re taking provisions out of the agreement, of a plea agreement that would normally be in there. So can you — I don’t really understand why that is. (51)

[snip]

All right. Now I have reviewed the case law and I have reviewed the statute and I had understood that the decision to offer the defendant, any defendant a pretrial diversion rest squarely with the prosecutor and consistent with that, you all have told me repeatedly that’s a separate agreement, there is no place for me to sign off on it, and as I think I mentioned earlier, usually I don’t see those agreements. But you all did send it to me and as we’ve discussed, some of it seems like it could be relevant to the plea. (92)

[snip]

THE COURT: First it got my attention because you keep telling me that I have no role, I shouldn’t be reading this thing, I shouldn’t be concerned about what’s in these provisions, but you have agreed that I will do that, but you didn’t ask me for sign off, so do you have any precedent for that? (94)

[snip]

What’s funny to me is you put me right smack in the middle of the Diversion Agreement that I should have no role in, you plop meet [sic] right in there and then on the thing that I would normally have the ability to sign off on or look at in the context of a Plea Agreement, you just take it out and you say Your Honor, don’t pay any attention to that provision not to prosecute because we put it in an agreement that’s beyond your ability. (104)

The first two of these citations — the ones that precede Leo Wise’s “revocation” of the plea deal — are not mentioned in Noreika’s opinion. The other three are invoked several times in references to the transcript (including three of the references made by Judge Scarsi), but in none of those references does Noreika admit she was demanding the authority to sign off on the diversion agreement. 

The Court pressed the government on the propriety of requiring the Court to first determine whether Defendant had breached the Diversion Agreement before the government could bring charges – effectively making the Court a gatekeeper of prosecutorial discretion. (D.I. 16 at 92:22-95:17).

[snip]

The parties attempted to analogize the breach procedure to a violation of supervised release, but the Court was left with unanswered questions about the constitutionality of the breach provision, leaving open the possibility that the parties could modify the provision to address the Court’s concerns. (Id. at 102:5-106:2).

She presented these demands to sign off on the diversion agreement as the exact opposite of what they were: a concern that she would be usurping the role of prosecutors if the diversion went into effect, when in fact she was concerned that she wasn’t being given opportunity to veto prosecutors’ non-prosecution decision.

Notably, Judge Noreika mentions Chris Clark’s failure to object after Leo Wise (after such time as Wallace could have told him that Bray did not sign the diversion agreement) said the agreement would go into effect when Probation signed it.

4 Although not part of the Court’s decision, the Court finds it noteworthy that the government clearly stated at the hearing that “approval” meant “when the probation officer . . . signs it” and Defendant offered no objection or correction to this. (D.I. 16 at 83:13-17 & 90:13-15).

She doesn’t mention her own failure to correct Wise when he said she could sign the diversion agreement.

I think practically how this would work, Your Honor, is if Your Honor takes the plea and signs the Diversion Agreement which is what puts it into force as of today, and at some point in the future we were to bring charges that the Defendant thought were encompassed by the factual statement in the Diversion Agreement or the factual statement in the Plea Agreement, they could move to dismiss those charges on the grounds that we had contractually agreed not to bring charges encompassed within the factual statement of the Diversion Agreement or the factual statement of the tax charges.

This doesn’t prove that Judge Noreika asked Margaret Bray not to sign the diversion before Bray told Wallace she would not sign it. But it does show that Noreika thought one of the two of them, either she or Bray, should have the power to veto a prosecutorial decision.

And Judge Noreika refashions her intervention in the plea hearing to obscure that point.

Noreika shifts her demands for sign-off power

As noted, even in spite of her minute order that reflects she deferred agreement on both the plea agreement and the diversion agreement in which it would be unconstitutional for her to intervene, Noreika suggests that the plea fell apart only because of the dispute about immunity that started after she had already intervened in signing authority.

She does ultimately deal with her demands — in a section reserving veto authority over the diversion agreement based on her authority to dictate public policy to prosecutors!

In a truly astonishing section, Noreika applies contract law about a diversion she claims, with no basis, has been made part of the plea deal and uses it to claim she could veto a prosecutorial decision.

Contractual provisions that are against public policy are void. See Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Joseph Schlanger 2006 Ins. Tr., 28 A.3d 436, 441 (Del. 2011) (“[C]ontracts that offend public policy or harm the public are deemed void, as opposed to voidable.”). “[P]ublic policy may be determined from consideration of the federal and state constitutions, the laws, the decisions of the courts, and the course of administration.” Sann v. Renal Care Centers Corp., No. 94A-10-001, 1995 WL 161458, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 1995). Embedded in the Diversion Agreement’s breach procedure is a judicial restriction of prosecutorial discretion that may run afoul of the separation of powers ensured by the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .”); United States v. Wright, 913 F.3d 364, 374 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A] court’s power to preclude a prosecution is limited by the separation of powers and, specifically, the Executive’s law-enforcement and prosecutorial prerogative.”).

At the hearing in July 2023, the Court expressed concern over the breach provision of the Diversion Agreement and the role the parties were attempting to force onto the Court.8 (See D.I. 16 at 92:12-98:19). In the Court’s view, the parties were attempting to contractually place upon the Judicial Branch a threshold question that would constrain the prosecutorial discretion of the Executive Branch as to the current Defendant. As the government admitted, even if there were a breach, no charges could be pursued against Defendant without the Court first holding a hearing and making a determination that a breach had occurred. (Id. at 94:10-15). If the Court did not agree to follow the procedure, no charges could be pursued against Defendant. (Id. at 94:16-20). Mindful of the clear directive that prosecutorial discretion is exclusively the province of the Executive Branch, the Court was (and still is) troubled by this provision and its restraint of prosecutorial decisions. Although the parties suggested that they could modify this provision to address the Court’s concerns (id. at 103:18-22), no language was offered at the hearing or at any time later. And no legal defense of the Diversion Agreement’s breach provision has been provided to the Court – the deals fell apart before any supplemental briefing was received.

Even if the Court were to find the Diversion Agreement was approved by Probation as required and the scope of immunity granted sufficiently definite, the Court would still have questions as to the validity of this contract in light of the breach provision in Paragraph 14. To be clear, the Court is not deciding that the proposed breach provision of Paragraph 14 is (or is not) constitutional. Doing so is unnecessary given that the Diversion Agreement never went into effect. The Court simply notes that, if the Diversion Agreement had become effective, the concerns about the constitutionality of making this trial court a gatekeeper of prosecutorial discretion remain unanswered. And because there is no severability provision recited in the contract, more would be needed for the Court to be able to determine whether this provision could properly remain in the Diversion Agreement and whether the contract could survive should the Court find it unconstitutional or refuse to agree to serve as gatekeeper.

This entire opinion is rife with examples where Judge Noreika placed herself in a contract to which she was never a party, effectively dictating what David Weiss could include in a prosecutorial declination. But she claims she’s doing the opposite, not snooping into a contract that should only be before her for its immunity agreement, but instead protecting prosecutors’ ability to renege on a declination decision.

I will leave it to the lawyers to make sense of the legal claims here.

But there’s a procedural one that Noreika overlooks.

As noted here, Scarsi’s ruling that the diversion agreement remains binding on the parties conflicts with Noreika’s claim that the problem here is that no one briefed her to placate her complaints.

There are other places where Scarsi’s ruling and Noreika’s conflict — specifically about Probation’s involvement in revisions to the terms that Probation actually governs. But if Scarsi is right, than Noreika’s order withdrawing the briefing order was withdrawn improperly.

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Alexander Smirnov Goes Missing — from Judge Noreika’s Opinions

The name Alexander Smirnov appears in neither Judge Maryellen Noreika’s opinion rejecting Hunter Biden’s immunity nor her opinion rejecting his selective and vindictive prosecution claim. Whereas it appears that Judge Mark Scarsi believes that Smirnov is not before him at all, Lowell did raise Smirnov — whose arrest postdated the reply brief deadline before Noreika and so couldn’t have been included in motions filings in Delaware — as an additional authority for his selective and vindictive claim.

The detail matters because of the way Noreika handled the two motions, which she treated as related by relying on the facts laid out in her immunity opinion in her selective prosecution opinion, even though her position in those two opinions is slightly different.

For the selective prosecution opinion, Noreika used Abbe Lowell’s request, in his reply brief, that she focus on David Weiss’ decision to abandon the plea and diversion agreement, an approach she adopted.

Defendant’s motion sets forth a winding story of years of IRS investigations, Congressional inquiries and accusations of improper influence from Legislative Branch and Executive Branch officials within the prior administration, including former President Trump himself. (See D.I. 63 at 4-20). Yet, as Defendant explains in reply, his selective  and vindictive prosecution claims are focused on “the prosecution’s decision to abandon the Plea and Diversion Agreement framework it had signed in response to ever mounting criticism and to instead bring this felony indictment.” (D.I. 81 at 2 n.1). That decision occurred in the summer of 2023. Any allegation of selective or vindictive prosecution stemming from the IRS investigations or prior administration officials or any conduct that preceded this past summer appears largely irrelevant to the present motions. Moreover, the only charges at issue in this case are firearm charges  — Defendant’s financial affairs or tax-related charges (or investigations thereof) also appear irrelevant. Thus, the only charging decision the Court must view through the selective and vindictive prosecution lens is Special Counsel David Weiss’s decision to no longer pursue pretrial diversion and instead indict Defendant on three felony firearm charges.

But Noreika’s treatment of when the decision occurred is fuzzy. In one place she describes that it happened in summer 2023, which could include everything from June 21, 2023 on (the day after the diversion and plea were published).

Defendant claims that the Special Counsel’s decision to abandon pretrial diversion and indict Defendant on the three felony firearm charges in this case is presumptively vindictive. (See D.I. 81 at 2 n.1). Because that decision occurred in the summer of 2023, his complaints about original charging decisions (or lack thereof) in this case are irrelevant, as are charging decisions for the unrelated tax offenses being pursued in another venue. Yet even as to the Special Counsel’s decision to indict after failing to reach agreement on pretrial diversion, Defendant fails to identify any right that he was lawfully exercising that prompted the government to retaliate. [my emphasis]

Her temporal argument doesn’t seem to support the point she uses it for: That Weiss’ decision to change his mind means that what he changed it from, “are irrelevant” (this is particularly important given how she treats the dispute over immunity).

Elsewhere, she treats the entirety of the decision to be after the failed plea hearing.

Defendant has made clear, however, that his selective prosecution claim is focused on the decision to abandon pretrial diversion and pursue indictment on the three felony firearm charges – a decision that occurred after the Court’s hearing in July 2023. (See D.I. 81 at 2 n.1). [my emphasis]

It’s not remotely clear how she adopted this timeframe. But by doing so, she excluded from her consideration things that clearly were part of abandoning the existing plea deal, most notably reneging on the full extent of the immunity. (She also excluded from her consideration her own role in the process, which as I’ll show, she makes a good case was unconstitutional.)

She did so even while describing that “the government appeared to revoke the deal” when Hunter Biden insisted on the terms of immunity that had been negotiated in June.

Having received contradictory sworn statements about Defendant’s reliance on immunity, the Court proceeded to inquire about the scope of any immunity. At this point, it became apparent that the parties had different views as to the scope of the immunity provision in the Diversion Agreement. In the government’s view, it could not bring tax evasion charges based on the conduct set forth in the Plea Agreement, nor could it bring firearm charges based on the particular firearm identified in the Diversion Agreement, but unrelated charges – e.g., under the Foreign Agents Registration Act – were permissible. (D.I. 16 at 54:13-55:9). Defendant disagreed. (Id. at 55:17-18). At that point, the government appeared to revoke the deal (id. at 55:22) and proceedings were again recessed to allow the parties to confer in light of their fundamental misunderstanding as to the scope of immunity conferred by the Diversion Agreement (id. at 57:1-7). The hearing resumed, with Defendant’s attorney again reversing position and explaining to the Court that the immunity provision covered only federal crimes related to “gun possession, tax issues, and drug use.” (Id. at 57:23-24).

For reasons I’ll explain in a follow-up, Noreika sua sponte conducted a lengthy discussion of the scope of immunity. But just that observation that the government “appeared to revoke” the terms of the deal, paired with the uncontested claims that Hunter had been assured there was no ongoing investigation on June 19, should make Weiss’ decision to chase the Smirnov claims central.

Noreika also claimed that by adopting Lowell’s framework about how the deal was abandoned, it put the actions of all Trump’s officials out of play.

Yet, as was the case with selective prosecution, the relevant point in time is when the prosecutor decided to no longer pursue pretrial diversion and instead indict Defendant. Whether former administration officials harbored actual animus towards Defendant at some point in the past is therefore irrelevant. This is especially true where, as here, the Court has been given no evidence or indication that any of these individuals (whether filled with animus or not) have successfully influenced Special Counsel Weiss or his team in the decision to indict Defendant in this case. At best, Defendant has generically alleged that individuals from the prior administration were or are targeting him (or his father) and therefore his prosecution here must be vindictive. The problem with this argument is that the charging decision at issue was made during this administration – by Special Counsel Weiss – at a time when the head of the Executive Branch prosecuting Defendant is Defendant’s father. Defendant has offered nothing credible to support a finding that anyone who played a role in the decision to abandon pretrial diversion and move forward with indictment here harbored any animus towards Defendant. Any claim of vindictive prosecution based on actual vindictiveness must fail.

Except it shouldn’t. Lowell cited Barr’s intervention in the FD-1023 discussion in his original motion to dismiss, intervention that happened between the time Weiss agreed to a deal and the time he started reneging on the immunity he had offered. The Brady side channel was a central part of Lowell’s argument about the selective prosecution role of Trump’s officials.

Plus, Noreika’s silence about Smirnov matters because Noreika invests a whole lot of energy in prosecutors’ claims that they couldn’t be retaliating against Hunter Biden because Hunter’s father runs the Executive Branch.

To the extent that Defendant’s claim that he is being selectively prosecuted rests solely on him being the son of the sitting President, that claim is belied by the facts. The Executive Branch that charged Defendant is headed by that sitting President – Defendant’s father. The Attorney General heading the DOJ was appointed by and reports to Defendant’s father. And that Attorney General appointed the Special Counsel who made the challenged charging decision in this case – while Defendant’s father was still the sitting President. Defendant’s claim is effectively that his own father targeted him for being his son, a claim that is nonsensical under the facts here. Regardless of whether Congressional Republicans attempted to influence the Executive Branch, there is no evidence that they were successful in doing so and, in any event, the Executive Branch prosecuting Defendant was at all relevant times (and still is) headed by Defendant’s father.

This entire argument fails if, as the available evidence suggests, David Weiss asked for Special Counsel status to pursue a bribery investigation into Hunter and his father. Once you include the Smirnov claims, Joe Biden is the subject of the investigation, an investigation that was only made possible by reneging on the immunity agreement.

Judge Noreika clearly stated that the government appeared to revoke the deal based on Hunter’s statement about immunity. If that’s right, then Smirnov has to be central to her considerations. Instead, she ignored him.

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