And not a word about NFL Free Agency?

Oy.

AWWA [American Water Works Association] Journal article
Flint Water Crisis: What Happened and Why?
Susan Matsen, et. al; AWWA Journal; 12/2016
[Lead author Susan J. Masten is a professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Michigan State University.] [Research reported in this publication was supported by National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) under award number 1R21 ES027199-01]
[quote] We have investigated the chemistry and engineering behind what happened to Flint’s water, why it was corrosive, and the extent to which the system appears to be recovering. This analysis is based on an extensive review of the monthly operating reports (MOR’s) and other documents from the water treatment facilities, and from personal communications with plant operators and managers.
Historical Perspective
With the goal of reducing the costs for treated water (Felton 2016), Flint officials decided in 2013 to join the newly formed Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA), which was constructing its own pipeline to transmit raw water from Lake Huron. […]
After failing to come to an agreement on a short term contract with DWSD, Flint decided to use water from the Flint River and treat it at the FWSC.
Many warnings and concerns were voiced…Brian Larkin, then associate director of the (Michigan) Governor’s Office of Urban and Metropolitan Initiatives, foretold the crisis in a March 14, 2014, e-mail message to several others in the governor’s office: “The expedited timeframe is less than ideal and could lead to some big potential disasters down the road.” Mike Glasgow, laboratory and water quality supervisor at the plant, wrote in an April 25, 2014, e-mail to the State of Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), “I do not anticipate giving the OK to begin sending water out anytime soon. If water is distributed from this plant in the next couple weeks, it will be against my direction.” Despite concerns, the FWSC switched from purchasing and distributing [treated] water from DWSD to treating water at its facility in Flint. In doing so, the source water changed from Lake Huron to the Flint River. […]
Water Treatment at the Flint Water Treatment Plant […]
While [Mike Glasgow’s e-mail] message sounded the alarm that staffing and monitoring plans were inadequate, it has not been reported how poorly equipped the plant was. It was clear from the MOR that the plant was woefully unprepared for full-time operation on April 25, 2014. The May 2014 MOR reveals that the plant had only four to five days of polymer available to “use as a trial on two different occasions.” Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) upgrades were incomplete and out for bid. Filter headloss meters were not operational on the SCADA system. Also, chlorine residual monitoring equipment at the point of entry into the distribution system had not been installed, so chlorine levels would have had to have been measured by taking grab samples from the clearwell as well as from a tap in the laboratory. It appears that, on the basis of the MORs, chlorination after filtration was not used until May 17, 2014. Flouridation was not implemented until July 2, 2014. The water utility did not have a corrosion control plan, and it had not installed corrosion control equipment when the water was switched back to DWSD on Oct. 16, 2015. On the basis of the MORs, the filter headloss meters were never made operational. […]
Without any treatability studies on which to determine chemical dosages until late August 2015, (City of Flint, 2015), it appears that plant personnel were left to attempt to address the plethora of complex water quality issues and complaints by trial and error. Significant changes were made to chemical dosages, and the reasons for these changes were often not apparent. […]
Difficulties were encountered in maintaining chlorine residuals throughout the distribution system throughout the 1.5 years of treatment and continues to be problematic, even after the change back to DWSD water […] detection of E. coli…TTHM [exceedance], [ozonation system repair, summer 2015] […] The US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) Drinking Water Task Force remains concerned about chlorine residual levels in Flint’s water. (Emery 2016)
The 24-month source water sampling for Cryptosporidium, E. coli, and turbidity to determine bin placement required by the SDWA Long-Term 2 Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule was not done before the switch to Flint River water, apparently because MDEQ staff believed the Flint River was only a temporary source (MDEQ e-mail conversations), despite the fact that construction of the 80-mi KWA pipeline had not even begun in April 2014.
Quality of Treated Flint River Water […]
Corrosive Indexes
The high values of the CSMR [chloride-to-sulfate mass ratio] and Larson-Skold indexes of water entering the Flint distribution system should have raised serious concerns about the possibility of corrosion, especially given prior experience by water utilities. For example, in Columbus, Ohio, the 90th percentile lead levels in the water increased by almost 360% after a change in coagulant [like what happened in switch from DWSD to FWSC] from alum to ferric chloride, which resulted in an increase in the CSMR by up to 170% (Hill & Cantor 2011)
So What Went Wrong in Flint?
The previous discussion demonstrates the complexity of treating a variable water source. Flint River water was considered to be a challenge to treat, with “high bacteria and high carbon concentrations” that “fluxuate (sic) depending on rain events” (Mar. 20, 2012 meeting minutes, MDEQ meeting on KWA water issues).The only pilot testing that appears to have been completed before the switch was in 2002—a treatability study by Alvord, Burdick, and Howson LCC (AB&H)—and is mentioned in the OER [Operational Evaluation Report] (Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman [sic] 2015). The author of the study describes the water source as “particularly difficult to treat with seasonal variation between high organic load and high magnesium hardness” (Lawrence 2012). The treatment train recommended in the AB&H report differs significantly from that used at the Flint water treatment plant, which meant that in 2014 the plant operators lacked important information about the treatability of the water that was necessary for proper plant operation.
AWWA (Muylwyk et al. 2014) recommends that “If a municipality is considering changing how its source water is treated, the potential effects on the corrosivity of the treated water and the need for corrosion control should be evaluated.”  However, sufficient pilot testing and corrosion control studies were not commissioned and completed before the April 2014 switch of source waters. Furthermore, since the Flint plant had not been fully operational in almost 50 years, was understaffed, and some of the staff were undertrained, it is not surprising that it was difficult to achieve effective treatment.
[List of water treatment changes that occurred in Flint which “could affect corrosion or corrosion control in the treatment system” [Muylwyk et al.2014]] These changes were made when Flint switched to treating the Flint River water; however, as mentioned previously, corrosion control was not used at the plant, and there was no plan for corrosion control. […] such rapid changes in water chemistry (as experienced in the Flint system) may adversely affect system equilibrium and the passivation layer and scales on the insides of the pipes […] changes in pH and alkalinity can result in the softening of iron tubercles and therefore result in increased iron corrosion [red water] …In addition, bacteria are known to contribute to the corrosion of iron pipes, so it is possible that the corrosion problem was exacerbated by bacterial regrowth as a result of low chlorine residual and the likely presence of low molecular weight/easily metabolized compounds formed from the reaction of ozone with naturally occurring organic matter.
Commonly used indexes could have predicted that the treated Flint River water would likely corrode lead pipes. […]
The addition of phosphate as an inhibitor to prevent lead corrosion is commonly used in the industry (Hill & Cantor 2011), and while the possible use of phosphate as a corrosion inhibitor was suggested (Wade Trim 2009), the reason corrosion control was not implemented is still not known. No preliminary corrosion estimates using simple indexes appear in any of the engineering reports, and they do not appear to have been considered during the design process. Journalistic reports of the Flint disaster have often stated that the failure to add phosphate was the primary cause of the lead corrosion problems. However, it should be recognized that the CSMR of the treated Flint River water was so high that, even with the addition of phosphate, the water may have been so corrosive that lead levels in the system might have still exceeded the action level. The failure to recognize the corrosivity of the water and to add corrosion control had devastating effects. […] it appears that a significant number of premises still have high lead levels in their water. […] High lead levels were found in in a number of samples four years after all the lead pipes were replaced in Madison, Wis. (Cantor 2006), suggesting that even after all the lead pipes are replaced, it may take years for the lead levels in Flint to reach a point at which the concentrations of all samples are below the action level. […] [end quote]