John Durham Committed the “Crime” of “Inferring” of Which He Accused Rodney Joffe

/17 Comments/in , /by

I’d like to look at 13 instances in which the word, “inference” appears in the Durham Report.

Almost half come in Durham’s discussion of Rodney Joffe’s work on the Alfa Bank anomalies. Durham states as fact that Joffe “tasked” a number of people to “mine … data to establish ‘an inference’ … tying then-candidate Trump to Russia.”

With respect to the Alfa Bank materials, our investigation established that Joffe had tasked a number of computer technology researchers who worked for companies he was affiliated with, and who had access to certain internet records, to mine the internet data to establish “an inference” and “narrative” tying then-candidate Trump to Russia.

[snip]

In particular, in late July and early August, Joffe commenced a project in coordination with Sussmann and Perkins Coie to support an “inference” and “narrative” tying Trump to Russia. For example, records show that on three days in August 2016, Joffe had meetings or conference calls with Sussmann and Elias. 1401 At about the same time, Joffe began tasking his own employees and associates to mine and assemble internet data that would support such an inference or narrative. 1402

[snip]

Regarding this whole project, my opinion is that from DNS all we could gain even in the best case is an *inference*. I have not the slightest doubt that illegal money and relationships exist between pro-Russian and pro-Trump, meaning actual people very close to Trump if not himself, [meaning actual people very close to Trump if not himself. And by Putin’s traditional style, people Putin controls, but not himself. He controls the oligarchs and they control massive fortunes and cross nearly all major industries in a vast number of countries.]

But even if we found what Rodney asks us to find in DNS we don’t see the money flow, and we don’t see the content of some message saying “send me the money here” etc.

I could fill out a sales form on two websites, faking the other company’s email address in each form, and cause them to appear to communicate with each other in DNS (And other ways I can think of and I feel sure [University-1 Researcher-2] can think of[.])

IF Rodney can take the *inference* we gain through this team exercise … and cause someone to apply more use.fit! tools of more useful observation or study or questioning … then work to develop even an inference may be worthwhile.

That is how I understood the task. Because Rodney didn’t tell me more context or specific things. What [Cyber Researcher- 1] has been digging up is going to wind up being significant. It’s just not the case that you can rest assured that Hil[l]ary’s opposition research and whatever professional govts and investigative journalists are also digging … they just don’t all come up with the same things or interpret them the same way. But if you find any benefit in what [he] has done or is doing, you need to say so, to encourage [him]. Because we are both killing ourselves here, every day for weeks.

[I’m on the verge of something interesting with hosts that talk to the list of Trump dirty advisor domain resources, and hosts that talk to [Russian Bank1]-* domains. Take even my start on this and you have Tehran and a set of Russian banks they talk to. I absolutely do not assume that money is passing thru Tehran to Trump. It’s just one of many *inferences* I’m looking at.

SAME IRANIAN IP THAT TALKS TO SOME TRUMP ADVISORS, also talks to:

[list of domains redacted]

(Capitals don’t mean SUPER SIGNIFICANT it was just a heading.)

Many of the IPs we have to work with are quite MIXED in purpose, meaning that a lot of work is needed to WINNOW down and then you will still only be left in most cases with an *inference* not a certainty.]

Trump/ advisor domains I’ve been using. These include ALL from Rodney’s PDF [the Trump Associates List] plus more from [Cyber Researcher-1]‘s work[:

Trump/ advisor domains I’ve been using. These include ALL from [Tech Executive-1’s] PDF [the Trump Associate’s List] plus more from [name redacted, probably also Cyber Researcher-1]’s work: [list of domains redacted] [RUSSIAN BANK-1] DOMAINS [list of domains redacted] More needs to be added to both lists.]1438 

The word “inference” here comes not from Joffe, but from April Lorenzen, who wrote the large block quote here, to which I’ve added — in the italicized brackets — language from the Durham motion to get it admitted at trial. Even without the Lorenzen language Durham excludes, his deceit is clear, because someone that Durham has never included in his feverish conspiracy theories — Cyber Researcher-1 — is described as doing his or her own work. With Lorenzen’s language included, Durham’s deceit is still more obvious, given how Lorenzen talks about forming her own inference. Not to mention the fact that (as I noted here), many of Lorenzen’s inferences — starting with the fact that Trump’s campaign manager was laundering money from Russia through Cyprus and that he had a tie with Alfa Bank founder’s son-in-law or that Trump was hiding business ties with Russia — turned out to be 100% correct.

But Durham’s deceit goes even further, because the effort to review DNS data for signs of Russian hacking started, organically, in June, not in July in response to Joffe.

Durham’s misrepresentation of the relationship between the various researchers is particularly rich given that a technical review he had done months after indicting Sussmann revealed that the data Sussmann shared with the FBI was referred to as Lorenzen’s data, not Joffe’s.

The 851 records of resolutions on the USB drive were an exact match for a file of resolutions sent from University-1 Researcher-2 to University-I Researcher- 1 on July 29, 2016, which was referred to as “[first name of Tech Company-2 Executive-l]’s data.”

As it happens, three more of the appearances of the word “inference” in the Durham Report come from the technical review.

The FBI DNS experts with whom we worked also identified certain data and information that cast doubt upon several assertions, inferences, and allegations contained in (i) the above-quoted white papers about the Yotaphone allegations, and (ii) the presentation and Yotaphone-related materials that Sussmann provided to the CIA in 2017.

[snip]

Data files obtained from Tech Company-I, Tech Company-2, and University-I reflect that Yotaphone-related lookups involving IP addresses assigned to the EOP began long before November or December 2016 and therefore seriously undermine the inference set forth in the white paper that such lookups likely reflected the presence of a Trump transition-team member who was using a Yotaphone in the EOP.

[snip]

In sum, as a result of our investigation, the FBI experts advised us that actual data and information on YotaPhone resolution requests directly undermined or refuted several conclusions and inferences included in the Yotaphone white paper. 1674

But that technical review only treats claims made about Yotaphone, not the Alfa Bank allegations, as “inferences.”

I’ll return to the way that Durham presents this technical review at some later time. It doesn’t help Durham in the way he thinks it does.

The point being, though, is that Durham claimed that Joffe was directing people to make inferences about Alfa Bank. He investigated private citizens who made such inferences as a crime.

Which is why I find it telling that the remaining three uses of the word “inference” in the Durham report are his own.

For example, Durham infers, first, that Sussmann’s statements that he was not at the FBI or CIA on behalf of any client is proof he was hiding who his client(s) were, and from that inference, he in turn infers that Sussmann was deliberately trying to hide Clinton and Joffe.

Accordingly, Sussmann’s conduct supports the inference that his representations to both the FBI and the CIA that he was not there on behalf of a client reflect attempts to conceal the role of certain clients, namely the Clinton campaign and Joffe, in Sussmann’s work. Such evidence also further supports the inference that Sussmann’s false statements to two different agencies were not a mistake or misunderstanding but, rather, a deliberate effort to conceal the involvement of specific clients in his delivery of data and documents to the FBI and CIA.

Both these inferences are nonsense — not least because Clinton no longer was a client of Sussmann’s when he went to the CIA in 2017 and both in the process of setting up the CIA meeting and helping the FBI to kill the NYT Alfa Bank story, Sussmann revealed that he did have a client he was working with.

Durham simply refuses to consider the possibility that DNS experts can see anomalous traffic and view it with alarm. And he grossly misrepresents the evidence regarding whether Sussmann pushed the Alfa Bank story after helping the FBI to kill it, probably because that evidence strongly supports Sussmann’s claimed motive: to give the FBI a chance to investigate before the public story alerted those behind the anomaly.

The final use of the word inference in the report is even more egregious.

As discussed above, Fusion GPS approached Steele in May 2016. Prior to his retention, Glenn Simpson met with Steele at Heathrow Airport in London and pitched Steele on the opposition research project. 1100 Approximately one week later, Danchenko contacted RIA Novosti journalists seeking Millian’s contact information. 1101 The timing of Danchenko’s request to RIA Novosti on the heels of Steele’s meeting with Simpson in London strongly supports the inference that Fusion GPS directed Steele to pursue Millian. 1102 Indeed, by the time of Steele’s meeting with Simpson, Nellie Ohr had already identified Millian’s alleged connections to Trump.

As with Carter Page (and Felix Sater, the focus on whom Durham continually downplayed over the course of this investigation), it didn’t take a research firm to identify Millian’s ties to Trump. Especially not with Millian bragging of those ties. Indeed, elsewhere Durham suggests Ohr learned of Millian from the RIA Novosti interviews he did in April. RIA Novosti was just as accessible to Danchenko as it was to Ohr.

But once you’ve traced the interest in Millian back to a Nellie Ohr report completed on April 22, 2016, then you’re tracking the research started no later than November 2015 under Paul Singer. You’re blaming Hillary for a project she took over from a right wing billionaire. You’re also tracking research that turned out to be reliable and accurate.

Again, these kinds of inferences are the stuff that Durham tried to criminalize when Lorenzen, a private citizen, made them.

But he nevertheless included them in a declination report provided to the Attorney General.

John Durham, High Priest of the Cult of the Coffee Boy

/37 Comments/in , , /by

One of the most telling passages in the entire Durham Report is this one:

245 See supra§ IV.A.3.a (discussing the views of Papadopoulos held by the Australian diplomats and noting his strengths and weaknesses). Understandably, as noted below, when Crossfire Hurricane was opened, serious efforts were made to keep the investigation quiet so as not to interfere with the upcoming election. Ultimately, however, the Mueller investigation reported that:

When interviewed, Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials who interacted with him told the [Mueller] Office that they could not recall Papadopoulos’ sharing the information that Russia had obtained “dirt” on candidate Clinton in the form of emails or that Russia could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information about Clinton ….No documentary evidence, and nothing in the email accounts or other communications facilities reviewed by the [Mueller] Office, shows that Papadopoulos shared this information with the Campaign.

I Mueller Report at 93-94 [Ellipsis emphasis mine]

It appears in a section reviewing the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. There are no prosecutorial decisions tied to this section, meaning the section is — at least arguably — one of the 100 pages of extraneous material in this report outside the scope of “closing documentation” required by regulation.

In a section discussing whether the investigation should ever have been opened, preceding the discussion falsely claiming to have found a conflict between Alexander Downer’s version of George Papadopoulos’ statement about the Russian offer of help and Erika Thompson’s (which I laid out in this post), Durham footnotes a passage in which he discusses how little the FBI evaluated the Papadopoulos tip before opening an investigation by quoting what he claims is the Mueller Report conclusion on this matter.

Here’s what that passage from the Mueller Report actually looks like.

Durham omits with an ellipsis the part of the report that describes Papadopoulos, “wavered about whether he accurately remembered an incident in which Clovis had been upset after hearing Papadopoulos tell Clovis that Papadopoulos thought ‘they have her emails.'”

Durham purports to quote from the Mueller Report, but then leaves out language from it that utterly changes the entire meaning of the passage, showing that Papadopoulos did have some memory of telling Sam Clovis, “they have her emails,” rather than concluding definitively that he did not.

To sustain his narrative that the tip about Papadopoulos should not have been used to open an investigation, Durham distorts what the evidence about Papadopoulos actually shows.

This is not the only misrepresentation Durham makes with regards to the Papadopoulos investigation. Here’s how he describes Papadopoulos’ prosecution.

With regard to misleading and incomplete information being provided to the FBI, Papadopoulos was subsequently charged in a one-count Information with and convicted of making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). United States v. George Papadopoulos, Crim. No. 17-cr-182 (RMD) (D.D.C.), Document 8 (Information). Specifically, during his first interview with the Crossfire Hurricane Agents on January 27, 2017, Papadopoulos told the Agents about an individual associated with a London-based entity who had told him about the Russians having “dirt” on Clinton. Although Papadopoulos provided the FBI with the name of the individual and where he could be contacted, Papadopoulos lied to the Agents about when he had received the information (it was received after not before he was named as a foreign policy advisor to the Trump campaign) and he downplayed his understanding of the individual’s connections to Russian government officials. U.S. v. Papadopoulos Document 19 (Statement of the Offense) at 1-2. In addition, Papadopoulos misled the Agents about his attempts to use the individual and a female associated with that person to arrange a meeting between the Trump campaign and Russian government officials. Id. at 2-3. Ultimately, Papadopoulos pleaded guilty to making false statements. On multiple occasions he then met with, answered questions for, and provided information to the Government, id. at 13, and eventually was sentenced to 14 days incarceration. U.S. v. Papadopoulos Document 50.

He cites a few words in Papadopoulos’ Statement of Offense to suggest that Papadopoulos “provided information” to the government. He doesn’t quote the sentencing memo, which explains that Papadopoulos cooperated to the extent that DOJ had obtained a written record debunking the things he had earlier said to the FBI.

The defendant did not provide “substantial assistance,” and much of the information provided by the defendant came only after the government confronted him with his own emails, text messages, internet search history, and other information it had obtained via search warrants and subpoenas well after the defendant’s FBI interview as the government continued its investigation. The defendant also did not notify the government about a cellular phone he used in London during the course of the campaign – that had on it substantial communications between the defendant and the Professor – until his fourth and final proffer session.

And Durham definitely doesn’t cite the September 19 proffer in which Papadopoulos claimed to be unable to read his own notes, written around July 11, 2016 — so just weeks before the opening of Crossfire Hurricane — that appear to discuss plans for a September 2016 meeting with “Office of Putin” in London.

Just a few weeks before the FBI opened an investigation into Papadopoulos, he had discussed plans for a secret meeting with Putin’s office in London. Papadopoulos ultimately refused to explain that plan to the FBI.

And John Durham questions whether this investigation should ever have been opened.

This misrepresentation of the record on Papadopoulos is fairly significant. That’s because sixteen pages of Durham’s investigative review and two of his actual prosecutorial decisions pertain to whether the FBI committed a crime by having informants record conversations with Papadopoulos and Sam Clovis (again, remember that in his report Durham did not mention the informant, handled by pro-Trump agents, targeting the Clinton Foundation in the same period, a far clearer violation of what he complains about here), but not including everything that Durham believed helped Trump in Carter Page’s FISA application.

Durham goes to great lengths to conclude that there was not only exculpatory information in the recordings that didn’t make the Carter Page FISA applications (something about which DOJ IG agreed with him on), that Papadopoulos’ labeling of what Roger Stone ultimately did do — at Manafort’s request — to be treason as similarly exculpatory, but that Sam Clovis (who may have had advance notice about the emails) raising voter suppression in response to a question about Russia, or Papadopoulos, confessing he responded to Halper in the belief he might report back to the CIA were not inculpatory statements. These are all opinions. Significantly, some of the are opinions that Congress first floated in a hearing that served as the impetus for this very investigation, an investigation that concluded that investigations shouldn’t be driven by direction from Congress.

To prove the FBI wrong about this difference of opinion, though, Durham provides his own opinion about whether Papadopoulos had offered a scripted answer to the question that he later said he believed would be shared with the CIA. To attempt to criminalize the decision to leave out denials that the FBI believed to be scripted, Durham did his own review.

Things get weirder when Durham credits Papadopoulos’ statements — made to a friendly informant on March 31, 2017, after having already lied to the FBI and misrepresented to this particular informant his ties with Sergei Millian, though before FBI discovered the relationship with Ivan Timofeev that Papadopoulos had hidden in his initial interviews — that he had nothing to do with Russia.

14:03:45

CHS-2: Do you think the Russians would come and kill you if you said something? The Russian Mafia?

GP: I have nothing to do with the Russians.

14:14:30

CHS-2: If Russia [expletive] meddled in our elections, what else are they controlling about us? That just makes America look weak.

GP: I still don’t believe that [they did].

And we can be sure that Durham left out inculpatory statements.

For example, Durham makes no mention of the fact that Papadopoulos talked about monetizing his relationship with Trump specifically in context of a question about Russia, as described in the Horowitz Report.

When Source 3 asked Papadopoulos if he had ever met Putin, Papadopoulos said that he was invited “to go and thank God I didn’t go though.” Papadopoulos said that it was a “weird story” from when he “was working at … this law firm in London” that involved a guy who was “well connected to the Russian government.” Papadopoulos also said that he was introduced to “Putin’s niece” and the Russian Ambassador in London. 472 Papadopoulos did not elaborate on the story, but he added that he needed to figure out

how I’m going monetize it, but I have to be an idiot not to monetize it, get it? Even if [Trump] loses. If anything, I feel like if he loses probably could be better for my personal business because if he wins I’m going to be in some bureaucracy I can’t do jack … , you know?

This expressed enthusiasm to monetize his access to Trump and his relationship with “Putin’s niece” is a clear counterintelligence concern. Durham doesn’t mention it.

All this provides likely explanation for why Durham misrepresented the results of the investigation against Papadopoulos.

Immediately before the section, quoted above, where Durham describes Papadopoulos’ guilty plea and exaggerates his cooperation, Durham complains that a footnote in the Carter Page FISA applications referring to lies Papadopoulos later pled guilty to telling in interviews with FBI Agents “contained qualifying language regarding the denials.” Here’s the footnote from the last two Page FISA applications:

As of March 2017, the FBI has conducted several interviews with Papadopoulos. During these interviews, Papadopoulos confirmed that he met with officials form the above-referenced friendly foreign government, but he denied that he discussed anything related to the Russian Government during these meetings. Based on the FBI’s investigative efforts and some of the comments made by Papadopoulos, the FBI believes that Papadopoulos provided misleading or incomplete information to the FBI during the interviews.

Durham’s own interviews with Downer and Thompson confirm Papadopoulos’ statements about the Australians were incorrect. And yet Durham complains that the FBI correctly observed that Papadopoulos was misleading the FBI about statements that he himself proved to be inaccurate.

As noted above, certain denials made by Papadopoulos in FBI interviews were mentioned in a footnote, but the Crossfire Hurricane team reported that it believed Papadopoulos was misleading in those interviews. This denial from Papadopoulos in this conversation with CHS-2, which occurred prior to those two renewal applications being submitted to the FISC, was also omitted from any discussion in that referenced footnote.

I would write this all off as just Durham’s effort to parrot what people like Mark Meadows and Jim Jordan urged him to investigate, or desperation, or maybe just an old man seeing clouds in old informant recordings, except for a few more details about Durhams’ treatment of Papadopoulos.

First, as I noted here, as of June 2022, Durham had never interviewed Papadopoulos himself. In fact, if you can believe Papadopoulos, rather than interviewing him, Durham relied on Papadopoulos’ congressional testimony conducted without any of the underlying documents in question, in which Papadopoulos repeatedly laundered conspiracy theories told in right wing rags into the Congressional record. If you can believe Papadopoulos, Durham took those conspiracy theories, and ran off to Europe to chase them down.

Papadopoulos: So, that’s a good question. In 2018, I was one of five witnesses who was invited by–under oath, behind closed doors–in front of the House Oversight Committee. And the other four witnesses, besides myself, were Rod Rosenstein, Sally Yates, uh, Jim Comey, and Loretta Lynch. Now, back in 2018, and there’s a Washington Post article, I think it’s called “Papadopoulos and Rosenstein about to testify behind closed doors,” back in 2018, people were scratching their heads, why on earth is George Papadopoulos one of four, one of five witnesses who is going to testify to both John Ratcliffe and Mark Meadows. Back then, obviously, before Mark Meadows was Chief of Staff at the White House and Ratcliffe was the head of DNI, they were Congressmen. They were in charge of the House Oversight Committee. During that testimony back then, both of those individuals who later served in senior White House, uh, Administrative capacities were asking me questions about wiretaps. They were asking me if I was being monitored while I was in Europe. They were asking me whether my lawyers were ever given so-called exculpatory information about any of, about Joseph Mifsud, any of these other type of operatives, both domestic and foreign. And I basically let them know, under oath, that I’m telling you. How I met him, what my background was, why I believe there was this target on my back, why I think it followed me all the way from the beginning, all the way until the summer of 2017, where they were, the FBI was trying to set me up while I was in Israel with this other bizarre exchange that I had, that I talk about in my book. So that testimony, I believe, was used with the Durham team, to help get this entire thing started, that’s how Durham and Barr flew to both to Rome, to talk to Italian intelligence services — not the FBI — to learn about Mifsud, and I believe — that’s why NBC has also been quoted as saying that Western intelligence officials have gone on the record and stated that it’s Papadopoulos’ breadcrumbs, if you want to call it that, that have led to Durham’s real conspiracy case that he’s trying to uh–

Stone: So, but to go to my direct question, have you had any direct contact with Durham or his office, or your attorneys?

Papadopoulos: No, I haven’t. No no no, no I haven’t. But my understanding is that that testimony, 2018, was used by the Durham, that’s my understanding.

Rather than corroborating Papadopoulos’ conspiracy theories, Durham instead learned of evidence implicating Trump in a crime, an investigation that has disappeared. Durham makes no mention of these junkets in his final report — he makes no mention that Papadopoulos, whose criminal investigation he misrepresents, sent him and the Attorney General on wild goose chases to Europe.

That’s one reason it matters that Durham made no mention of these junkets in his final report, because doing so would discredit the testimony Papadopoulos made to Congress, and in the process make it even more clear that the FBI was right to open an investigation into the Coffee Boy.

But there’s an even bigger reason that Durham’s failure to interview Papadopoulos matters: because he was the one person known to have undeniably relevant testimony about Sergei Millian’s communication practices during July 2016, someone who could provide direct insight onto whether it was possible that Igor Danchenko and Millian communicated in those very same weeks.

Durham’s failure to interview Papadopoulos on that topic is all the more telling given that in the 11-page section of the report in which Durham discusses the basis for four charges against Igor Danchenko that a jury acquitted on, he makes just three references to actual interviews his own team did:

1085 OSC Report of Interview of Sergei Millian on Feb. 5, 2022 at 1.

[snip]

1136 OSC Report of Interview of Brian Auten on July 26, 2021 at 21; OSC Report of Interview of Kevin Helson on July 27, 2021 at 3-4.

The Millian interview was conducted remotely; Millian refused to make the same comments under oath, in a venue in which he could be held accountable for lies.

The interviews with Auten and Helson were significantly debunked on the stand at Danchenko’s trial.

Under cross-examination by Danchenko attorney Stuart Sears, for example, Helson testified he never walked away from his meetings with Danchenko believing he had lied.

Q. Agent Helson, it was no — it was no secret, during the course of your relationship with Mr. Danchenko, that there was a discrepancy between how Mr. Steele described how Mr. Danchenko represented his interactions with Mr. Millian and how Mr. Danchenko told you he actually explained his interactions?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. It was no — it was no secret. Everyone knew all along that there was a disconnect there?

A. Correct.

Q. And at no point during your entire time of meeting with Mr. Danchenko over those three years, did you ever walk away thinking that he was lying to you about anything; is that fair?

A. That’s fair.

Q. In fact, for years after your conversations with Mr. Danchenko about his anonymous phone call with the person he believed to be Mr. Millian, you would submit reports indicating that he was a reliable source?

A. Correct.

Q. And some of those reports would even mention the Millian discrepancy and you would write that you believed that Mr. Danchenko had accurately reported the information as best you could recall?

A. Yes.

Helson is likely the person whom Durham referred for further investigation for his handling of Danchenko. The report doesn’t provide the date of the referral, suggesting he may have retaliated against Helson for this testimony given under oath.

In cross-examination, Danchenko attorney Danny Onorato first got Auten to acknowledge that Danchenko himself had said the communication he had with someone he believed was Millian was “strange,” and Auten never followed to up clarify if they meant the same thing by “strange.”

Q. All right. So, first of all, I think your testimony yesterday was that you thought that the interaction was strange between Millian, the person he believed to be Millian, and Mr. Danchenko.

A. I thought that that interaction, as described, was peculiar and strange, yes.

Q. Right. And before you thought they were peculiar, Mr. Danchenko told you, on the 24th, is that he thought what happened was strange, right?

A. I do recall that, yes.

Q. Right. Because when you write a 302 or your memo, you write what the witness tells you, right?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. And you would agree that his characterization was, “Guys, this is strange,” and that’s what you wrote in that report?

A. I believe that’s how I characterized it.

Q. Okay. So you agree with him when he said, “This was strange.” You said, “You know what, he’s right. This seems strange,” right?

A. He characterized it as strange. I think my characterization of strange might not be the same characterization of strange.

Q. Okay. But you used the same word?

A. Used the same word, yes.

Q. So you can use the same word, and sometimes people can interpret the word differently is what you’re telling me.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And the only way for you to know that is to ask a follow-up question and say, “Hey, when you say ‘strange,’ this is what I think and this is what you think,” right?

A. Right.

Q. But you never did that?

A. I don’t recall asking him to define what he meant by strange in that.

Q. Very well. But he told you that he got information from a person who did not identify himself, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. And, again, I’m not giving you a hard time because you didn’t ask a lot of probing questions on that day because you were just trying to break the ice with him to see if you can get him to work with you. Somma said you’d have more time to work with him, right?

A. Correct.

Then, Onorato demonstrated that Durham had gotten Auten to lie unwittingly on the stand by withholding the part of the Danchenko transcript where, in his first interviews with the FBI, he said the call he had with the person he believed was Millian could have been via app.

Q. Okay. But I do want to try to correct something about what you testified about this morning. Okay?

A. Okay.

Q. And you prepared to testify with Mr. Durham and his team, right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And I think he asked you to look at Government Exhibit 100.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And when he asked you to look at Government one- — Exhibit 100, I think you may have answered that he did not mention a call app on Page 20, right, in response to his questions?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Well, do me a favor. Look at Page 20 and then 21, And see if that refreshes your memory the first day about what Mr. Danchenko told you.

A. I apologize. Yes, it basically says — would you like me to read it?

Q. Yeah.

A. Okay. I’ll start at the middle of — middle of the last paragraph of Page 20. [As read:] “The two of them talked for a bit and the two of them tentatively agreed to meet in person in New York City at the end of July. At the end of July, Danchenko traveled with his daughter to New York but the meeting never took place and no one ever called Danchenko back. Altogether, he had only a single phone call with an individual he thought to be Millian. The call was either a cellular call or it was a communication through a phone app.”

Q. I’m sorry, what did you just say?

A. “Or it was a communication through a phone app.”

Q. Okay. So remember when Mr. Durham asked you questions this morning, right?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he omit — ask you to look at page 21 to see what Mr. Danchenko told you that day?

A. I don’t think he was omitting. I think I —

Q. Okay. And did you intentionally omit, intentionally tell the jury something wrong, right?

A. No.

Q. But the import of the testimony was that, no, he never mentioned in that first meeting it could have been a phone app, right?

A. Correct.

Q. And now we all know that that’s false, right?

A. Correct.

Q. So he did mention a mobile app?

A. That is correct.

Onorato then got Auten to testify to how Durham had withheld the Amtrak records that corroborated Danchenko’s version of what happened.

What happened next was more dramatic. Durham attempted to exclude just the metadata of communications between Papadopoulos and Millian in these very same weeks of July 2016 because — he said in a bench conference — the content of the communications “sound[ed] creepy.”

The defendant has provided what he has premarked as Defendant’s Exhibit 480, 4-8-0, which is an email, a LinkedIn message from Millian to George Papadopoulos. Unless the defendant is going to somehow explain to the jury what Millian and Papadopoulos were communicating about at this period of time, then the Court should not permit it. Papadopoulos and Millian, as I think the defense knows from the discovery in this case, were exchanging any number of emails or Facebook exchanges or LinkedIn all about real estate, potential real estate transactions.

And so what the defense would be asking the jury to do is to draw some adverse inference that there was something going on between Millian and Papadopoulos that they really don’t know about, but it certainly sounds creepy. Well, in fact, if you look at what the communications were, as I say, between Papadopoulos and Millian, they are all about real estate, potential real estate investments.

[snip]

MR. DURHAM: 486 is from Millian to Papadopoulos. Again, you know, its irrelevant to these proceedings, but for the same reason, in the government’s view, it would be inadmissible unless we want to get into evidence relating to what Papadopoulos and Millian were doing at or about the time these email exchanges were occurring. [my emphasis]

Then, when Durham made another attempt to prevent just this metadata from coming into evidence, he spent five minutes trying unsuccessfully to get Auten to rule out that these communications could be proof of Russian “collusion.”

Q. And do you remember what Papadopoulos and Millian were involved in that generated these numbers?

A. I don’t recall exactly what they were involved in, but it was —

Q. But was it pretty much they were involved in real estate or investment discussions over a long period of time?

A. That, I don’t recall exactly.

Q. Well, how about generally? Do you generally refer — recall that Papadopoulos and Millian were involved in discussions about real estate projects and the like?

A. In January of…

Q. Well, this whole period that’s reflected in Defendant’s Exhibit 403.

A. Yeah, again, I don’t know if I — I don’t know if I can speak to that at this point.

Q. Well, you — you were the analyst — that supervisory analyst, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you recall, sir, what it was that Mr. Millian was involved in, the kind of investments?

A. Yes, he was involved in investments and the like.

Q. Right.

A. But I don’t know if I can speak to, at this point, these phone records being tied to any real estate deals or anything of that sort.

Q. Right. So all of these records have shown there was contact between the two of them, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And did you know that Millian was involved in the energy sector as well?

A. Yes, correct.

Q. And did you know that Papadopoulos was talking about getting involved in the energy sector in the Middle East?

A. Yes, I did know that.

Q. Does that refresh any recollection as to whether or not the contact between Millian and Papadopoulos had to do with energy and other investments?

A. Again, I am familiar with both of those things. I don’t know if that is what this document was actually written for.

Q. Okay. And there’s nothing in this document that tells you what it is about, correct?

A. No. Gmail talks about — there are a couple of references on — it’s not — it’s Bates Number — last Bates number is 105262.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. And there are two paragraphs that talk about another individual involved with energy.

Q. Right. This is all about business, correct?

A. Again, I don’t know if all of this is about business. I know that there are paragraphs in here involving energy.

Q. Okay. So one can tell from this is that they were involved in exchanges of emails or the like, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And it appears it has to do with energy, correct?

A. It might , yes. Again, there are a lot of — there are a lot of communications on here.

Q. Yes.

A. So I would not be able to state with any substance that these are all involving energy issues.

Q. You can’t say that because the document doesn’t tell the jury what it’s about, other than that it, at least it has partially to do with energy?

A. Correct.

Q. Between Millian and Papadopoulos, correct?

A. That’s what it appears, correct.

Q. So it would be unreasonable to conclude anything or draw any conclusions from this other than Papadopoulos and Millian were involved in investments in the energy sector, right?

A. I don’t know if I can say that it follows necessarily from this, that all of these things deal with that.

Q. That wasn’t my question, though.

A. Okay.

Q. My question was: It would be unreasonable to conclude from this document anything other than they were at least involved in talking about — the energy sector, correct?

A. I would say that from this document there may —

Q. Uh-huh.

A. — there are likely communications within this list of communications dealing with energy, though I cannot say, analytically speaking, that all of these deal with energy

Q. Fair enough. You know that Millian was involved in the energy sector and real estate?

A. I do recall that.

Q. And Papadopoulos is involved in the energy sector and real estate?

A. I recall that.

Q. And so this document doesn’t have anything to do, from looking at it on its particulars, anything to do with Russia and Russia collusion and the like, correct?

A. So the only thing that this has is — it has a list of — most of it is a list of communications between the two parties, dates, times.

Q. Okay. [my emphasis]

Durham, in open court, tried to prevent any mention of the relationship between Papadopoulos and his sole affirmative witness against Danchenko, Sergei Millian, because, in his own words, the communications between Millian and Papadopoulos “certainly sound[] creepy.”

And he made no mention of any of this in his report. He sure as hell made no mention of getting a prosecution witness to make a false claim on the stand by withholding information.

This is the witness, Papadopoulos, he never interviewed to learn about the nature of Millian’s communications at the time.

This is the witness he spent pages and pages of his report misrepresenting.

This is the witness, George Papadopoulos, whose Congressional testimony launched him onto multiple international junkets with the Attorney General, in search of conspiracy theories that yielded only some useless Blackberries and evidence of financial crimes involving Trump.

In his report to Merrick Garland, John Durham maintains that the FBI was overly hasty to open an investigation into Papadopoulos, the guy who weeks before the investigation was opened was planning a secret meeting with Putin.

But in open court, Durham admitted that in very weeks the FBI opened the investigation, the Coffee Boy was involved in “creepy” communications with Sergei Millian.

And he doesn’t mention those creepy communications in his report.

“Ridiculous:” Durham’s Failed Clinton Conspiracy Theory

/43 Comments/in , /by

I put together a very rough list of the interviews that John Durham included in his Report and a table showing the organization of his report.

I’d like to describe what appears to have happened with the investigation. Remember a few things about this list: It won’t include everything. Even just among witnesses who testified at trial, Durham was known to have done initial interviews, then threatened them with prosecution, in an often successful attempt to shade their testimony (see this post for an example). With others, Durham is being affirmatively misleading by stating that people who did appear before the grand jury were unwilling to be interviewed.

This list is just a list of interviews that actually support his narrative.

2019: Manufacturing a new origin story

As noted, most of the junkets that Durham and Barr did in the first year of the investigation don’t appear. The only overseas investigative steps noted in 2019 include the Legal Attaché personnel in London and the two Australian sources, Alexander Downer and Erika Thompson (described as Australian Diplomat-1), behind the original tip on George Papadopoulos. Durham did two separate interviews with the Australians, done on the same day, months before the DOJ IG Report determined the investigation was properly predicated.

Durham relies heavily on Downer, instead of Thompson, and claims to have discovered a conflict in their two accounts.

The Australian account reflects that two meetings of a casual nature took place with Papadopoulos. 215 These meetings were documented by Downer on May 11, 2016 and by Australian Diplomat-I later in the month. 216 Both diplomats advised that prior to the Spring of 2016, Papadopoulos was unknown to them. 217 Notably, the information in Paragraph Five does not include any mention of the hacking ofthe DNC, the Russians being in possession of emails, or the public release of any emails. In addition, when interviewed by the Office, Downer stated that he would have characterized the statements made by Papadopoulos differently than Australian Diplomat-1 did in Paragraph 5. According to Downer, Papadopoulos made no mention of Clinton emails, dirt or any specific approach by the Russian government to the Trump campaign team with an offer or suggestion of providing assistance. Rather, Downer’s recollection was that Papadopoulos simply stated “the Russians have information” and that was all. 218

As recounted to the FBI on August 2, 2016, by Australian Diplomat-1, the substance of Paragraph Five was written in a “purposely vague” way. 219 This was done because Papadopoulos left a number of things unexplained and “did not say he had direct contact with the Russians.” 220 The impression Papadopoulos made on the Australian diplomats was wide ranging. On the one hand, he “had an inflated sense of self,” was “insecure,” and was “trying to impress.” 221 On the other hand, he was “a nice guy,” was “not negative,” and “did not name drop.” 222

Downer noted that he

was impressed Papadopoulos acknowledged his lack of expertise and felt the response was uncommon for someone of Papadopoulos’ age, political experience and for someone thrust into the spotlight overnight. Many people in a similar position would represent themselves differently and [Downer] would have sniffed them out. If [Downer] believed Papadopoulos was a fraud [he] would not have recorded and reported on the meeting [he] had with Papadopoulos. 223

Downer also said that he “did not get the sense Papadopoulos was the middle-man to coordinate with the Russians.” 224 The Australian diplomats would later inform the FBI, and subsequently the Office, that the impetus for passing the Paragraph Five information in late-July was the public release by WikiLeaks ( on July 22, 2016) of email communications that had been hacked from the DNC servers. 225

215 We note there is an inconsistency in the statements given by Australian Diplomat-1 and former-High Commissioner Downer to the Crossfire Hurricane interviewers in August 2016 and what they told the Office when interviewed in October 2019. Australian Diplomat-1 and Downer were interviewed together in August 2016, and, according to the FD-302 prepared afterward by Supervisory Special Agent- 1, Papadopoulos made the statements about the Russians during the May 6, 2016 introductory meeting when he met only with Australian Diplomat-1. When the two diplomats were interviewed separately by the Office in October 2019, investigators were advised that Papadopoulos made the statements in front of both Australian Diplomat-1 and Downer during the second meeting on May 10, 2016.

216 The meetings with Papadopoulos took place on May 6 and 10, 2016. Australia 302 at 1- 2. The Australian diplomats documented the meetings in two cables dated May 11 and May 16, 2016; OSC Report of Interview ofAlexander Downer on Oct. 9, 2019 at 2; OSC Report of Interview ofAustralian Diplomat-1 on Oct. 9, 2019 at 3.

217 OSC Report of Interview of Alexander Downer on Oct. 09, 2019 at 1; OSC Report of Interview of Australian Diplomat-I on Oct. 09, 2019 at 1-2.

218 OSC Report of Interview of Alexander Downer on Oct. 09, 2019 at 2 (and related field notes); Downer also is reported to have stated in an interview that in talking with Papadopoulos there was “no suggestion that there was collusion between Donald Trump or Donald Trump’s campaign and the Russians.” Brooke Singman, Diplomat Who Helped Launch Russia Probe Speaks Out, Defends Role, Fox News (May 10, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/forrner-ausralian-diplomat-alexander-downer-defendswork-pushes-back-on-claim-he-tried-to-trap-papadopoulos. 219 Australia 302 at 2.

There’s no conflict.

Papadopoulos appears to have told the story about advance notice of Russia’s help to Thompson twice, once on May 6 and again, with Downer present, on May 10. She explains that not everything Papadopoulos said made it into her report. It’s likely Papadopoulos said more at the first meeting (I believe the record reflects that he drank more at the first meeting).

But by relying on Downer instead of Thompson, Durham claims that there was less to the tip than Thompson appears to have taken from it.

Having manufactured an alternate story about the initial predication, it’s no wonder Durham pushed Michael Horowitz not to say the investigation was fully predicated.

Durham also appears to have investigated why it took so long for the Steele reports to make their way from New York to DC. This is a fairly remarkable and sustained part of his report, because Durham is basically complaining that the pee tape report wasn’t immediately taken seriously.

Finally, from the very first year, Durham started doing investigations into the treatment of the Clinton Foundation investigation. As I have noted, his report leaves out really important details of that investigation: that agents who exhibited every bit as much bias as Durham finds in Peter Strzok, Lisa Page, or Kevin Clinesmith were running a key informant on the investigation, something no one has alleged happened with investigations into Trump’s associates.

That silence is all the more important given how Durham compares the predication of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation with that of Clinton Foundation, which relied in significant part on the Steve Bannon-linked Clinton Cash book which was every bit as shoddy as the Christopher Steele dossier, with a much more aggressive bias.

Once again, the investigative actions taken by FBI Headquarters in the Foundation matters contrast with those taken in Crossfire Hurricane. As an initial matter, the NYFO and WFO investigations appear to have been opened as preliminary investigations due to the political sensitivity and their reliance on unvetted hearsay information (the Clinton Cash book) and CHS reporting. 388 By contrast, the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was immediately opened as a full investigation despite the fact that it was similarly predicated on unvetted hearsay information. Furthermore, while the Department appears to have had legitimate concerns about the Foundation investigation occurring so close to a presidential election, it does not appear that similar concerns were expressed by the Department or FBI regarding the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Indeed, in short order after opening the Crossfire Hurricane file and its four subfiles, the FBI was having one of its long-time CHSs meet not with just one Trump campaign associate, but meet and record conversations with three such insiders. And a little more than a month after opening the Crossfire Hurricane file on Page, a “senior U.S. law enforcement official” was publicly reported as confirming for Michael Isikoff and Yahoo! News that the FBI had Page on its radar screen. 389

Durham says two Australians who had no stake in the election (and who likely didn’t want to create a row with a major political candidate) have the same credibility as a long term political hoaxster paid by Trump’s ultimate campaign manager.

And in making this comparison, Durham doesn’t consider the urgency of the ongoing Russian attack on democracy (something that he generally ignores throughout the report). The underlying crime behind the Papadopoulos tip was potential (and real, in the case of both Paul Manafort and Roger Stone) ongoing involvement in Russia’s efforts to interfere in the election.

2020: Laying the ground work for the Clinton conspiracy

Early in 2020, Barr made Durham a Special Counsel, giving him authority to use a grand jury.

The very next day, he met with Jim Baker.

In cross-examination at the Sussmann trial, Baker lawyer Sean Berkowitz situated this meeting and another, in June 2020, when Baker’s story about the Sussmann meeting was still radically different than the one he told at trial, in terms of a leak investigation into Baker that had just closed. Baker had recently been criminally investigated by Durham, he knew that Durham would come after him again on the Russian investigation, and that February 2020 meeting was the first after the close of the leak investigation.

Q. So you know what it’s like to be under criminal investigation. Right?

A. Yes.

Q. You know what it’s like to be under criminal investigation by this man?

A. Yes.

Q. That’s Mr. Durham?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact, sir, in March of 2017 Mr. Durham was appointed by the Department of Justice to conduct a criminal investigation of the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to a reporter. Correct?

A. I don’t remember exactly when he was appointed, but that’s roughly correct based on my recollection of the timeframe.

Q. And you were a subject of that investigation?

A. I was never told that I was a subject.

Q. Is it fair to say that your lawyer refused to let you answer questions before Congress because you were under investigation?

A. He did object to certain questions — certain questions — because I was under investigation. That’s correct.

Q. Under criminal investigation. Right?

A. It was a criminal investigation was my understanding, yes.

Q. And you refused to answer those questions on the gounds that it might incriminate you?

A. I refused to answer those questions on advice of counsel, and it was a voluntary interview so I could refuse to answer any questions that I didn’t want to answer.

Q. And the investigation took place between 2017 and 2018. correct:

A. Say that again.

Q. The investigation took place between 2017 and 2019. correct?

A. I think it was not closed until 2020 by the Department.

[snip]

Q. And you, sir, were aware that Mr. Baker was — I mean, Mr. Durham was reappointed as special counsel, correct, in or around 2019?

A. For this matter?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. And when that happened, you were concerned, were you not?

A. Concerned about what?

Q. That Mr. Durham might come and investigate you more?

A. I wasn’t concerned about it. I expected it.

[snip]

Q. It’s the first time you saw him after you were the subject of the criminal investigation by him?

A. Again, I was never told that I was a subject.

Q. Was that the first time?

A. Yeah, I think that was the first time.

In June 2020, Baker’s story started to evolve until ultimately, he testified, claiming 100% certainty about a story that had changed at least four times, to precisely the story Durham would want him to.

Most of the early 2020 interviews relied on by Durham in his report pertain to two topics: His reinvestigation of how the Clinton Foundation investigation proceeded, and his pursuit of a claim that Hillary framed Donald Trump (marked as “Russian intelligence” in the timeline).

Starting in June 2020, Durham appears to have started focusing on Igor Danchenko, burning him as a source, reviewing the long-dormant counterintelligence investigation into him, and focusing the same kind of pressure on Danchenko handler Kevin Helson (whom Durham seems to have referred for further investigation, on a date he doesn’t provide, for his handling of Danchenko). In July 2020, Barr provided Lindsey Graham the interview transcripts for Danchenko, which would lead to (or provide the excuse for) Danchenko’s exposure. In September 2020, the Senate Judiciary Committee would stage a FISA hearing to expose Danchenko’s past counterintelligence investigation.

None of these were effective investigative steps. Most witnesses didn’t testify at trial, and the one who did — Helson — was a devastating witness against Durham’s case (which may be why he was referred for further investigation). Those investigative steps did make Danchenko far more insecure, both legally and financially.

On September 29, John Ratcliffe would also share the report and, a week later, the underlying intelligence, around which Durham would build his Clinton conspiracy theory: A Russian intelligence Report that Hillary’s complaints about Trump’s pro-Russian bias stemmed from an attempt to cover up her email scandal and not from real concern about Russia or frustration with being victimized by a nation-state hack during an election.

On October 19, after Nora Dannehy disrupted Durham’s plan to release an initial report before the election, Barr made him Special Counsel so he could stick around for two more years to try to build the case he hadn’t done by 2020.

One of the most telling things about Durham’s actions in 2020 is that he didn’t do any of the ground work he needed to do to investigate the accusations he would make in late 2021. His primary work on the Alfa Bank case was making Danchenko far, far more vulnerable. He records virtually no obvious investigative work on the Alfa Bank allegations in 2020. He did little work on the dossier allegations. Some key investigative steps — getting a technical review of the Alfa Bank allegation and trying to secure Sergei Millian’s make-or-break testimony — waited until 2022, well after he had actually indicted these cases.

2021: Preparing actual indictments to hang failed conspiracy theories on

And it’s not just those two indictments Durham neglected in 2020. Here’s something Carter Page should think seriously about: John Durham did not do the investigation into the problems with his FISA application until the statutes of limitation started to expire in 2021. Given that investigative history, it’s fairly clear that Durham was never going to charge FBI agents in conjunction with those applications. Never. He had other priorities.

Instead, in 2021, he started making belated attempts to substantiate his Clinton conspiracy, with interviews to set up Charles Dolan as a witness.

Durham did no apparent interviews into Sergei Millian in 2021.

He did begin the effort — one paralleled and assisted by Alfa Bank lawsuit against the researchers in question, which to a DC judge seemed,”almost like they were written by the same people in some way,” — to spin the research into DNS anomalies into a deliberate plan by Hillary’s team.

In Durham’s investigations, however, there were obvious basic investigative failures. Durham didn’t interview people from Cendyn and Listrak until after the Sussmann indictment (and in the latter case, it’s not clear whether Durham spoke to anyone authoritative or even got the name of all the people interviewed).

I’ve already laid out how Durham didn’t even ask Michael Horowitz for relevant evidence until after the indictment. It was several months later before he asked Jim Baker to check his iCloud for the exculpatory communications that Sussmann correctly predicted would be there.

Durham didn’t interview Sergei Millian — and even then, he only did so remotely, with no agreement he would testify at trial — until February 2022, three months after indicting Danchenko.

These indictments — both of which could only have worked if charged as conspiracy indictments for which Durham had no evidence — were always bound to fail. They were bound to fail because they weren’t the result of an investigation, the logical progression from a clear crime committed. They were instead legal clothes hangers on which he could try to hang a conspiracy theory. They might have worked if Sussmann or Rodney Joffe or Danchenko had caved to the economic and legal pressure Durham was applying (as he did with Danchenko, Durham also got Joffe discontinued as an FBI source, but that had no financial repercussions for Joffe). But the charges were so flimsy Sussmann and Danchenko mounted a fairly clearcut defense.

Late 2021 to 2022: Chasing Clinton conspiracies

There’s a detail, though, that is all the more revealing given Durham’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation into these charges before indicting. As I noted last year, even after Sussmann was indicted, Durham refused the former Clinton lawyer’s demand for a list of the people on the Clinton campaign with whom he had coordinated his Alfa Bank efforts. It wasn’t until months later that it became clear — as Sussmann laid out in a filing — that Durham hadn’t even interviewed any of the people Sussmann purportedly coordinated with until after the indictment.

[T]he Special Counsel has alleged that Mr. Sussmann met with the FBI on behalf of the Clinton Campaign, but it was not until November 2021—two months after Mr. Sussmann was indicted—that the Special Counsel bothered to interview any individual who worked full-time for that Campaign to determine if that allegation was true.

Here’s what those interviews look like, as laid out in the Durham Report:

11/10/21: Jennifer Palmieri

11/12/21: Jake Sullivan

1/19/22: John Podesta (Russian Intelligence)

5/11/22: Hillary Clinton (Russian Intelligence)

Those questions weren’t focused on Sussmann, though. They were focused on Durham’s Clinton conspiracy, the claim that she had made a plan to frame Donald Trump.

During an interview of former Secretary Clinton, the Office asked if she had reviewed the information declassified by DNI Ratcliffe regarding her alleged plan to stir up a scandal between Trump and the Russians. 44 ° Clinton stated it was “really sad,” but “I get it, you have to go down every rabbit hole.” She said that it “looked like Russian disinformation to me; they’re very good at it, you know.” Clinton advised that she had a lot of plans to win the campaign, and anything that came into the public domain was available to her.

In addition, the Office interviewed several other former members of the Clinton campaign using declassified materials441 regarding the purported “plan” approved by Clinton.

The campaign Chairperson, John Podesta, stated that he had not seen the declassified material before, characterized the information as “ridiculous,” and denied that the campaign was involved in any such “plan.”442 Jake Sullivan, the campaign Senior Policy Advisor, stated that he had not seen the intelligence reporting before and had no reaction to it other than to say, “that’s ridiculous.”443 Although the campaign was broadly focused on Trump and Russia, Sullivan could not recall anyone articulating a strategy or “plan” to distract negative attention away from Clinton by tying Trump to Russia, but could not conclusively rule out the possibility. 444 The campaign Communications Director, Jennifer Palmieri, who was shown the Referral Memo, 445 stated that she had never seen the memorandum before, found its contents to be “ridiculous,” and could not recall anything “like this” related to the campaign. 446 She stated that Podesta, Mook, Sullivan and herself were aware of a project involving ties between Trump and Russia being conducted by Perkins Coie, the campaign law firm, but she did not think Clinton was aware of it, nor did she receive any direction or instruction from Clinton about the project.447

Another foreign policy advisor (“Foreign Policy Advisor-2”) confirmed that the campaign was focused on Trump and Russia, but that focus was due to national security concerns and not designed to distract the public from Clinton’s server issue. 448

Every single one of them called Durham’s conspiracy theories “ridiculous.”

For good reason. As I’ve laid out, the timeline Durham obscures, in which Trump’s rat-fucker had contact with Russia weeks before Hillary purportedly ginned up this plan, disproves the conspiracy theory.

Which explains something about the Sussmann trial — led by Andrew DeFilippis, the same AUSA who had willingly attempted to trump up a crime against John Kerry. Over and over, Durham’s prosecutors willfully ignored Judge Christopher Cooper’s orders, thereby introducing evidence with no evidentiary basis. They did so most blatantly when, minutes after Cooper ordered DeFilippis not to read from a paragraph of a Hillary Tweet calling on FBI to investigate the Alfa Bank allegations, he did so anyway, predictably leading the same outlets that wrote supine reviews of the Durham report to focus exclusively on something not before the jury.

After Judge Cooper said he would reserve his decision, Berkowitz noted that in fact, DeFilippis planned to use the tweet to claim the campaign wanted to go to the FBI when the testimony at trial (from both Elias and Mook) would establish that going to the FBI conflicted with the campaign’s goals.

[T]hey are offering the tweet for the truth of the matter, that that’s what the campaign desired and wanted and that it was a accumulation of the efforts.

Number one, it’s not the truth; and in fact, it’s the opposite of the truth. We expect there to be testimony from the campaign that, while they were interested in an article on this coming out, going to the FBI is something that was inconsistent with what they would have wanted before there was any press. And in fact, going to the FBI killed the press story, which was inconsistent with what the campaign would have wanted.

And so we think that a tweet in October after there’s an article about it is being offered to prove something inconsistent with what actually happened.

Then, after both Elias and Mook had testified that they had not sanctioned Sussmann going to the FBI, DeFilippis renewed his assault on Cooper’s initial exclusion, asking to introduce it through Mook’s knowledge that the campaign had tried to capitalize on the Foer story.

Having ruled in the past that the tweet was cumulative and highly prejudicial, Cooper nevertheless permitted DeFilippis to introduce the tweet if he could establish that Mook knew that the campaign tried to capitalize on the Foer story.

But Cooper set two rules: The government could not read from the tweet and could not introduce the part of the tweet that referenced the FBI investigation. (I explained what DeFilippis did at more length in this post.)

THE COURT: All right. Mr. DeFilippis, if you can lay a foundation that he had knowledge that a story had come out and that the campaign decided to issue the release in response to the story, I’ll let you admit the Tweet. However, the last paragraph, I agree with the defense, is substantially more prejudicial than it is probative because he has testified that had neither — he nor anyone at the campaign knew that Mr. Sussmann went to the FBI, no one authorized him to go to the FBI, and there’s been no other evidence admitted in the case that would suggest that that took place. And so this last paragraph, I think, would unfairly suggest to the jury, without any evidentiary foundation, that that was the case. All right?

MR. DeFILIPPIS: Your Honor, just two brief questions on that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DeFILIPPIS: Can we — so can we use — depending on what he says about whether he was aware of the Tweet or the public statement, may we use it to refresh him?

THE COURT: Sure. Sure.

MR. DeFILIPPIS: Okay. And then, as to the last paragraph, could it be used for impeachment or refreshing purposes as well in terms of any dealings with the FBI?

THE COURT: You can use anything to refresh.

MR. DeFILIPPIS: Okay.

THE COURT: But we’re not going to publish it to the jury. We’re not going to read from it. And let’s see what he says. [my emphasis]

Having just been told not to read the tweet, especially not the part about the FBI investigation, DeFilippis proceeded to have Mook do just that.

The exhibit of the tweet that got  to the jury had that paragraph redacted and that part of the transcript was also redacted. But, predictably, the press focused on little but the tweet, including the part that Cooper had explicitly forbidden from coming into evidence.

In his report, Durham obscures the timeline of all this to falsely suggest that Hillary endorsed going to the FBI in September, before Sussmann met with the FBI, and not days before the election, when Franklin Foer reported the story.

On October 31, 2016 – about one week before the election – multiple media outlets reported that the FBI had received and was investigating the allegations concerning a purported secret channel between the Trump Organization and Alfa Bank. For example, Slate published an article that discussed at length the allegations that Sussmann provided to the FBI. 1530

Also on that day, the New York Times published an article titled Investigating Donald Trump, F.B.f Sees No Clear Link to Russia. 1531 The article discussed information in the possession of the FBI about ··what cyber experts said appeared to be a mysterious computer back channel between the Trump Organization and the Alfa Bank.” 1532 The article further reported that the FBI had “spent weeks examining computer data showing an odd stream of activity to a Trump Organization server,” and that the newspaper had been provided computer logs that evidenced this activity. The article also noted that at the time of the article, the FBI had not found “any conclusive or direct link” between Trump and the Russian government and that “Hillary Clinton’s supporters … pushed for these investigations.” 1533

As noted above, in the months prior to the publication of these articles, Sussmann had communicated with the media and provided them with the Alfa Bank data and allegations. 1534 Sussmann also kept Elias apprised of his efforts. 1535 Elias, in tum, communicated with the Clinton campaign’s leadership about potential media coverage of these issues. 1536

In addition, on September 15, 2016, Elias provided an update to the Clinton campaign regarding the Alfa Bank allegations and the not-yet-published New York Times article, sending an email to Jake Sullivan (HFA 154 ° Chief Policy Advisor), Robby Mook (HF A Campaign Manager), John Podesta (HF A Campaign Chairman), and Jennifer Palmieri (HFA Head of Communications), which he billed to the Clinton campaign as “email correspondence with J. Sullivan, R. Mook, J. Podesta, J. Palmieri re: Alfa Bank Article.” 1541

On the same day that these articles were published, the Clinton campaign posted a tweet through Hillary Clinton’s Twitter account which stated: “Computer scientists have apparently uncovered a covert server linking the Trump Organization to a Russian-based bank.” 1542 The tweet included a statement from Clinton campaign advisor Jake Sullivan which made reference to the media coverage article and stated, in relevant part, that the allegations in the article “could be the most direct link yet between Donald Trump and Moscow[,] that “[t]his secret hotline may be the key to unlocking the mystery ofTrump’s ties to Russia[,]” and that”[w ]e can only assume that federal authorities will now explore this direct connection between Trump and Russia as part oftheir existing probe into Russia’s meddling in our elections.”

In context, Durham falsely leaves the impression that Hillary supported going to the FBI in advance, even though both Robby Mook and Marc Elias testified that the last thing Hillary wanted to do was let the FBI get more involved in her campaign. In context, Durham falsely leaves the impression that Sussmann had sustained contacts with the NYT starting in September and never stopping, when the evidence he cites pertains exclusively to early September communications, after which Sussmann worked with the FBI to kill the story.

In a follow-up post, I will lay out just how grotesque Durham’s conspiracy theory is — the digital equivalent of slut-shaming a rape victim.

But for now, consider the abundant evidence that Durham didn’t investigate the charges he ultimately charged. He was far too busy, instead, pursuing this Clinton conspiracy theory he started chasing at least as early as February 2020.

Update: Added table showing the organization of Durham’s Report.

Dates

5/13/19: Preliminary review 

5/28/19: UK Legat-1

6/4/19: UK ALAT-1

6/17/19: SSA-1 (Steele Reports, Papadopoulos)

6/17/19: CIA Employee-1 (Page FISA)

6/18/19: SSA-1 (bias)

6/19/19: Case Agent-1 (defensive briefing, Steele Reports, Papadopoulos)

7/2/19: Handling Agent-1 (Page FISA)

7/2/19: NYFO ASAC-1 (Page FISA)

7/3/19: Michael Harpster (Steele Reports)

8/1/19: Mike Rogers

8/6/19: NYFO ADC-1

8/12/19: Randall Coleman (Clinton Foundation, Steele Reports)

8/12/19: Diego Rodriquez (Clinton Foundation)

8/14/19: HQ Analyst-3 

9/16/19: Cyber Agent-2 (Alfa)

10/17/19: SSA-2 (Clinesmith, Papadopoulos)

8/21/19: Case Agent-1

8/29/19: OGC Unit Chief-1 (bias, Australia referral, Page FISA)

9/5/19: NYFO Case Agent-1 (Page FISA)

10/9/19: Erika Thompson; Alexander Downer

12/9/19: DOJ IG Report

12/10/19: HQ Analyst-3 

1/6/20: David Johnson (Steele Reports)

1/15/20: NYFO Case Agent-1 (Clinton Foundation)

1/16/20: Diego Rodriquez (Clinton Foundation)

1/28/20: HQ Unit Chief-3 (Clinton Foundation)

2/6/20: Special Attorney to Attorney General (may reflect grand jury)

2/7/20: Jim Baker (defensive briefing)

2/13/20: Cyber Agent-3 (Alfa)

2/19/20: HQ Analyst-3 (Page FISA)

2/25/20: HQ Analyst-2 (Russian Intelligence, Clinesmith)

2/28/20: Jonathan Moffa (Russian Intelligence)

3/18/20: Paul Abbate (Clinton Foundation)

4/14/20: Field Office-1 Handling Agent-3 

4/23/20 Field Office-1 Handling Agent (Clinton Foundation)

4/23/20: Michael Harpster (Steele Reports)

5/1/20: Mueller SSA-1

5/5/20 Field Office-1 Handling Agent (Clinton Foundation)

5/6/20: Steele Reports

5/28/20: HQ SSA-4 (Clinton Foundation)

6/11/20: Jim Baker (Russian Intelligence)

6/18/20: Jim Baker (Russian Intelligence)

6/25/20: SA-2 (Steele Reports)

6/29/20: Michael Steinbach (initial EC)

6/30/20: Referral regarding existing counterintelligence investigation

7/1/20: OI Attorney (Page FISA)

7/8/20: Ray Hülser (Clinton Foundation)

7/14/20: Kevin Helson (Page FISA)

7/22/20: SSA-1 (Russian intelligence, Steele Report) 

7/23/20: OGC Unit Chief-1 (Page FISA)

7/28/20: Baltimore Special Agent-2 (Danchenko)

8/13/20: Baltimore Case Agent-1 (Danchenko)

8/13/20: CIA Employee-2 (Alfa)

8/19/20: IC Officer #6 (Russian Intelligence)

8/20/20: WFO Clinton Foundation Case Agent-1 

8/21/20: John Brennan (Russian Intelligence)

9/9/20: Acting OGC Section Chief-1 (Clinton Foundation)

9/10/20: Field Office-1 SAC

9/22/20: Field Office-1 Handling Agent-3

9/29/20: Patrick Fallon (Clinton Foundation)

9/29/20: John Ratcliffe shares Russian Intelligence with Lindsey Graham

10/19/20: Special Counsel appointment

10/27/20: OI Unit Chief-1 (Page FISA)

11/24/20: Kevin Helson (Danchenko)

12/8/20: HQ Supervisory Analyst-1 (Danchenko)

12/15/20: HQ SSA-3 (Alfa)

12/18/20: Baltimore Special Agent-1 (Danchenko)

12/21/20: Designation to use classified information

12/23/20: IC Officer#12 (Russian Intelligence)

12/20: Referral regarding accuracy of info in non-Page FISA (possibly Millian?)

2/2/21: Tech Company-1 Employee 1 (Alfa)

2/11/21: DARPA Program Manager-1 (Alfa)

2/25/21: Tech Company-1 Employee 1 (Alfa)

3/3/21: SSA-1 signed statement on Steele Reports

3/18/21: SSA-3 (Page FISA)

3/21/21: SA-1 (Page FISA)

4/8/21: Field Office-1 SSA-1

4/13/21: US Person-1 (Dolan Associate) (Danchenko)

4/14/21: Research Exec-1 (Alfa)

4/22/21: HQ Unit Chief-2

5/5/21: SSA-2  (bias, Page FISA, Danchenko, Clinesmith, Papadopoulos)

5/5/21: Field Office-1 Handling Agent-2 (second CI investigation)

6/21/21: David Archey (Defensive briefings)

6/29/21: CIA Employee-3 (Alfa)

6/30/21: OGC Attorney-1 (Page FISA)

6/30/21: Danchenko Employer-1 Exec-1 

7/7/21: Field Office-1 ASAC-1

7/9/21: Jennifer Boone

7/9/21: Tech Company-1 Employee 1 (Alfa)

7/21/21: Foreign Policy Advisor-1 (Russian Intelligence)

7/21/21: SSA-1 (Page FISA)

7/22/21: University-1 Researcher-1 (Alfa)

7/26/21: Brian Auten (bias, Russian Intelligence, Steele Reports)

7/27/21: Kevin Helson (Danchenko)

8/21: University-1 Researcher-2 (Alfa) [appears to be one 302 on more than one conversation]

8/9/21: NJ-Based Company Exec (Danchenko)

8/10/21: University-1 Researcher-3

8/11/21: Handling Agent-1 (Page FISA)

8/16/21: Mueller Analyst-1 (Danchenko)

8/12/21: Tech Company-3 Exec-1 (Alfa)

8/31/21: Charles Dolan (Danchenko)

8/31/21: Mueller SSA-1 (Danchenko)

9/7/21: Charles Dolan (Danchenko)

9/16/21: Michael Sussmann indictment

9/17/21: Brookings Fellow-1 (Danchenko)

10/21/21: UCE-1 (Papadopoulos)

10/27/21: Listrak Employee-1 and personnel (Alfa)

10/29/21: Mueller Analyst-1 (Danchenko)

11/1/21: Charles Dolan (Danchenko)

11/3/21: Danchenko indictment

11/17/21: Cendyn CEO and CTO (Alfa)

11/9/21: Jonathan Winer (Steele Reports)

11/10/21: Jennifer Palmieri

11/12/21: Jake Sullivan

11/16/21: Brookings Fellow-2 (Danchenko)

11/17/21: Cendyn CEO and CTO (Alfa)

12/2/21: HQ Analyst-3 (Steele)

11/20/21: Victoria Nuland

11/30/21: Victoria Nuland (Steele Reports)

12/13/21: James Clapper

1/19/22: John Podesta (Russian Intelligence, Alfa)

2/2/22: David Cohen

2/5/22: Sergei Millian (Danchenko)

3/1/22: Handling Agent-1 (Page FISA)

3/28/22: Foreign Policy Advisor-2

5/11/22: Hillary Clinton (Russian Intelligence)

6/22/22: SSA-1 (Russian Intelligence)

8/9/22: Ritz GM (Danchenko)

12/14/22: Referral to DOD IG on DARPA

Eight Things Not Mentioned in the Durham Report

/57 Comments/in , /by

There are a whole lot of gaping holes in the Durham Report (my Twitter thread on the report is here; here’s a ThreadReader version). Here are eight of the most important things that Durham chose to leave out of his report on his four-year investigation.

1. All mention of the Italian referral on Trump. In January, NYT reported on the many problems with the Durham investigation, none of which shows up in his report. Most importantly, NYT reported that on a trip to Italy, the Italians gave Bill Barr and Durham a tip about crimes Trump may have committed.

On one of Mr. Barr and Mr. Durham’s trips to Europe, according to people familiar with the matter, Italian officials — while denying any role in setting off the Russia investigation — unexpectedly offered a potentially explosive tip linking Mr. Trump to certain suspected financial crimes.

Mr. Barr and Mr. Durham decided that the tip was too serious and credible to ignore. But rather than assign it to another prosecutor, Mr. Barr had Mr. Durham investigate the matter himself — giving him criminal prosecution powers for the first time — even though the possible wrongdoing by Mr. Trump did not fall squarely within Mr. Durham’s assignment to scrutinize the origins of the Russia inquiry, the people said.

Mr. Durham never filed charges, and it remains unclear what level of an investigation it was, what steps he took, what he learned and whether anyone at the White House ever found out. The extraordinary fact that Mr. Durham opened a criminal investigation that included scrutinizing Mr. Trump has remained secret.

By regulation, there should be some investigative result from this investigation in Durham’s report. It’s not in there.

2. All mention of the conspiracy theories Durham and Barr chased in Europe. The first year or so of the Durham investigation, Bill and John spend traipsing around the world chasing the conspiracy theories George Papadopoulos had floated in a 2018 House Oversight appearance. Barr has confessed they found nothing. But Durham doesn’t do that — or even mention the conspiracy theories — in his report. That’s important for a number of reasons: because Durham asserts that Congress should have no say in criminal investigations even though they dictated the initial direction of his own, because (as I’ll show) Durham badly whitewashes everything having to do with Papadopoulos, and because Durham also doesn’t mention the investigative steps he failed to take while running off to Italy to get Joseph Mifsud’s blackberries.

3. Durham’s own investigative failures. I’ve written at length about how Durham’s own investigative failures make anything Crossfire Hurricane did look tame by comparison. He failed to get relevant information from DOJ IG or ask Jim Baker to check his iCloud for what happened to be texts proving Michael Sussmann’s defense until after he indicted Sussmann. He never interviewed Papadopoulos, indicted Danchenko relying on what Sergei Millian said on Twitter, and then failed to obtain the messaging app evidence he would need to disprove a call between Millian and Danchenko. Durham focuses, at length, on steps he speculated the FBI didn’t take on the Carter Page FISC, but he had more egregious failures to pursue what turned out to be exculpatory information.

4. The Trump Tower Moscow deal. In a footnote, Durham concedes there are things that the FBI later found that corroborated ties between Trump and Russia that weren’t known when the investigation was opened. The only example he provides, however, is the June 9, 2016 meeting in Trump Tower in New York.

There were also at least some activities involving the Trump campaign and Russians that did not become public, and were not known to the FBI, until much later. For example, on June 9, 2016, senior representatives of the campaign met briefly with a private Russian lawyer, Natalia Veselnitskaya, and others at the Trump Tower. Mueller Report at 110, 117. Veselnitskaya “had previously worked for the Russian government and maintained a relationship with that government throughout this period oftime.” Id. at 110. The initial email to Donald Trump Jr. proposing the meeting said that the Crown prosecutor of Russia was offering to provide the campaign with documents and information that would incriminate Clinton. Id. The meeting at the Trump Tower only became public over a year later. Id. at 121.

Durham leaves out many others — like Manafort sharing campaign strategy and Trump having Manafort order Roger Stone to reach out to WikiLeaks. But because Durham focuses closely on Dmitry Peskov’s role in the Steele dossier and a brief nod he makes towards Russian disinformation in it, Durham’s silence about Michael Cohen’s January 2016 conversation with Dmitry Peskov’s office asking for help on a Trump Tower Moscow deal, using sanctioned banks and a former GRU officer as broker, is the most damning. Olga Galkina and Charles Dolan’s ties to Peskov — an interminable focus of this report — are important especially because Peskov was the one person in Russian who undeniably knew that Cohen had made a secret call to Russia during the campaign that both he and Trump were lying to cover up. Yet Durham simply ignores that critical context.

5. Konstantin Kilimnik’s name. Not only did Durham fail to mention most of the most damning things that Trump and his flunkies did, he also failed to mention some of the key people they did them with. None is more important than Konstantin Kilimnik, with whom Paul Manafort conspired to cover up his past pro-Russian Ukraine lobbying, to whom Manafort provided campaign strategy at a meeting where they also discussed millions in debt relief for Manafort, and about which meeting Amy Berman Jackson found Manafort had lied to prosecutors. Kilimnik is important for two reasons. First, Durham nods to the potential role of “Oligarch 1,” whom he doesn’t reveal was Oleg Deripaska, in disinformation in the dossier. He also confirms that Christopher Steele was working for Deripaska earlier in 2016 (in which discussion Durham does name the now-sanctioned Oligarch). But Durham never mentions that Manafort had direct ties to Deripaska through Kilimnik. And Durham repeatedly claims that, because the Intelligence Community had no record of ties between Trump and Russian intelligence services when the FBI opened Crossfire Hurricane, it’s proof the FBI shouldn’t have opened the investigation. Of course, the IC has since concluded that Kilimnik shared that campaign information from Manafort with Russian spooks and that he is himself a spook. Thus, the IC’s failures to identify Kilimnik’s intelligence ties (and those of other people more loosely tied to Russia and Trump) is not a reflection, at all, of the merit of the investigation, but instead a mark of the IC’s own failures in advance of the operation.

6. Description of Guccifer 2.0’s initial releases. Unlike Kilimnik, Durham at least mentions Guccifer 2.0, the persona GRU officers created as a cut-out through whom to release some of the files they stole. But Durham only mentions the persona in a discussion of what he calls a Clinton Plan to impose a political cost on Trump for cozying up to Russia.

Per FBI verbal request, CIA provides the below examples of information the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE fusion cell has gleaned to date [Source revealing information redacted]: [] An exchange … discussing US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s approval of a plan concerning US presidential candidate Donald Trump and Russian hackers hampering US elections as a means of distracting the public from her use of a private email server. According to open sources, Guccifer 2.0 is an individual or group of hackers whom US officials believe is tied to Russian intelligence services. Also, per open sources, Guccifer 2.0 claimed credit for hacking the Democratic National Committee (DNC) this year.

There’s much that is downright noxious about Durham’s treatment of his so-called Clinton Plan. But he fails to distinguish the treatment of whatever report this intelligence made of Guccifer 2.0 and the allegation about Hillary, including when discussing its briefing and dissemination. More problematic still, Durham claims that all this only happened in late July 2016, even though the Democrats identified the hack and its attribution, Guccifer 2.0 started releasing stolen files, and (per Rick Gates, at least) Roger Stone entered discussions with the persona about advance releases in mid-June. Durham’s silence (aside from this quotation) about Guccifer 2.0 not only serves his criminalization of Hillary’s response to being victimized by a nation-state attack, but it permits him to craft a completely false timeline on which his Clinton Plan conspiracy theory depends.

7. The biased FBI Agent running the Clinton Foundation informant. Durham engages in a good deal of false comparisons between how Hillary was treated and how Trump was. Most fall apart. For example, he points to a defensive briefing Hillary got in a different foreign influence investigation to claim that Trump should have gotten a defensive briefing in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. But his own report shows she didn’t get that briefing until around ten months into the investigation; less than six months into the Russia investigation, Trump got a briefing, about Mike Flynn. Durham’s comparisons of the conduct of the Clinton Foundation investigation and Crossfire Hurricane are even more strained, since he engages in no reflection of how shoddy Clinton Cash was, which (unlike the Steele dossier here) was part of that predication. Nor does he contemplate the rampant leaking, during the campaign, about that investigation. Most dishonest, however, is Durham’s silence about the single informant run during 2016 known to be handled by biased agents, one targeting Clinton Foundation described in the Carter Page IG Report.

We reviewed the text and instant messages sent and received by the Handling Agent, the co-case Handling Agent, and the SSA for this CHS, which reflect their support for Trump in the 2016 elections. On November 9, the day after the election, the SSA contacted another FBI employee via an instant messaging program to discuss some recent CHS reporting regarding the Clinton Foundation and offered that “if you hear talk of a special prosecutor .. .I will volunteer to work [on] the Clinton Foundation.” The SSA’s November 9, 2016 instant messages also stated that he “was so elated with the election” and compared the election coverage to “watching a Superbowl comeback.” The SSA explained this comment to the OIG by saying that he “fully expected Hillary Clinton to walk away with the election. But as the returns [came] in … it was just energizing to me to see …. [because] I didn’t want a criminal to be in the White House.”

On November 9, 2016, the Handling Agent and co-case Handling Agent for this CHS also discussed the results of the election in an instant message exchange that reads:

Handling Agent: “Trump!”

Co-Case Handling Agent: “Hahaha. Shit just got real.”

Handling Agent: “Yes it did.”

Co-Case Handling Agent: “I saw a lot of scared MFers on … [my way to work] this morning. Start looking for new jobs fellas. Haha.”

Handling Agent: “LOL”

Co-Case Handling Agent: “Come January I’m going to just get a big bowl of popcorn and sit back and watch.”

Handling Agent: “That’s hilarious!” [my emphasis]

This exchange is similar to the texts that Durham uses to implicate Peter Strzok, Lisa Page, or Kevin Clinesmith. But in this case, this agent was directly handling an informant targeting the actual candidate during the election.

8. The response to Mike Flynn’s lies about Sergey Kislyak. In retrospect, another significant thing missing from this report is the investigation into how, in early 2017, the FBI responded to Mike Flynn’s lies about speaking with Sergey Kislyak. We know that Durham did investigate this. Much of what he investigated was handed to Jeffrey Jensen to launder into the effort to overturn the Flynn prosecution. But Durham doesn’t even whitewash the ultimate charges against Flynn, as he does, to hilarious effect, with George Papadopoulos. There’s nothing more than a passing reference to discomfort from investigators that could pertain to this investigative effort. I’m not sure what to make of its absence. It’s possible it was too closely related to the blow-up with Nora Dannehy. Possibly, the interim report the team drafted without her knowledge focused on Flynn and she debunked it, meaning there’s a prosecutorial judgment somewhere that undermines the claims Barr and others made. Possibly, the games Barr played after that — including the release of a Bill Barnett 302 that conflicted in key ways with the public record — have made those claims untenable. Whatever the reason, its absence in this report is notable.

There’s a lot more that’s missing from this report. But if Durham were to fill just a few of these critical gaps, the whole thing would crumble.

Update: Added an eighth missing item, the Mike Flynn prong of the investigation. Subsequently fixed Jensen’s first name.

John Durham Repeats Debunked Claims in Report to Garland

/136 Comments/in , /by

John Durham has, after four years, finally released a report.

It is corrupt. It harms America. It misrepresents FISA.

It also repeats claims that were debunked under oath. I’ll be reading it here. But for those who want to vent, this is your open thread.

Before Rand Paul Went to Moscow, He Was in a White House Meeting Discussing Lisa Page, Peter Strzok, and Andrew McCabe

/30 Comments/in , /by

Peter Strzok filed what is billed as a motion for clarification of Judge Amy Berman Jackson’s order last week requiring that Strzok’s deposition of FBI Director Chris Wray take place before Strzok’s deposition of Trump.

In part, it is a fact check, laying out all the ways that DOJ seems to have panicked after (and because) Strzok scheduled a deposition with the former President on May 24.

In part, it seems to be an effort to pre-empt DOJ’s threat to file for a writ of mandamus against ABJ because she permitted these depositions. For example, Strzok’s lawyers describe how much easier it was to schedule time with the unemployed former President than with the FBI Director. Under the Apex doctrine that DOJ claims to be adhering to, that should mean that Wray’s deposition should come after Trump’s (and indeed, that’s effectively what DOJ seemed to argue last year).

More interesting, though, are notes Strzok included to establish a need to depose Trump regardless of what Wray says, both taken by John Kelly when he was Chief of Staff.

According to Kelly’s own transcription, this February 21, 2018 note reads:

Potus, AG, Don McGahn

  • Deep state issues
  • Investigations
  • Firing love birds

McCabe?

  • Trust?

This note establishes that pressure to fire Strzok and Page may have bypassed Wray. McCabe was fired weeks later.

More curious still, however, is this note:

Kelly transcribed the July 23, 2018 note this way:

Potus, Rand Paul +2

Security clearances

*add Page, McCabe, Stroch (sic)

For some reason, a week after Trump submitted to Vladimir Putin in Helsinki on July 16 and 15 days before Paul would carry a letter from Trump to Putin expressing an interest in remaining besties, Paul was in a meeting discussing the FBI officials Trump had a vendetta against (who also happen to be Russian experts).

Days after Paul returned from Moscow, the FBI fired Strzok.

Update: Per Rand’s Twitter account, he met with Trump to discuss revoking John Brennan’s security clearance that day.

The Media’s Past Indifference to Trump’s Past Abuse of Pardons Invites Him To Do It Again

/75 Comments/in , , , /by

It took former Reagan and Poppy appointee Wayne Beyer to raise the subject of pardons as the very first question at CNN’s Town Hall on Wednesday.

[Wayne] BEYER: My question to you is: will you pardon the January 6th rioters who were convicted of federal offenses?

TRUMP: I am inclined to pardon many of them. I can’t say for every single one because a couple of them, probably, they got out of control.

But, you know, when you look at Antifa, what they’ve done to Portland, and if you look at Antifa, look at what they’ve done to Minneapolis and so many other – so many other places, look at what they did to Seattle. And BLM – BLM, many people were killed.

These people – I’m not trying to justify anything, but you have two standards of justice in this country, and what they’ve done – and I love that question because what they’ve done to see many people is nothing – nothing. And then what they’ve done to these people, they’ve persecuted these people.

And yeah, my answer is I am most likely – if I get in, I will most likely – I would say it will be a large portion of them. You know, they did a very –

And it’ll be very early on. And they’re living in hell right now.

Given his legal focus on police misconduct and sometime membership in a GOP lawyers association, Beyer may have been teeing Trump up to promise to pardon the men and women who attacked the Capitol on January 6 and might have assassinated Mike Pence. Given his background, this feels like a scripted question, designed to provide Trump an opportunity to promise those facing prosecution (including some lawyers!) to remain loyal to Trump.

In response, Kaitlin Collins attempted to point out Trump’s hypocrisy by raising one of the several cops and former cops who rioted on January 6, to say nothing of the former and active duty service men and women who participated in the attack (she was probably alluding to Thomas Webster, the most celebrated of the former cops charged with assaults, but he is not the only one). That only teed up another opportunity for Trump to undermine the rule of law in the US.

COLLINS: So when it comes to pardons –

TRUMP: They’re living in hell, and they’re policemen, and they’re firemen, and they’re soldiers, and they’re carpenters and electricians and they’re great people. Many of them are just great people.

COLLINS: Mr. President, one of the people who was convicted was a former policeman but he was convicted of attacking a police officer, I should note.

But when you said you are considering pardoning a large portion of those charged with crimes on January 6th, does that include the four Proud Boys members who were charged and convicted of seditious conspiracy?

TRUMP: I don’t know. I’ll have to look at their case, but I will say in Washington, D.C., you cannot get a fair trial, you cannot. Just like in New York City, you can’t get a fair trial either.

Collins made no mention — none — about Trump’s past pardons. She let one of the most unprecedented abuses committed during Trump’s first term, his pardons for those who lied to protect him, go unmentioned even when discussing a topic directly on point.

She’s not alone in her silence. Six months after Trump announced he was running, I’m aware of no deep dive on Trump’s abuse of the pardon power in his first term, not even the pardons that were — as a mass pardon of January 6 convicts would be — pardons of criminals whose crimes served his own power.

Take Paul Manafort. Whatever you imagine the Mueller Report says, whether or not you’ve read the far more damning Senate Intelligence Committee Report, it is a fact that Trump pardoned his way out of legal trouble with Manafort.

After entering into a plea deal in September 2018 that averted a damaging trial during the 2018 pre-election period, Manafort immediately changed his testimony on several key subjects. Judge Amy Berman Jackson ultimately ruled that his changed testimony amounted to lies that breached his plea agreement. She ruled that Manafort lied about three topics, one of which was what happened during an August 2, 2016 meeting with Konstantin Kilimnik at which:

  • Manafort explained how the campaign planned to win the swing states where Trump would eventually win the election
  • Kilimnik discussed how Manafort could get millions in payments from his Ukrainian paymasters and $19 million in disputed funds forgiven with Oleg Deripaska
  • Kilimnik recruited Manafort’s involvement in a plan to carve up Ukraine very similar to the plan Russia pursued until they invaded last February

Had Manafort not entered the plea deal he abrogated within hours, weeks of pre-election coverage would have focused on Manafort’s FARA trial, the proof that Manafort had worked for pro-Russian Ukrainians and then lied to cover it up. Such a trial might have led to even greater Republicans losses in the November 2018 elections.

On the other hand, had Manafort cooperated in good faith, Mueller would have had three witnesses to the meeting, days after the conventions, where Manafort took steps — either wittingly or unwittingly — that provided someone who played a key role in the Russian interference operation with inside information about the Trump campaign.

Instead, Manafort forestalled the trial and undermined any value that his damning testimony (including that Roger Stone had pre-knowledge that WikiLeaks would release John Podesta emails) would have.

And after Manafort lied to cover up what really happened at that meeting and thereby faced a stiffer sentence, Trump pardoned his former campaign manager. In the process, Trump — who has bitched about the cost of the Mueller investigation — reversed the forfeitures that would have contributed to the expense of investigating Manafort’s crimes.

Intelligence judgments since make the meeting even more damning. In June 2020, the FBI offered a $250,000 reward for information leading to Kilimnik’s arrest. The Senate Intelligence Committee Report included two redacted sections (one, two) describing evidence that Kilimnik may have been more closely tied the hack-and-leak activities.

An April 2021 sanctions report stated as fact that Kilimnik had shared campaign information with Russian intelligence.

Konstantin Kilimnik (Kilimnik) is a Russian and Ukrainian political consultant and known Russian Intelligence Services agent implementing influence operations on their behalf. During the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign, Kilimnik provided the Russian Intelligence Services with sensitive information on polling and campaign strategy. Additionally, Kilimnik sought to promote the narrative that Ukraine, not Russia, had interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In 2018, Kilimnik was indicted on charges of obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice regarding unregistered lobbying work. Kilimnik has also sought to assist designated former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych. At Yanukovych’s direction, Kilimnik sought to institute a plan that would return Yanukovych to power in Ukraine.

Kilimnik was designated pursuant to E.O. 13848 for having engaged in foreign interference in the U.S. 2020 presidential election. [my emphasis]

The declassified intelligence report on the 2020 election (which was declassified in March 2021 but completed in classified form on January 7, 2021, before Trump left office) described that Kilimnik continued to interfere in US elections in 2020.

A network of Ukraine-linked individuals— including Russian influence agent Konstantin Kilimnik—who were also connected to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) took steps throughout the election cycle to damage US ties to Ukraine, denigrate President Biden and his candidacy, and benefit former President Trump’s prospects for reelection. We assess this network also sought to discredit the Obama administration by emphasizing accusations of corruption by US officials, and to falsely blame Ukraine for interfering in the 2016 US presidential election.

Derkach, Kilimnik, and their associates sought to use prominent US persons and media conduits to launder their narratives to US officials and audiences. These Russian proxies met with and provided materials to Trump administration-linked US persons to advocate for formal investigations; hired a US firm to petition US officials; and attempted to make contact with several senior US officials. They also made contact with established US media figures and helped produce a documentary that aired on a US television network in late January 2020.

In other words, the tie to Kilimnik ended up being far more damaging than imagined at the time of the Mueller Report, but by the time voters learned it, Trump had already bought Manafort’s silence with a pardon, one that because it reversed the forfeiture, ended up being worth millions to Trump’s former Campaign Manager.

Though the evidence is sketchier, Trump may have pardoned his way out of even worse Russian trouble with Roger Stone. A jury found that Trump’s rat-fucker lied to cover up the true means by which he learned that WikiLeaks would release files from John Podesta (Manafort and Gates both testified that he did get advance knowledge). As Stone was about to report to prison, Stone did a series of appearances where he specified the number of calls Stone had with Trump during 2016 that (Stone claimed, unreliably) prosecutors had asked him about, a list of calls that may have come from a notebook of such contacts prosecutors hoped to find in the search of Stone’s properties. And amid Stone’s claims to have refused to tell prosecutors about the substance of dozens of contacts he had with Trump during 2016, Trump first commuted Stone’s sentence and then — the same day as Manafort — pardoned him.

Importantly, within days of getting that full pardon, Stone met with Trump to thank him for that pardon. At what was likely the same meeting, they talked about January 6, including Trump speaking; the meeting immediately preceded the White House’s shift on making that speech happen. Prosecutors have tied a January 3 appearance Stone did with the Proud Boys with efforts some of those Proud Boys made days later to prevent the vote certification.

Which leads to the most remarkable unremarked pardon of one of Trump’s co-conspirators, that of Steve Bannon.

Bannon did not get pardoned, directly, for lying to cover up what went on in 2016 (indeed, Bannon’s testimony helped to convict Stone).

Rather, as one of his last acts as President, Trump pardoned Bannon for defrauding Trump voters, to the tune of millions, using Trump’s image to do that.

Several of Bannon’s victims testified about believing they were investing in Trump’s wall at his co-conspirator Timothy Shea’s trial. Public school teacher Nicole Keller described investing because border security was so important to her late border patrol agent spouse.

Q. Why did you decide to donate to We Build the Wall? A. My late husband was a border patrol agent. We lived at the southern border in the Rio Grand Valley from 1998 through fall of 2007. Border security is something that is very — was very important to him. He dedicated his career to it. At that point in time, I was a teacher at the southern border. I taught sixth grade and high school science. And we believed that the southern border should be secure, just like the door to our house. It’s not that we’re trying to keep people out; it’s just making sure when someone comes in to our home or residence, we know who they are and what business that they might have at our house.

William Ward, a veteran and retired Washington State Medicare fraud administrator, described contributing because he didn’t believe Congress was doing enough to build Trump’s wall.

Q. Why did you decide to make that donation to We Build the Wall?

A. It was symbolic on my part more than anything else, that I thought if there were a whole lot of people that donated that way, that it might draw some attention to what I think is a difficulty along our Southern Border.

Q. Why do you think there’s a difficulty along the Southern Border? Explain what you mean by that, please.

A. Well, it’s a personal view, but I’m not sure that Congress has done what they should in passing laws that have sort of gotten out of date with the truth on the ground now, for a couple of decades, and that I think that’s where it should start. It should be a congressional thing.

Both described feeling cheated when they discovered their donations were being misused. Keller:

Q. Did there come a time when you became concerned that We Build the Wall wasn’t using donors’ money properly?

A. There did, yes.

Q. Why did you become concerned about that?

A. Again, it was something that was being talked about on news websites.

Q. And when you saw news that caused you concern, what, if anything, did you do about it?

A. I went to the GoFundMe website and tried to get my money back. Mr. Kolfage had implied that if I did not — if the monies were not used as they could be, that we would get our money back.

Q. Were you able to get your money back?

A. I was not, no.

Q. Why did you want your money back?

A. I was insulted that somebody had taken what should be a position of honor and valor, being injured for their country, and, instead, used it to defraud me.

And Ward:

Q. Did there come a time when you became concerned that We Build the Wall wasn’t using donated money in the right way?

A. Yes, there was.

Q. Why did you become concerned about that?

A. The — again, going through a news feed at breakfast every morning, I saw something that there was an investigation of misuse of the funds.

Q. When you saw that, what, if anything, did you do?

A. I got a hold of the GoFundMe page to see if I could recover my donation.

Q. Were you able to get your donation back?

A. No, I was not.

Q. Why did you want your money back?

A. I just felt I’d been cheated.

A restitution filing ordered the defendants to pay over $25 million to their victims.

Bannon cheated people who believed in Trump and his goddamn wall. And Trump pardoned him for it. And Kaitlan Collins didn’t think it worth mentioning to an audience of potential Trump supporters.

Trump obviously didn’t find the charges themselves faulty; he didn’t pardon Bannon’s co-conspirators. They were just sentenced — to three to four-plus years in prison — for the fraud they perpetrated against Trump supporters. And while Dustin Stockton’s testimony to the January 6 Committee has proven unreliable, he and Jennifer Lawrence claimed they were floated pardons in conjunction with their involvement with planning January 6.

The full story of why Trump pardoned Bannon in one of his last acts as President has not been — may never be — told. But there’s no way to regard a pardon for defrauding Trump supporters outside the context of Bannon’s involvement in Trump’s efforts to overturn the election. And, particularly given the absence of any defect in the charges themselves — given that Trump didn’t pardon all the Build the Wall fraudsters — it’s impossible to understand Bannon’s pardon as anything but payback.

And yet, when Kaitlin Collins talked about how horrible it would be if Trump started pardoning everyone else who helped Trump attack Congress, she treated as if it would be an unprecedented abuse. She did so even though she made that tie herself in breaking the story of the Bannon pardon.

Bannon’s pardon would follow a frantic scramble during the President’s final hours in office as attorneys and top aides debated his inclusion on Trump’s outgoing clemency list. Despite their falling out in recent years, Trump was eager to pardon his former aide after recently reconnecting with him as he helped fan Trump’s conspiracy theories about the election.

[snip]

Things shifted in recent months as Bannon attempted to breach Trump’s inner circle once again by offering advice before the election and pushing his false theories after Trump had lost.

One concern that had stalled debate over the pardon was Bannon’s possible connection to the riot of Trump supporters at the US Capitol earlier this month, a source familiar with the discussions told CNN.

“All hell is going to break loose tomorrow,” Bannon promised listeners of his podcast – “War Room” – on January 5, the day before the deadly siege on the Capitol.

[snip]

While some advisers believed it was decided last weekend that Bannon was not getting a pardon, Trump continued to raise it into Tuesday night. Throughout the day, Trump had continued to contemplate pardons that aides believed were settled, including for his former strategist – something he continued to go back and forth on into Tuesday night, sources told CNN.

Ultimately, Trump sided with Bannon.

It would be the exact same thing Trump did in the wake of the November 2020 election, at a time he thought he would face no consequences for such an abuse of the pardon power.

Trump waited to pardon those who had protected him until after voters weighed in. He waited, because he knew that making these pardons before an election would harm his chances of getting elected.

And yet no one — not even Collins, when discussing pardons in the direct context of the next election — could be bothered to mention how abusive were Trump’s past pardons.

Of course Trump will pardon January 6 criminals if he wins in 2024, Kaitlan! Why wouldn’t he?!?! You let him blather on for an hour, even discussed future pardons with him, with not a single mention of his past abuses.

DOJ Attempts to Stave Off May 24 Trump Deposition in Peter Strzok Lawsuit

/38 Comments/in /by

Many of the details of the how and the why of DOJ’s bid to get Judge Amy Berman Jackson to reverse her decision allowing Peter Strzok’s lawyers to depose Christopher Wray and Donald Trump in whichever order they choose are redacted.

But several things are clear.

First, Strzok currently has a Trump deposition scheduled for May 24.

Following the Court’s ruling, Defendants requested that Plaintiffs depose Director Wray before taking a deposition of the former President. See Exhibit A to Declaration of Christopher M. Lynch (“Lynch Decl.”). Plaintiffs refused that request, and instead scheduled a deposition of the former President to take place on May 24, before any deposition of Mr. Wray had been scheduled.

And, today, Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar gave DOJ approval to pursue several means of forestalling the deposition, including filing for a writ of mandamus as well as a more conventional appeal.

DOJ has something called the apex doctrine, which says that in a suit you have to depose more junior and non-governmental people first, in case it’s possible the lower level depositions will obviate the need for more senior ones.

In this case, DOJ hopes that Chris Wray will say he didn’t pass on any of the political pressure he was getting from Trump to fire Strzok to David Bowdich, who did the firing. If he does, DOJ claims, then there’s no need to depose Trump, who will say he was demanding that Strzok be fired.

There is no dispute that former FBI Deputy Director David Bowdich made the decision to remove Mr. Strzok from the FBI. Mr. Strzok argued that he should be permitted to take the former President’s deposition “about whether he met with and directly pressured FBI and DOJ officials to fire Plaintiff . . . and whether he directed any White House staff to engage in similar efforts.” Opp’n Mot. Quash Trump Subpoena at 10, In re Subpoena Served on Donald J. Trump, No. 1:22- mc-27-ABJ (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2022), ECF No. 11. But this line of inquiry is potentially relevant only if any such meeting or pressure (a) included Mr. Bowdich or (b) was reported to Mr. Bowdich by Director Wray, who also had authority to discipline Mr. Strzok. Mr. Bowdich has already testified that he made the decision himself, without any input from former President Trump. See Bowdich Dep. 360:4-362:1 (Sept. 9, 2022); id. at 149:9-11; see also Defs.’ Suppl. Filing of Sept. 29, 2022, at 1, Strzok v. Garland, No. 1:19-cv-2367 (D.D.C.), ECF No. 90. And he has also testified that he “absolutely” did not recall Director Wray ever telling him about any meeting with President Trump in which “the President[] pressed the Director to fire Peter Strzok and Lisa Page[,]” and that he was “trying to keep [Director Wray] removed from th[e] particular adjudication” of Mr. Strzok’s misconduct. Bowdich Dep. at 200:17-204:2, 332:4-6; see also Defs.’ Suppl. Filing of Sept. 29, 2022, at 1. If Director Wray’s deposition establishes that Director Wray either did not receive the alleged pressure from the former President or did not convey any such pressure to Deputy Director Bowdich, the recipients of any alleged “pressure” to discipline Mr. Strzok would have been limited to those who did not take any action to discipline Mr. Strzok.

Thus far, Trump has not done things he could have done to insulate himself from this lawsuit, including invoking Executive Privilege.

But he did consent to DOJ’s attempt to stall his May 24 deposition.

1 Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(m) the undersigned conferred on the substance of this motion with counsel for Mr. Strzok and former President Trump. Counsel for Mr. Strzok advised the undersigned that Mr. Strzok opposes this motion. Counsel for former President Trump advised that former President Trump consents to this motion.

Maybe the E Jean Carroll verdict helped him realize how damaging his surly depositions can be in civil suits.

Meanwhile, ABJ just assumed senior status on May 1. She’ll remain a diligent judge, but she’s got far less reason to care that DOJ wants to tell her she has been shirking her job.

Update: The backup that DOJ submitted reveals that DOJ had already floated moving for a writ of mandamus on March 30 — but may not have done so until Trump’s deposition was locked in.

Update: Judge ABJ has issued an order scolding both sides, noting that based on the Apex doctrine arguments DOJ made last year, Chris Wray’s deposition should go last, but nevertheless ordering that it go before Trump’s.

MINUTE ORDER denying as moot [110] Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Stay. On August 10, 2022, the Court ruled, pursuant to the apex doctrine, that any request to depose FBI Director Christopher Wray or former President Donald J. Trump must await the completion of the depositions of former FBI Deputy Director Bowdich and former Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein. Thereafter, on February 23, 2023, after full briefing by the parties as to what had transpired in those proceedings, the Court issued a lengthy oral ruling on the question of whether the depositions of Director Wray and former President Trump could proceed. It ordered in its discretion and in accordance with the applicable law that they could both go forward under very strict restrictions as to time and subject matter. The Court is somewhat surprised to learn that since then, the parties have done nothing more than wrangle over the order of the two depositions. The government seems chagrined that the Court did not order that the deposition of the FBI Director be completed first, but it may recall that it was the Court’s view that it was Director Wray, the only current high-ranking public official in the group of proposed deponents, whose ongoing essential duties fell most squarely under the protection of the doctrine in question. The defendants’ instant motion repeats arguments that were made and fully considered before, and it does not set forth grounds warranting reconsideration. The Court’s ruling was appropriate in light of all of the facts, including the former President’s own public statements concerning his role in the firing of the plaintiff. However, in order to get the parties — who apparently still cannot agree on anything — over this impasse, it is hereby ORDERED that the deposition of Christopher Wray proceed first, rendering the instant motion moot.

“Lock Him Up!” Trump Calls on Congress to Halt the Criminal Investigation into Joe Biden

/35 Comments/in , , , /by

Yesterday, four Trump lawyers sent House Intelligence Chair Mike Turner a really risky letter. CNN first reported on the letter.

Boris Epshteyn, who had allegedly been leading Trump’s defense in that investigation, did not sign the letter.

The letter responds to the news that Turner and other Gang of 8 members have recently been given access to the documents found at Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and Mike Pence’s properties.

We understand that DOJ is making the documents marked classified available for your review, and this letter provides the Committee with information that we suspect DOJ has not disclosed to it.

It doesn’t cite its source of information about those reviews, which is one way to obscure that the Gang of 8 actually began to get such access by April 11, two weeks ago.

Since Mike Turner and other Gang of 8 members started reviewing the documents, two things have happened.

First, Joe Biden announced his reelection campaign, without waiting on Special Counsel Robert Hur to report the results of his investigation into Biden for mishandling classified information.

And, about a month after Evan Corcoran testified in a crime-fraud excepted appearance before the grand jury, Boris Epshteyn spent two days last week chatting with Jack Smith’s prosecutors. (Like Epshteyn, Corcoran did not sign this letter, but that’s because his partners forced him to recuse from the investigation after he testified.) Even though Epshteyn has been a likely source for a lot of the press reports on the various investigations into which he has or had visibility, I’m not aware of any report describing his testimony, much less why he testified without any report of a subpoena.

Contemplate the significance of the first item — Biden’s reelection announcement — as you consider the purported point of the letter. Donald Trump — the guy who won the presidency with non-stop chants of “Lock her up!” in 2016 — claims to think that an investigation analogous to the one that targeted Hillary Clinton in 2015 to 2016 is improper.

A legislative solution by Congress is required to prevent the DOJ from continuing to conduct ham-handed criminal investigations of matters that are inherently not criminal.

[snip]

What is consistent in all three of these cases is that the document handling procedures in the White House are flawed and DOJ is not the appropriate agency to conduct investigations pertaining to the mishandling or spillage of classified material.

Conclusion

The solution to these issues is not a misguided, politically infected, and severely botched criminal investigation, but rather a legislative solution. DOJ should be ordered to stand down, and the intelligence community should instead conduct an appropriate investigation and provide a full report to this Committee, as well as your counterparts in the Senate. Armed with the appropriate knowledge, we respectfully suggest that your Committee hold hearings and make legislative changes to:

1. Correct classified document handling procedures in the White House;

2. Standardize document handling and storage procedures for Presidents and Vice Presidents when they leave office; and

3. Formalize procedures for investigations into the mishandling or spillage of classified material, to prevent future situations where DOJ is inappropriately assigned to conduct an investigation.

President Trump’s legal team would be happy to meet with you or your staff to assist in any way necessary to address these issues. Please know that despite the differences in the cases, we do not believe that any of these three matters should be handled by DOJ as a criminal case. Rather, the stakeholders to these matters should set aside political differences and work together to remediate this issue and help to enhance our national security in the process. [my emphasis]

Donald Trump is asking Congress to intervene to halt not just into the investigation into him — and make no mistake, that is what he’s doing. But he’s also asking Congress to halt the investigation into his opponent!

Having won the presidency in 2016 by demanding the investigation into Hillary be more punitive, he’s now asking Congress to halt the investigation into Joe Biden.

Having won the presidency in 2016 by succeeding in highlighting Hillary’s negligence for mishandling classified information, Trump now wants to forego the opportunity to pursue the same approach in 2024.

At the very least, that’s a pretty good sign that he and his lawyers don’t believe their own claims that the known facts about Biden’s mishandling of classified information are worse than the known facts about Trump’s.

4 Of course, we also recently learned from media reports that President Biden possessed
marked documents in a “personal” folder at the Penn-Biden Center – strong evidence
that he intentionally possessed then after he or someone else secretly removed them,
from the Senate SCIF at least 14 years earlier when he was the Senator from Delaware.
We also now know that after DOJ learned about President Biden’s possession of
classified documents at the Penn-Biden Center, it allowed his personal attorneys to
search for and collect documents from his residence in Delaware making the specific
locations of the documents in the residence difficult, and perhaps impossible, to
determine. And, it has since been publicly reported that there could be even more
classified documents in the 1,850 boxes that Mr. Biden shipped to the University of
Delaware in 2012. https://www.cnn.com/2-23/02/15/politics/biden-delawaresearch/index.html. DOJ’s reaction to all of this is stunningly different from how it
responded to President Trump’s offer of cooperation regarding the boxes stored at Mara-Largo. [sic: Trump’s lawyers misspell Mar-a-Lago in several different ways in the letter]

[snip]

When documents were found in President Joseph Biden’s Penn-Biden Center office, despite clear indicators that his violations were more likely the result of willful misconduct, DOJ treated him very differently by forgoing any attempts at manufacturing conflict, while implicitly approving the spoliation of evidence.

The applicable criminal statute prohibits “willful retention” of national defense information, not mere possession. See 18 U.S. § 793 (e). To prove willful retention, a prosecutor must first establish that the possession was knowing. Despite media spin to the contrary, this is the key element that distinguishes President Trump’s retention of documents from that by President Biden. Evidence of knowing possession can be readily inferred from the length of time that President Biden possessed the marked documents since leaving office and the fact that they were moved and stored at multiple locations. In comparison, the materials found at Mar-a-Lago were still stored in the same GSA boxes in which they left the White House, untouched in the relatively short time since the end of President Trump’s term. Perhaps the most damning fact for President Biden is that he possessed marked documents from his time in the Senate—a body that maintains all marked documents in a SCIF, unlike the White House. Further, as you are no doubt aware and as mentioned earlier in this letter, media reports have indicated that classified documents were contained in a folder labeled “personal,”8 which is much more powerful evidence of knowing retention than documents being randomly dispersed into boxes by moving teams.

8 See, e.g., Jamie Gangel et al., “Exclusive: U.S. intelligence materials related to Ukraine, Iran and UK found in Biden’s private office, source tells CNN,” CNN (Jan. 10, 2023), https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/10/politics/biden-classified-documents-iran-ukraineunited-kingdom-beau-funeral/index.html.

There is not a chance in hell that Trump would forgo an opportunity to make this race about Biden’s mishandling of classified information if he really believed that Biden’s “violations were more likely the result of willful misconduct.”

Not a chance in hell!

But then, there’s abundant reason to believe that the four lawyers know they’re blowing smoke (to Congress). Heck, I’m so sure of it I think Mark Warner should invite all four of them to give sworn testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee.

There are the claims this letter makes that conflict with known testimony, such as that Trump didn’t review any of the documents in the boxes ultimately returned to the Archives.

However, due to other demands on his time, President Trump subsequently directed his staff to ship the boxes to NARA without any review by him or his staff.

There are the claims this letter makes that conflict with known details about the case, such as that, because Trump was too busy starting an insurrection, he didn’t have the ability to send his documents to a GSA-leased facility.

When President Trump left office, there was little time to prepare for the outgoing transition from the presidency. Unlike his three predecessors, each of whom had over four years to prepare for their departure upon completion of their second term, President Trump had a much shorter time to wind up his administration. White House staffers and General Service Administration (“GSA”) employees quickly packed everything into boxes and shipped them to Florida. This was a stark change from the standard preparations made by GSA and National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”) for prior administrations. As NARA acknowledged in a Press Statement it issued on October 11, 2022:

The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), in accordance with the Presidential Records Act, assumed physical and legal custody of the Presidential records from the administrations of Barack Obama, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George H.W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan, when those Presidents left office. NARA securely moved these records to temporary facilities that NARA leased from the General Services Administration (GSA), near the locations of the future Presidential Libraries that former Presidents built for NARA. All such temporary facilities met strict archival and security standards, and have been managed and staffed exclusively by NARA employees.2

Investigators paid by the lead writer of this letter, Tim Parlatore, found two additional documents with classification marks in what is reportedly a GSA-leased facility in Florida.

Lawyers for Donald Trump found at least two items marked classified after an outside team hired by Trump searched a storage unit in West Palm Beach, Fla., used by the former president, according to people familiar with the matter.

[snip]

Emails released by the General Services Administration, which assists former presidents during their transition to private life, show that the government agency helped rent the storage unit at a private facility in West Palm Beach on July 21, 2021. The unit was needed to store items that had been held at an office in Northern Virginia used by Trump staffers in the months just after he left office.

There’s the claim that DOJ dictated the timing of the June 3 document pick-up, when the record shows Evan Corcoran called FBI and told them to come down the next day.

Ultimately, President Trump’s legal team complied with DOJ’s demands, performing as diligent a search as they could by Mr. Bratt’s arbitrary deadline, and submitted a certification that affirmed the same.

And this letter repeats a bullshit claim that Trump’s lawyers have chanted from the start of his attempts to sucker the press: that the only thing Jay Bratt requested after he had seen the storage room at Mar-a-Lago was to put a lock on the facility.

Although Mr. Corcoran told the DOJ representatives that they were not going to go through boxes together that day, he fully expected DOJ to ask to return to Mar-a-Largo and examine all the boxes. Mr. Bratt reinforced this belief when, five days later, he wrote to Mr. Corcoran requesting that an additional lock be placed on the door. The lock was soon installed, and the boxes kept under lock and key in a facility guarded by armed Secret Service agents.

It’s like Tim Parlatore thinks Mike Turner’s staffers are too stupid to review the unsealed affidavit, which reveals that Bratt’s letter says something else entirely: that the storage facility is not a secure facility authorized to store classified documents.

As I previously indicated to you, Mar-a-Lago does not include a secure location authorized for the storage of classified information. As such, it appears that since the time classified documents (the ones recently provided and any and all others) were removed from the secure facilities at the White House and moved to Mar-a-Lago on or around January 20, 202 1, they have not been handled in an appropriate manner or stored in an approptiate location. Accordingly, we ask that the room at Mar-a-Lago where the documents had been stored be secured and that all of the boxes that were moved from the White House to Mar-a-Lago (along with any other items in that room) be preserved in that room in their current condition until further notice.

Because the staffers that deal with this document have security clearance they surely want to keep, they’ll undoubtedly know that this is a reference to CFR standards for storage, not a request to add an almost certainly non-compliant lock.

And that’s why I think this letter was ill-advised.

These are just the obvious, affirmatively false things in the letter. There’s a whole bunch more that Trump’s lawyers simply ignore, such as the surveillance video showing Trump’s staffers moving boxes out of the storage facility in advance of the search they’re claiming here was a diligent search or the fact that FBI found 70-some classified documents in the storage facility of which Corcoran had claimed to have done a diligent search.

The only way this document could have the desired effect is if Mike Turner likes being lied to, or is so in the tank that — like Richard Burr before him — he’s willing to risk his own legal exposure to obstruct a criminal investigation.

And that’s assuming Warner didn’t subpoena any or all of these lawyers to repeat these farcical claims to Congress under oath.

All that’s before you consider the asymmetry. Trump’s lawyers — just one of whom (they admit) actually has clearance — acknowledge they have no fucking clue what FBI caught Trump hoarding.

Despite our requests to DOJ, it has refused to tell us whether in its judgment any of the documents remain classified. Similarly, DOJ has refused to allow for inspection of the documents at any time during the last eight months despite the fact that one of our attorneys has sufficient clearance to view the majority of the documents marked as classified.

Mike Turner does know.

Trump’s lawyers claim — or rather confess — that among the files he originally had in his beach resort were call briefings with foreign officials, just like the ones hidden from Congress in the first impeachment.

The vast majority of the placeholder inserts refer to briefings for phone calls with foreign leaders that were located near the schedule for those calls.

Again, I can only imagine how stupid Parlatore thinks Turner’s staffers are to confess this.

But even I know that many of the things Trump kept after DOJ subpoenaed them are not similar. Even I know that Trump compiled two classified documents with messages from a pollster, a book author, and a faith leader. And Mike Turner has reviewed these documents and he knows it too. And I know that he knows it.

So unless Mike Turner is totally in the tank for Trump — worse even than Burr was! — this letter risks pissing Turner off.

Last month, before Evan Corcoran was forced to give crime-fraud excepted testimony against Trump and before Boris Epshteyn spent two days chatting with Jack Smith’s prosecutors, Tim Parlatore — lead author of this insulting letter — said the following about Epshteyn’s role in the stolen documents case.

Mr. Epshteyn’s legal role with Mr. Trump, while less often focused on gritty legal details, has been to try to serve as a gatekeeper between the lawyers on the front lines and the former president, who is said to sometimes roll his eyes at the frequency of Mr. Epshteyn’s calls but picks up the phone.

“Boris has access to information and a network that is useful to us,” said one of the team’s lawyers, Timothy Parlatore, whom Mr. Epshteyn hired. “It’s good to have someone who’s a lawyer who is also inside the palace gates.”

Mr. Parlatore suggested that he was not worried that Mr. Epshteyn, like a substantial number of other Trump lawyers, had become at least tangentially embroiled in some of the same investigations on which he was helping to defend Mr. Trump.

“Absent any solid indication that Boris is a target here, I don’t think it affects us,” Mr. Parlatore said.

Neither Corcoran nor Epshteyn signed this letter. It’s not yet clear why Epshteyn didn’t.

And that’s as telling as the embarrassing false claims that it makes.

Prosecutorial Discretion in the Age of Shitlords and “Psychological loldongs Terrorism”

/12 Comments/in , /by

I’m working on one more post integrating materials from the Douglass Mackey trial.

But first I want to comment about some investigative and prosecutorial details about the case.

I’ve made a timeline showing what got introduced in the troll chatrooms as evidence, other known activities of Mackey and the cooperating witness Microchip, and investigative details here. The timeline includes the following DM threads that were treated as part of the conspiracy for which Mackey was convicted:

In addition, this exhibit, which was introduced under a different evidentiary rule (largely, but not entirely, Mackey’s comments, rather than those of the conspiracy), consists in part of conversations elsewhere sourced to FedFreeHateChat from earlier in 2015-2016, along with a number of two-person DMs involving Mackey or unindicted co-conspirators 1080p or Microchip.

As you read the threads, remember a few things about them. First, they’ve been extensively sanitized of the racist and misogynist language used in the threads. Anything that wasn’t directly relevant to proving either the means and goals of Mackey’s trolling, a conspiracy between the thread participants, or their intent in sending out false tweets to depress the turnout of Black and Latino Hillary supporters was excluded as prejudicial.

You can read some of what was excluded — and the very important debate about where Mackey’s free speech ended and where an attempt to impair the votes of Black and Latino Hillary supporters began — in these court filings:

  • January 30, 2023: Mackey’s effort to exclude pre-September 2016 language and commentary from when he was banned by Twitter and inflammatory speech
  • January 30, 2023: The government’s effort to get the contents of the four chatrooms, above, admitted
  • February 24, 2023: Mackey’s response to the government’s motion
  • February 24, 2023: The government’s response to Mackey
  • February 28, 2023: The government’s reply to Mackey
  • February 28, 2023: Mackey’s reply
  • March 7, 2023: Mackey letter after meet-and-confer that details objections, revealing content of some excluded files
  • March 7, 2023: Government memo after meet-and-confer
  • March 10, 2023: Judge Nicholas Garaufis order laying out admissible exhibits
  • March 11, 2023: Mackey letter seeking to exclude bigoted speech and FBI agent testimony
  • March 13, 2023: Mackey letter seeking to exclude comment about women voting
  • March 13, 2023: Government letter responding regarding bigoted speech
  • March 19, 2023: Mackey letter objecting to specific inflammatory language and memes showing Trump in violent conquest

The outlines of this dispute will be critical to the inevitable appeal of Mackey’s guilty verdict.

These Twitter DM groups weren’t the only places these trolls organized, as portrayed by trial evidence. After one of Mackey’s bannings, he authenticated his new Twitter ID on Facebook and continued to work with others on Discord. The government did not introduce any of the related threads from TheDonald or 4chan with which — as a tweet from Microchip made clear — their efforts on Twitter were sometimes coordinated.

The exclusion of related 4chan activity is significant. At trial, Mackey took the stand and claimed he had gotten the text-to-vote meme for which he was charged from widely available 4chan threads, not from these DM groups, one of which he did not rejoin after being banned by Twitter on October 5. Mackey similarly claimed not to know the key players in workshopping this meme in the War Room twitter group beyond their user name.

The claim was pretty unconvincing; it may have been an attempt to deny forming a conspiracy with the others, or an effort to protect his online friends.

I’m interested in the picture of the conspiracy provided by these threads for several related reasons.

For starters, I’m interested in the troll — prosecutors referred to the account using a female pronoun — who first created a text-to-vote meme like the one that Mackey was convicted of. On October 27, 2016 on the War Room thread (which Mackey had rejoined after being banned), HalleyBorderCol (HBC) suggested, “let’s depress illegal voter turnout with a nice hoax ;).” Someone using the moniker P0TUSTrump argued they should hold off so the hoax would not get debunked before actually suppressing the vote. HBC responded by addressing him as “Donald” and explaining — using a British spelling for rumor — how rumors work, especially on social media:

people aren’t rational. a significant proportion of people who hear the rumour will NOT hear that the rumour has been debunked.

Then, two days later, HBC posted the first of the vote-by-text (as opposed to vote-by-hashtag) memes using the text number that allowed DOJ to track the reach of those that Mackey would send on November 2.

As far as is public, prosecutors never charged HBC, in spite of her key role in planning a “hoax” to suppress turnout, but perhaps that’s because she lives in a place where they spell “rumor” with a “u.”

In fact, DOJ didn’t even identify HBC as an unindicted co-conspirator in the complaint against Mackey, though it does describe her actions. The complaint names Anthime “Baked Alaska” Gionet as CC#1 (compare ¶17 of the complaint with this DM), Microchip as CC#2 (compare ¶25 of the complaint with this DM), a troll named NIA4_Trump who got temporarily suspended along with Mackey in November 2016 as CC#3, and a thus far unidentified troll named 1080p who was instrumental in tweaking the memes to more closely mimic Hillary’s graphics as CC#4 (compare ¶22a in the complaint with this DM).

By the time DOJ described the co-conspirators in a footnote to their February 24 filing, however, HBC was first on their list.

As was noted in the government’s initial motion in limine, the government alleges that individuals who posted, shared, or strategized over how to optimize the deceptive images or the messages therein are co-conspirators, and that the statements of those individuals are admissible as co-conspirator statements. These co-conspirators include the Twitter users identified in the Government’s Motion in Limine: @Halleybordercol, @WDFx2EU7, @UnityActivist, @Nia4_Trump, @1080p, @bakedalaska, @jakekass, @jeffytee, @curveme, 794213340545433604 and @Urpochan, the latter of which was described but not specifically identified as a co-conspirator in that submission. The materials provided to defense counsel on September 23, 2023 [sic] include statements from the following additional users which are of a similar character and admissible as co-conspirator statements: @WDFx2EU8, @MrCharlieCoker, @Donnyjbismarck, @unspectateur and 2506288844.

Note this footnote treats a second Microchip account as separate rather than identifying that it knew Microchip was behind both accounts using the same naming convention, “@WDFx2EU#.” This was the period after DOJ had informed Mackey, on February 13, which Twitter handles its cooperating witness had used but before DOJ had publicly revealed that it had a cooperating witness.

When it came to cross-examining Mackey on his claims to know nothing about these people, however, AUSA Erik Paulson prioritized HBC.

Q I’d like to ask you about some of people in that room.

A Okay.

Q Who is HalleyBorderCol?

A That’s someone I just know as HalleyBorderCol. I don’t know anything more about that person.

Q Nothing more?

A Yes.

[snip]

Mr. Mackey, do you remember this page?

A Yes.

Q HalleyBorderCol says: Let’s did depress illegal voter turnout with a nice hoax.

A Yes.

Q POTUSTrump says: I like that idea Haley, but I think we should wait for the day before or the day of, that way they don’t have time to debunk the rumor. Needs to be earlier than that.

The government’s identification of HBC in the complaint, or not, doesn’t matter legally. What mattered legally for the purpose of the trial was that Judge Ann Donnelly ruled the government had presented sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to treat HBC as one for the purposes of hearsay exception rules; Donnelly ruled that all the accounts listed above were.

But DOJ’s decision to charge Mackey alone, and to make Microchip plead guilty after a series of proffers as part of a cooperation agreement, suggests DOJ exercized discretion to treat HBC and a few other key players differently, even while both at trial and in the development of the offending meme she had a larger role.

She certainly had a larger role in the text-to-vote meme itself than Baked Alaska, for example.

Baked Alaska is all over the trolling effort. He congratulates Mackey for being named the 107th most influential political tweeter of 2016, as everyone else did too, in March 2016. He warns against “roast[ing]” Bernie supporters, “cuz the more hatred they have for hillary the more likely they will join us in national or not vote at all,” in the same April 20, 2016 chat where he discusses the “new smart team” Trump has hired. On April 23, 2016, Baked Alaska asked Mackey via DM if he wanted to join the “Trump HQ Slack for more coordinated efforts?”

In May, Mackey asks for his help making #InTrumpsAmerica go viral. Baked Alaska boasts on July 24 that “we are controlling the narrative this is amazing.” In October, Gionet reminds other trolls to “make [minorities] hate hillary.”

At least as exhibited in the trial evidence, Baked Alaska’s sole overt act in the deceptive tweet involves instructing 1080p to “make a text message version of” the Tweet calling to vote remotely (it’s unclear whether Gionet calls 1080p or jeffytee “Gabe”). The tweets for which Mackey was convicted may have been his idea, but others executed the idea.

But it was enough for others to credit him with some responsibility for Trump’s win on November 9, 2016. “Tonight we meme’d reality,” Baked Alaska said after the win.

One more person’s role is of interest. Andrew Auernheimer — better known as Weev — was all over the earlier FedFreeHateChat, which came in for Mackey’s direct comments rather than as statements of co-conspirators. Weev seems to have spent the end of 2015 helping Mackey fine-tune his trolling skills. “Thanks to weev I am i[m]proving my rhetoric,” Mackey said in FFHC on November 19, 2015. “I just hope all this shitlording goes real life.”

Weev’s involvement is of particular interest because he was helping to run the Daily Stormer in pro-Russian territories. He was always one of the most obvious potential ties between Trump’s trolls and Russia. That’s one reason this paragraph, from the government’s motion in limine, reads very differently if you know “the Twitter user” in question is Weev.

On or about December 22, 2015, the defendant communicated with others in a Twitter direct-message group about sharing memes that would suggest certain voters were hiding their desire to vote for the defendant’s preferred Presidential candidate. The defendant stated, “it’s actually a great meme to spread, make all these shitlibs think they’re [sic] friends are secretly voting for Trump.” Several weeks later, on or about January 9, 2016, the defendant and another Twitter user discussed their Twitter methodologies. After the defendant stated that “Images work better than words,” the user stated “we should collaboratively work on a guide / like, step by step, each major aspect of the ideological disruption toolkit . . . ricky you could outline your methods of commentary / we could churn out a book like this, divide profits / and hand people a fucking manual for psychological loldongs terrorism.” The defendant responded “Yes… I think that would be good / I could do another chapter on methodologies from the ads industry– shit like my twitter ads stuff was very much the result of careful targeting, nobody’s managed to replicate it properly since.” Shortly thereafter, the Twitter user stated, “honestly at this point i’ve hand [sic] converted so many shitlibs that like, i am absolutely sure we can get anyone to do or believe anything as long as we come up with the right rhetorical formula and have people actually try to apply it consistently.” The defendant responded, “I think you’re right.”2 These statements, and those like them, are admissible and relevant to show, among other things, that the defendant’s intent in spreading memes was to influence people.

But Weev doesn’t appear, at least under the handle Rabite, after he celebrated the efficacy of the trolling on the day Trump sealed the nomination.

it’s fucking astonishing how much reach our little group here has between us, and it’ll solidify and grow after the general

“This is where it all started,” Mackey responded. But for Weev, that’s where his appearance in the trial evidence, under the moniker Rabite, at least, ended.

Weev’s absence — under his Rabite moniker, anyway — is all the more striking given that per a bench conference at trial, the search warrant specified that the specific meme Mackey ultimately sent out came from The Daily Stormer.

The search warrant also noted that the one that the defendant sent out was available on the Daily Stormer website, the American Nazi newspaper, as early as October 29, which is a couple days before the defendant did.

That is, Weev may have played a direct role in creating the meme in question. But unless he was posting under the moniker 1080p (who may have been referred to as “Gabe” by others), he was not credited with doing so in evidence presented at trial.

That differential treatment — and the changed focus on HBC in the trial as compared to the complaint — is one reason, but in no way the only reason, I’m interested in some other investigative details:

  • Details about Microchip’s discussions with the government
  • The timing of interviews with Hillary Clinton staffers and its disclosure to Mackey
  • The decision not to call an investigative agent to the stand

According to a motion in limine dispute, an FBI agent named Jamie Dvorsky attempted to interview Mackey in Florida after his identity was disclosed in April 2018, which is when the FBI opened the case. Mackey first raised this issue on March 11 after he received materials on potential witnesses.

According to reports of FBI Special Agent Jamie Dvorsky, marked by the government as 3500-JAD-2 and 3500-JAD-17 (submitted under seal herewith), she and another agent traveled to Florida in 2018 and met Mr. Mackey at a Panera Bread in Boynton Beach. Mr. Mackey told her that he would be happy to speak to the agents if they would first contact his attorney, Richard Lubin. Mr. Lubin thereafter contacted Agent Dvorsky and said that Mr. Mackey would “100% cooperate and talk to the FBI.” Thereafter, Mr. Lubin did not contact the FBI nor return multiple calls.

When the government responded two days later, they described planning to call Dvorsky to explain how and when the FBI first opened the investigation.

As discussed with defense counsel, the government is calling Special Agent Dvorsky to testify as to when the government learned that the defendant was the user of the accounts that distributed the deceptive images and the initial investigative steps that were taken in the wake of that revelation. The chronology matters. As noted above, to the extent the defendant claims or suggests that the prosecution was somehow politically motivated, the fact that the government first identified the defendant in 2018 and began its investigation at that point is relevant in that regard. The government does not intend to elicit from Special Agent Dvorsky testimony that the defendant offered to cooperate with the FBI, but never followed through on the offer. Rather, to the extent that Agent Dvorsky will communicate the defendant’s statements at all, her testimony will be limited to the defendant’s telling her that he worked with Paul Nehlen.4 Accordingly, the limited testimony the government does intend to elicit is simply not prejudicial and does not warrant preclusion

They never did call her, though.

The FBI contacted Microchip, now their cooperating witness, around December 17, 2018 about a perceived threat he had made online in July 2018, but that may have been about a different case. Microchip then contacted Baked Alaska to inform him about the FBI visit, suggesting he has or had resilient ties to Baked Alaska.

Megan Rees, the FBI agent who ultimately obtained the arrest affidavit, was one of two FBI agents who visited Microchip’s home in December 2020, this time in conjunction with the Mackey case. When she wrote up that affidavit, she named Microchip, like Baked Alaska and 1080p, only as an unindicted co-conspirator.

But after Microchip saw that complaint, he reached out to the FBI via his lawyer.

Q Sir, my question to you is this: On February 4, 2021, did you reach out to Agent Rees and tell her that you had become aware that the person you knew as Ricky Vaughn had been arrested, and you believed you had information that would be useful to the FBI. Did you say that to Agent Rees?

[snip]

Q My first question is: When you reached out to Agent Rees on February 4, 2021, did you tell her that you had learned the person you knew as Ricky Vaughn had been arrested recently? Did you say that?

A Yes.

Q And in addition, did you tell her that you believed you had information that would be useful to the FBI?

A Correct.

Per his testimony on cross-examination, Microchip made a formal proffer around April 22, 2021.

At it, he claimed that the intent wasn’t so much to dissuade people from voting but just to push out as many messages as possible. He also claimed the chatrooms weren’t all that organized.

Q Sir, I’m going to ask you a question. Forgive the profanity in advance, but have you ever heard the term “shit posting”?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall telling the Government at this meeting that the focus was not on one message, it was on pushing out as many — as much content as possible?

[snip]

Q Do you recall telling the Government at that meeting that the participants in the chats were not as organized as many people believed?

A Yes, I remember saying that.

Q Do you recall telling the Government that there was no grand plan around stopping people from voting?

After several continuances and a revised memory of how organized things were, Microchip pled guilty on April 14, 2022. He had a meeting in advance of the disclosure of a cooperating witness on February 23, 2023. This post describes how Microchip testified to wanting to “infect” everything.

The timing of Microchip’s proffer is important, though, because it might explain any change in focus between the complaint and the evidence as presented at trial. That is, it might explain why prosecutors focused much more closely on HBC than Baked Alaska at trial.

But it also might explain any new investigative direction that DOJ took after first speaking with Microchip.

Mackey’s lawyer, Andrew Frisch (who has also represented VDARE), several times expressed curiosity about why the government used a summary FBI agent largely uninvolved in the case to introduce all the Twitter evidence, rather than putting the FBI agent who led the investigation, Megan Rees, on the stand.

MR. FRISCH: Can I put something on the record, unrelated to our prior conference. I intended at the close of the Government’s place to put a placeholder. But because of the way it worked, the jury was here, I couldn’t do it. I have been concerned as the trial has gone on that no case agent has testified. Maegan Rees didn’t testify, my friend Agent Granberg didn’t testify, and ultimately Agent Dvorsky did not testify. At one time or another. The key agent I’m concerned with is Agent Rees.

[snip]

MR. FRISCH: I’m mostly concerned about why no case agent testified and specifically whether there’s a reason, a bad reason, why Agent Rees’s 3500 has not been provided, obviously apart from when she attended Microchip interviews and things like that. I just wanted to put a placeholder, I’ll discuss it with the Government, I don’t want to hold things up. I wanted to register an objection at my earliest opportunity so if I can come back to it, if necessary.

[snip]

MR. FRISCH: I don’t know what she has, I don’t know what she said, I don’t know what’s in the reports. It’s just in my experience, it’s highly unusual that a trial happens without the case agent testifying, without any case agent testifying.

He’s not wrong, really, to question why the government didn’t use a case agent. Often, the government does so to keep someone who knows information inconvenient to the prosecution off the stand. For example, Durham may have used a paralegal in the Michael Sussmann case because the case agents had discovered some of Durham’s claims about the Alfa Bank anomaly were bullshit by the time of trial. Mueller used an agent focused on the obstruction part of the investigation in the Stone trial, who thereby could honestly say she didn’t know some of what DOJ subsequently discovered about Roger Stone’s actual ties to Russia when asked.

But it’s often (as it was in the Mueller investigation), done to hide parts of an ongoing investigation — something that a movement lawyer would surely have some interest in.

In this case, there are two obvious reasons to keep case agents off the stand.

The first is — as was revealed to Frisch after his opening argument — EDNY had a series of 18 interviews with Hillary’s campaign, between March 2021 and January 2023.

As Frisch laid out in a letter to the judge, after he opened, the government revealed those interviews, which, he claimed, he should have obtained.

The government’s second witness was Jess Morales Rocketto. On March 10, 2023, the Friday before the start of jury selection, the government first identified Ms. Rocketto as a witness. Thereafter, during jury selection, the government disclosed a report of the government’s then-recent interview of Ms. Rocketto, without disclosing any of eighteen reports of the government’s interviews of seventeen other representatives of the Clinton Campaign, conducted between March 2021 and January 2023. Ms. Rocketto testified that she was the Clinton Campaign’s digital organizing director; learned of vote-by-text memes using fake graphics during the final days of the campaign; found the memes’ misappropriation of the Clinton Campaign’s graphics and hashtag “#imwithher” to be such a “big deal” and so “jarring” that “you have to make a decision about what to do about something like this.” T 76, 78, 84-85, 90-92. See T 86 (The Court: “If you can avoid asking like terribly open-ended questions to this witness . . . . she has a lot to say, which is fine, but we’re never going to finish.”). On defense counsel’s subsequent cross-examination of Lloyd Cotler (a representative of the Clinton Campaign called principally to testify to steps to remediate the memes’ reference to a short code), defense counsel confirmed an unelaborated statement in the government’s report of Mr. Cotler’s interview that a Clinton Campaign worker named Amy Karr monitored social media, including 4chan [T 103], on which Mr. Mackey had seen the memes that he then shared.

The following morning, the government provided defense counsel with two reports of its interviews of Ms. Karr. At the lunch break, defense counsel requested that the government provide reports of all the government’s interviews of representatives of the Clinton Campaign. Highlights of the reports, summarized in the draft stipulation, contradicted the testimony and inferences elicited by the government from Ms. Rocketto and Mr. McNees. For example, Alexandria Witt, Senior Social Media Strategist, told the government that she referred vote-by-text memes to executive staff, but the general response was lackluster as though – – directly contradicting the very words used by Ms. Rocketto – – “this was no big deal.” Diana Al Ayoubi-Monett, another Senior Social Medical Strategist, said that she was mocked for taking “text-to-vote” memes seriously. Timothy Lu Hu Ball, a senior security expert, said that senior officials of the Clinton Campaign did not take the vote-by-texts seriously. Ms. Witt and Ms. Karr both were aware of and monitored “shit-posters” on social media supporting Clinton’s opponent. Memes containing misinformation about voting began to appear about three months before Election Day; there was no single influencer behind them; and senor staff, including campaign chair John Podesta, did not take concerns about the memes seriously. According to Matthew Compton, Deputy Digital Director (possibly Ms. Rocketto’s principal underling), the “#imwithher” hashtag had been somewhat commandeered with “unbelievable” amounts of irrelevant information, rendering it not “particularly useful.” Multiple witnesses told the government about records created by the campaign to track misinformation on social media (about which Mr. Mackey had been unaware and never attempted to subpoena or investigate). [my emphasis]

There’s no reason to believe these interviews were primarily pre-trial preparation. As the government explained in a bench conference, the government only handed them over after hearing what Mackey’s defense was in Frisch’s opening.

MR. PAULSEN: Your Honor, part of the reason we provided the 302s we did, is that we heard his opening argument, at the same time everyone did, and he made something like that argument. We turned them over at that point because it seemed like he was interested in that.

But even assuming Frisch’s description is accurate, what the Clinton campaign thought about Mackey’s trolling doesn’t change Mackey’s intent.

Which is what Judge Ann Donnelly ruled in the bench conference: this wasn’t Brady material, and besides, Frisch at that point still had several remedies available to him, such as calling the Hillary intern who identified some of the disinformation targeting Hillary on the dark web much earlier than anyone else.

THE COURT: Let me stop you there. I think I understand what you’re saying.

With respect to the issue — the e-mail telling people they could text to vote was not a big deal to the Clinton campaign. Why is that Brady material what their opinion of it is?

MR. FRISCH: Because they called Ms. Rocketto to essentially testify how horrible this was. How something had to be done right away. How she recognized this as a problem. That it specifically, in her view, was either targeted to or designed to affect or had the affect of effecting Latin American and African American voters. She was a terrific — she’s very charismatic and had a lot to say, that’s fine —

THE COURT: Why is someone —

MR. FRISCH: But I couldn’t cross-examine her with this information.

THE COURT: But you opened on it.

MR. FRISCH: But I didn’t know that the Clinton campaign agreed with my defense.

THE COURT: But who cares what their opinion is. The Clinton campaign can’t testify in court about what they think about something, any more than they can come — you didn’t object to it, she did say something was sneaky, I think I stopped her at some point. A particular person’s opinion of what the case is, I don’t understand how that is Brady material.

[snip]

[I]t’s the Court’s view that it’s not Brady material because it amounts to really, the essence is what the Clinton campaign thought about it, and that’s just not relevant. In fact, their opinion of it is no more valid than their opinion would be about whether Mr. Mackey is guilty or not. That’s not relevant, to the extent that’s the claim.

In his letter demanding an acquittal because of all this, Frisch explained that rather than calling any of these people as witnesses, he drafted a stipulation that the government rejected, which he then just emailed to Chambers.

Defense counsel emailed it to the Court (rather than electronically file it with a letter) when an issue unexpectedly arose early on the morning of the last day of trial about the government’s timely receipt of the draft stipulation; exigencies of the imminent trial day made preparation and filing of a letter impractical. But it would otherwise have been electronically filed to show that Mr. Mackey’s attempt at a mid-trial remedy for the government’s violation of Rule 5(f) and Brady had been rejected (though the government agreed to stipulate to a narrow portion thereof), thereby filling in the record and helping to show the consequent irreparable prejudice.

The letter mostly seems like a bid by a movement lawyer to turn the Mackey prosecution into the second coming of the Durham trial, an opportunity to investigate the victim of a bunch of malicious crimes in the 2016 election, in part to distract from the heinous things that Trump and his allies were doing.

All these interviews took place after the indictment and most presumably took place after Microchip first met with the government in April 2021.

Frisch seems uninterested in the obvious question presented by the revelation of 18 interviews with the Clinton campaign about disinformation targeting her 2016 campaign that went viral after being drafted on the dark web: Why EDNY was conducting these interviews, continuing well after any 5 year statute of limitations would have expired.

I don’t know the answer to that, but I bet the case agents do, which might be a good reason to keep them off the stand.

The other obvious reason to keep case agents off the stand has to do with knowledge of Microchip’s ongoing cooperation, which as the original motion revealing his cooperation describes, is something “beyond the scope” of this case.

In addition, since entering into the cooperation agreement, the CW has provided assistance to the FBI in other criminal investigations beyond the scope of this case. The CW is presently involved in multiple, ongoing investigations and other activities in which he or she is using assumed internet names and “handles” that do not reveal his or her true identity. The CW has not interacted with any witness, subject, or target in these investigations and activities on a face-to-face basis, and the government has no reason to think that the CW’s true identity has been compromised as a result of this work.

There’s no evidence that the ongoing interviews with the Clinton campaign about disinformation the dark web has to do with Microchip’s ongoing cooperation. There’s not even any evidence that the case agents in Mackey’s case are the ones he worked with subsequently; on the stand, he suggested he had not met with Agent Rees since his guilty plea.

Frisch’s job is to claim all this is about Douglass Mackey and it also likely serves his interests to drum up a false scandal about Hillary by publicly releasing these 302s.

But there’s a whole bunch of tangentially related issues that didn’t show up in this trial. There’s a bunch of this that isn’t about Douglass Mackey.