”It highlights the problem of neoconservatism–an acute myopia that therefore cannot see a problem until we’re already in the thick of it and until they can make an argument–however specious–that the only solution is military.”

Agreed, but I also think they are incapable of admitting that anything of their genesis is a problem or wrong. And make no mistake about it, most of the nuclear unease/proliferation in second and third world countries, including Pakistan, is a direct result of decisions and omissions by Republican administrations, and Bush has compounded the mistakes of his predecessors by a geometric factor..

F’ing idiots can only see military options. As if we didn’t supply the Big Guns in the first place, support the military dictator to use the Big Guns, and look upon the ”humanitarian worry” option as contemptible.

But what I scratch my head about is ”Nor would it be strategically prudent to withdraw our forces from an improving situation in Iraq to cope with a deteriorating one in Pakistan.”

Um. First of all, there’s that if-I-say-it-enough-it-makes-it-true ”things are really, really improving in Iraq for us; the surge is working!” bit. Anyone else blown away how this fictional theme has quietly pervaded almost all media as fact?

But if it’s not strategically prudent to move over to become an occupying force in Pakistan, what are our ”feasible military options”? Bomb? Smart cruise missiles? Drones? The LAPD? I mean, one (don’t leave Iraq) precludes the other (take military action in Pakistan), doesn’t it?

Do these people actually believe the bullshit they put out, or are they just too stoned all the time to think it through?

Speaking of failing the Pakistan test, there was this article over the weekend in the NYT on the internal US debate on providing PALs to Pakistan. (Sorry if you posted about it, but I didn’t see it.)

IMHO that would have been one of our best forward-looking policy options. Naturally they decided not to do it.

Sure, it lacks the elan of parachuting the 88th onto Pakistani military bases, but it’s a lot more likely to actually prevent a disaster.

pakistan has been a problem since prior to 9-11.. actually their are a lot of lines leading from pakistan directly into 9-11… members of the bush admin were entertaining the head of security during 9-11 and i believe musharaf was in the us the week before.. musharafs military dictatorship has been supported by bush all along.. i guess the thinking behind that is, it is better to have someone in your corner( she the shah and numerous other historical examples) then it is to have someone not in your corner.. it comes at a price though and it looks like all the money the bush admin has thrown his way has been for not. nice try seeing about getting a handle of the isi, or finding bin laden.. pakistan was helped along to give some type of balance to india as a nuclear power as well.. usa leadership is fucked up more often then not. they can’t tell who their enemy is and who their friend is and they seem to have an uncanny ability to make enemies. i say this as a canuck.

yes, arm some militieas in the tribal areas, lol.. just like you did in afganastan to fight against the soviets… that was the beginning of the taliban, lol.

Speaking of failing the Pakistan test, there was this article over the weekend in the NYT on the internal US debate on providing PALs to Pakistan. (Sorry if you posted about it, but I didn’t see it.)

IMHO that would have been one of our best forward-looking policy options. Naturally they decided not to do it.

Sure, it lacks the elan of parachuting the 88th onto Pakistani military bases, but it’s a lot more likely to actually prevent a disaster.

So much to say, so little space. Look, without going back and doing a re-read of Pakistani History since 1947 and the diplomatic and development assistance history since that time, it is impossible to sort this all out. But it is fairly clear if you know the history, and have the patience to sort out the different meanings of ”independence” between India and Pakistan, vis a vis such matters as economic policy, social structure and all that. The problems are rooted in that, and subsequently rooted in how these dynamics have been manipulated over the last 60 years, both by inside forces, and by the outsiders with interests.

The US early relationship with Pakistan was based on the willingness of the founding generation to Identify with the West, and the US as part of the Cold War alignments, whereas India was one of the founders of the non-aligned nations group. While it has been slow going, India did manage some degree of land reform — it established economic policy that favored its working class, it invested in education — and while it still only has education for about 38% of its youth — that is nearly five times as many primary school students as at Independence. (and as with Pakistan, it started at near zero.) Pakistan depended on foreign aid in this sector — India did it home-made.

The result — in India you have literally hundreds of political parties, most only organized at the local or state level, but still able to join in coalitions for governing. Some are backward looking, caste based, based on interests in preserving past powers, while others are driven by modern interests — in a US context we would call them movements — but if you look around the Indian landscape you will find as much campaigning for Womens’ issues or environmental causes and all, as you would find in the EU or the US. In contrast, in Pakistan political parties are all about old centers of power. Bhutto’s party, the PPP is neo-feudal. It is about not reforming the ancient land ownership and tenent structures. It is about a kind of neo-paternalistic welfare structure that keeps the sources of power protected, while attracting the poor to the promised hand-outs. And it is centered in Sind and to some extent the Punjab — the well watered agricultural heart of Pakistan. Musharaff’s coalition really centers on those from the old British Indian Civil Service and the British Indian Army who migrated from India to Pakistan in 47 and thereafter (now days their sons and grand sons). When Pakistan was founded it was only this group that had the ;iteracy and administrative skills needed for managing a state. Shariff’s part of the Muslim League represents the merchant and mercantile classes, not migrants, but in many ways partnered with the land-owners. All of these groups are hostile to the emergence of a middle class based on modern vocational and professional functions. In fact, Pakistan exports many who achieve middle class status and credentials, to the US, to GB, to the Gulf States and elsewhere. Migration is a means of avoiding pressure on the traditional social and economic structures.

We also need to understand that for Pakistan, China is probably more important than the US and the West. The relationship with China goes back to the early days of the Sino-Soviet split, and in recent decades, much of Pakistan’s growth is dependent on Chinese investment. The China relationship is rooted in anti-Indianness, it is part of the foundation of the Nuclear Industry and all, and for China, it is a land route into the heart of the middle east and the Arabian Sea. Part of the US’s encouragement of the Sino-Soviet split involved this China-Pakistan relationship. People forget that as much as the Saudi’s were partnered up with the US and Pakistan during the Afghani wars of the 1980’s, another almost equal partner was China. And last summer, Musharaff’s decision to attack the Red Mosque in Islamabad had much more to do with the Taliban killing Chinese business persons than it did with any US pleas or interests. Al Qaeda and the Taliban are not exactly beloved by the Chinese.

The use of the Pashtoon Tribals as the ”point of the spear” by Pakistan dates back to the wars of partition between India and Pakistan in 47-48. If Pakistan is to become a true ”nation” and control its own policy and lands, it has to find a way to responsibly control them. It has always found it convenient not to. During the Cold War, it was always convenient to have India on edge given Kashmir. (Kashmir is the source of both the Ganges and Indus watersheds, and those are the life-bloods of both countries.) For Pakistan and India to make a deal on Kashmir, and end 60 years of war over it, Pakistan must be in control of its tribals — the Pashtoons. But the Pashtoons are half in Afghanistan and half in Pakistan as the British drew the Durrand Line, and back before the 19th Century British Wars of Conquest in NW India, the Pashtoon tribal nation did include much of NW Pakistan, including Peshwar and the Swat Valley as well as the Pashtoon lands in E. Afghanistan. Pashtoon claims for a state of Pashtoonistan date back to the 1930’s…well, actually back to the 19th century pre Durrand Line. The Royal line in Afghanistan, of which Karsi is part, has always been devoted to the recovery of Pashtoon lands alienated by the British Conquests. What is it that Bush never understood about all this? Aah, Condi did not tell him his bedtime story, read him up some Kipling, and then take the tales and read the actual history. In Contrast, FDR collected Kipling first editions, and while President on several occassions, invited him to weekends at Hyde Park, and then he invited in others with diverse opinions. That’s how he got his factual base to confront Churchill on the matter of Indian Independence as a consequence of US participation in World War II, and while he never really formulated a precise policy –he had huge doubts about partition as a solution.

Personally, I dismiss all the proposals that the US should help develop a Pakistani primary education system…not because it isn’t a good idea, but because we have already done that and failed. Much of our AID money in the 50’s and 60’s was devoted toward building teachers’ colleges, and then village schools that were part of centers that also included medical clinics, adult education, and community development efforts. We built hundreds of schools and centers — but when the Bhutto regime ended, and the General Haq regime began, they were all defunded, we removed the Peace Corps and AID — and a year or so later, they became either refugee centers for Afghani’s, and madrassas, or small factories for making arms for Afghanistan. It ended conflict between the secularly educated teachers and the village Mullahs, and it ended the slow progress toward something more modern. Pakistan does need modern schools and all — but the will to build them and then defend them against the anti-modernizing social forces has not been demonstrated. Money won’t fix this. It has to be accomplished by a social revolution that does something other than sustain ancient social structures and power systems.

And all that is before we get to Nukes. On that — well I suppose we can try deterence yet one more time.