Special Forces Suspend Training of Afghans in Program Petraeus Started
In happier days, David Petraeus was the face of Army recruiting in an ad on national television. Today, he is the face of a failed program that endangers the entire plan for withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.
In the biggest fallout yet from the massive increase in green on blue deaths in Afghanistan, US Special Operations forces have suspended training of Afghan Local Police and Afghan special forces until all members of these forces have been re-evaluated from a security standpoint. There are several important points to be made about this development.
Training for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, which are much larger forces, continues. From the New York Times story on this development:
The move does not affect the vast majority of Afghan forces — more than 350,000 Afghan National Army soldiers and Afghan National Police members — who are still being trained and are still working in the field with American and NATO counterparts, military officials said.
The story first broke in the Washington Post, and their account describes a very difficult bit of reality setting in on the military as it assesses the rapid acceleration of green on blue attacks:
The move comes as NATO officials struggle to stem the tide of attacks on NATO forces by their Afghan colleagues. The attacks, which have killed 45 troops this year, have forced NATO officials to acknowledge a painful truth: Many of the incidents might have been prevented if existing security measures had been applied correctly.
But numerous military guidelines were not followed — by Afghans or Americans — because of concerns that they might slow the growth of the Afghan army and police, according to NATO officials.
So, while only Special Operations forces have suspended training for now, it is hard to see how this will not extend to all training of Afghan security forces soon, because the lapses in screening of recruits applies equally to the much larger ANA and ANP forces (approximately 350,000 for those two forces combined, compared to various estimates in the 20,000 range for the ALP and Afghan special forces when combined).
Note also that while there have been 45 deaths of NATO forces in green on blue killings this year alone, the Post tells us that there have only been three attacks in which Afghan Local Police turned their weapons on NATO personnel with whom they were working since the program to train ALP began in 2010.
Another key point to be made about this program of training Afghan Local Police and special forces by US Special Operations forces is that this program was a signature part of David Petraeus’ COIN strategy. The Post describes the program without mentioning Petraeus:
The local police initiative places Special Forces teams in remote villages where they work with Afghan elders and government officials to help villagers defend themselves against insurgent attacks and intimidation. U.S. officials have touted the program, which numbers about 16,000 Afghans, as a critical way to spread security and the influence of the Afghan government to remote areas of the country where the Taliban have found haven.
Likewise, the Times doesn’t mention Petraeus when it describes the program:
The Afghan Local Police program is a relatively new program that has sent American Special Operations forces into more rural areas to train Afghan recruits who are not part of the main Afghan army or police. These police forces, while comparatively small in number, are regarded as an important stopgap to secure remote corners of Afghanistan as international troops withdraw.
Reuters, however, makes the daring move of actually tying Petraeus’ name to this program that is in such a failed state:
The ALP is a militia, set up two years ago by U.S. Forces, in villages where the national police force — a separate body trained by NATO — is weak. The ALP has been beset by allegations of abuse and widespread corruption.
/snip/
The ALP is a flagship project of U.S. General David Petraeus, who was replaced last year by U.S. General John Allen as commander of foreign forces in Afghanistan.
The final key point to come out of the Post article is that there now seems to be a push to separate NATO and Afghan forces at times when they are not actually on duty, rather than encouraging the troops to get to know one another better:
Troops are now being advised to stay away from Afghan soldiers and police officers during vulnerable moments, such as when they are sleeping, bathing or exercising, according to a directive from NATO leaders.
“We need to reduce risks by reducing certain interactions with the Afghans. We don’t need to sleep or shower next to them, because that’s when we’re most vulnerable,” said a NATO official who has been charged with making security recommendations. “It’s about force protection without endangering the relationship. It’s a true teeter-totter.”
The acknowledgement by US Special Operations that vetting of Afghan recruits has been poor enough that they are suspending training may become a significant watershed event. If there is not an accompanying suspension of training of the larger ANA and ANP, then the military risks sending the message to those who train these forces that they are less important than Special Operations personnel. But if training of the larger force is suspended, then look for the size of the overall Afghan security force to shrink dramatically. The rate of loss of forces is still very high, so if training is suspended then the force will begin to shrink immediately. Re-vetting such a huge force will be a huge problem, as the Post notes that even for many Afghan force members who have been vetted, they have never been issued identification badges.
In short, NATO faces the dilemma of choosing between telling those training the bulk of Afghan forces that they are not as important as Special Operations forces or suspending training for a security re-check and watching the Afghan force size fall below a level at which they will be comfortable handing over responsibility for security as NATO withdraws.
Excellent post and thank you for the analysis. I read about this today in the Canadian Press and found the story to be a little confusing.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/us-suspends-training-afghan-police-to-re-examine-recruits/article4514830/
I’m also not clear on your last two paragraphs. If you have a minute, can you restate those points?
I believe that there is a strong likelihood that this action to suspend training for the local militias is a direct response to the insider attacks on Australian troops last week (coinciding with other Austrailian casualties while Clinton was in the region) and a strong negative response from the Australian public and leaders who talked about an immediate withdrawal. I believe that New Zealand has already decided to pull their troops (but I might have the details wrong on that). I don’t know why this would appease the Aussies though because I think that attack was by someone in an Afghan army uniform. However, all of this strikes me as being politically motivated — some significant action was required so that the Australian leaders could tell their people that changes are being made to address the insider attack situation, and then the Australian leaders stop talking about withdrawing all of their forces immediately (something that would be very bad for the Obama campaign right now). And of course, some significant looking move has to be made for the American public too.
Otherwise, the change doesn’t make much sense unless they also plan to pause the training of the other forces who are responsible for the majority of the insider attacks.
And lo and behold, we have new news that the Aussies are going to stay the course:
I strongly believe that this is a token political move done primarily because Clinton was put in a very difficult spot and because the Aussies were talking immediate withdrawal and needed something to justify their decision to stay.
@joanneleon: What I’m trying to say is that if they suspend training for the larger force, then the really high rate of attrition they have (over 25% a year, last time I looked) means that the total Afghan security force size may well drop below the level NATO thinks is needed in order to hand over security responsibility as NATO withdraws. But if they continue training without a suspension, then it looks like the military is saying that Special Forces troops are more important than those training the rest of Afghan forces because they stopped the work of Special Forces to do the re-evaluation of screening for the Afghans they work with.
This is putting the military in a very tough spot. My guess is that Special Forces did this unilaterally without discussing with the rest of the military. And now they are in a real Catch-22.
@Jim White: US has no intention of leaving Afghanistan, and that will be made clear in 2013.
@Jim White: And in related news, Josh Gerstein fact checks the President on an Afghan withdrawal.
@emptywheel: Wow. Good for Politico for noting that Obama’s public claims of withdrawal don’t match reality. It would have been better, though, if they had brought out the Iraq example where Obama relied on semantics to declare the troops we left there to be “non-combat” even though their responsibilities didn’t change.
Obama speech at Fort Bliss:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/31/remarks-president-troops-fort-bliss-tx
The story is in HRW, Just Don’t Call It a Militia, page 43 and following.
If poor vetting is the problem, then Special Operations, in this case, did indeed miss some stuff.
Like, the documents in their file where they lobbied the State Department to tell the United Nations that their Member of Parliament guy needed delisted.
Afghanistan’s largely peaceful Bamiyan Province once was touted as a transition success story. Now it may become a cautionary tale about the pitfalls of winding down the war.
In the summer of 2011, Bamiyan’s tranquil image was such that it was picked as the country’s first province for the transfer of fighting duties from Western forces to Afghan troops, a process that is to be replicated across Afghanistan in a prelude to the end of NATO’s combat role in 2014.
In recent months, however, a province best known as the site of the giant Buddhas that were dynamited more than a decade ago by the Taliban has been making news of the most ominous kind, including the deaths of five soldiers from New Zealand this month. To put that loss in perspective, the fatalities represented half of that nation’s battle deaths for the entire war, including its first woman killed in conflict since 1966.
Even before the recent spasm of violence, there had been other danger signs for Bamiyan: the deaths of nine Afghan policemen in two bombing attacks in July, and the abduction and decapitation last year of Bamiyan’s popular provincial council leader as he traveled to the capital, Kabul.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghanistan-bamiyan-20120830,0,3835624.story
Afghans Protest Vengeful Militias
Afghan villagers and officials say reprisal killings are being carried out by pro-government militiamen for a Taliban assassination of a member of their militia.
It was the second time in a month that one of the controversial militia groups, known as arbakai, had carried out reprisal killings of people believed to be Taliban sympathizers.
In both cases, residents complained that the groups received support and protection from American Special Operations forces, which the United States military has denied. The Special Operations units train arbakai militiamen only when they are enrolled in official programs for recruits of the Afghan Local Police, American officials insist.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/03/world/asia/afghan-villagers-protest-vengeful-militias.html
@Call For Illumination: Wow. Thanks so much for that link. I hadn’t seen the story yet. My first reaction is that this puts the Panjwai massacre in a very different light. I’m hoping Marcy can fill that thought in further.
I wasn’t familiar with the meaning of the term “reprisal killing”. I guesss that international humanitarian law and the Geneva Convention are all too quaint for today’s wars.
@Call For Illumination:
Here’s AAN about the politically ambitious Daud brother in law, quoted washing his hands here.
It’s hard to tell just by name, but the quoted provincial deputy police chief might have a profile as well. “switched sides between Shura-ye Nazar and the Taliban three times in one month, is currently serving as the mayor of Kunduz.”